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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the extent to which victims' rights and interests are respected at the 
International Criminal Court(ICC). It examines how such rights and interests operate at 
the ICC through the framework of three themes. These themes are (1)prosecutorial 
discretion,(2) trial process and(3) sentencing decisions. These three themes are 
convenient as they enable an examination of victims' rights and interests at the different 
phases of criminal prosecution at the ICC. 
In the available scholarship, researchers have utilised qualitative interviews in assessing 
victim participation at the ICC. This researcher has decided to complement the available 
scholarship in this area by using a rarely-used and important data source for evaluating 
victim participation, namely, case transcripts. The research has undertaken a thematic 
analysis of the case transcripts to examine the extent to which these rights and victims 
have been respected. In investigating these questions, I used the decided cases of 
Lubanga and Katanga cases. 




The literature on prosecutorial discretion has highlighted the prosecutor's decision 
based on 'interests of justice' and 'gravity of crime'. However, there are relatively few 
studies on prosecutorial discretion's impact on victims' rights and interests. This 
research, therefore, addresses this gap in the knowledge. 
While a large and growing body of literature has focused on victims' participation 
during the trial process, most of this literature focused on fair trial issues and a 
comparison of victims' rights with defendants rights. Rather than focusing on a fair trial 
issue, this research adopts a more victims-focused approach and assesses the extent to 
which the rights and interests of victims-are respected during the trial process to access 
justice and express their concerns. 
Regarding the degree to which victims' rights and interests are respected in sentencing, 
to the researcher's best knowledge, very few publications are available in the literature 
that addresses the issue of victims' rights and interests in the ICC sentencing decision. 
Here also, therefore, the research makes an essential contribution to the available 
knowledge on this subject. 
Therefore, this thesis provides an exciting opportunity to advance our knowledge on 
the degree to which the ICC  respects the rights and interests of victims by using the 
thematic analysis of prosecutorial discretion, trial process and sentencing decision, 
based on a rarely-used and important source of data, namely, case transcripts. 
The analysis indicates that victims' rights and interests are generally recognised and 
given importance by the ICC. However, the findings also suggest that prosecutorial 




discretion has a significant influence on victims' rights and interests from the early 
phase of selection of situations through the commencement of cases to trial 
proceedings. In addition, the thesis found that the exercise of victims' rights and their 
interests during the trial remains secondary and subordinate to the defendants' rights, 
rather than being on an equal stance with the rights of the defendant. 
 Concerning the third theme, this thesis indicates that victims' rights and interests are 
respected during sentence hearing. However, such rights and interests remain 
significantly influenced by judicial discretion and the approaches of different decision-
makers.In this context, the thesis makes an original and important contribution to 
knowledge for shedding more light on the operation of victims' rights and interests at 
the ICC. 
KEYWORDS: victims, international criminal justice, prosecutorial discretion, trial 
process, sentencing, restorative justice and retributive justice. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1The Introduction 
This chapter will cover the study's background, the research question, significance of 
the study, research methods and research limitations. Chapter 1 explores these topics 
because it will help the researcher to lay a foundation for this thesis to address the 
research questions. This thesis intends to examine the consideration of victims' rights 
and interests at the ICC. It is structured into three themes or frameworks within which 
the analysis is undertaken, namely,(1)prosecutorial discretion, (2)trial process and 
(3)sentencing. 
The international criminal justice system has witnessed a significant change concerning 
victim involvement during criminal trial proceedings. Initially, victims' participation in 
criminal trials was restricted to -participation as witnesses.1 Christie, in his article, 
draws our attention to the passive role of victims in criminal trials. He argued that the 
State and Prosecutor had stolen the property from the victim.2 Christie believes the 
conflict belongs to the victim. However, it has been stolen by the State and the 
Prosecutor. He submitted that the courts had instrumentalised victims of crimes. From 
his perspective, the conflict (and resultant criminal trial)ought to be the victims' 
property. However, the prosecutor has taken over this while the victims are considered 
 
1Jonathan Doak,‘Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials:Prospects for Particpation’,32(2) Journal of Law 
and Society (2005)294. 
2 Nils Christie, ‘Conflict as Property’17(1)British Journal of Criminology(1977)1-15. 




instrumentally, merely as witnesses. In his words, 'the conflict' belongs to the victim. 
One of the significant implications of this is the preclusion of victims' access to justice. 
The international criminal justice system(ICJ) is at the heart of our understanding of 
access to justice for international crimes victims. It also plays a vital role in the 
administration of justice in the international community. Some of the institutions of the 
ICJ include the Ad hoc tribunals; the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia(ICTY) and, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone(SCSL) and the International Criminal Court(ICC). 
Historically, the advent of the ICJ is traceable to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.3 
However, these tribunals were faulted because they excluded victims from trials. The 
trial at Nuremberg and Tokyo relied mainly on documentary evidence, which led to the 
marginalisation of victims and their conflict experiences.4  
Following the first generation of international tribunals(Nuremberg and Tokyo) and the 
second generation of international tribunals and courts(the ICTR and the ICTY), the 
third generation of international criminal tribunals, represented by the ICC, brought 
about a shift from the role of victims in criminal proceedings to a more active, restricted 
participation of victims in criminal proceedings. The new approach enhanced victims' 
access to justice. 
 
3 Frederic Megret, ‘The Politics of International Criminal Justice’ (2002) European Journal of 
International Criminal Justice,1261-1284. 
4 Michael Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg(Caroline Academic Press 1997)340. 




Victims' rights are fast becoming a central issue in the international criminal justice 
system, being influenced in this area by developments in some domestic 
jurisdictions.5These rights are a reflection of the needs and interest of victims. Some of 
these rights grant victims the platform to participate in criminal trials. This shift is a 
gradual development that is evident in the success of domestic victims' rights 
movement, the emergence of human rights norms, and an international consensus that 
victim participation is essential to international criminal proceedings' legitimacy and 
effectiveness.6 This thesis will focus on victims' rights and interests because of the 
growing role that victims have gained in national and international criminal justice. 
Which, is also the rationale behind their involvement in the ICC. 
 Victims, as stakeholders in the criminal justice system, require rights to access justice. 
These rights may be described as a means to an end for them; a tool that empowers 
them in the criminal process. Their interests also lie in criminal proceedings. Victims' 
rights and interests could be used to determine what victims want from the criminal 
justice system. It may also set out their expectations. Studies have shown that if victims 
were given rights as entitlements, these rights might enhance their access to justice.7 
However, we should bear in mind that the purpose of these rights is not to create a 
balance or parity of rights with the defendant's position within sentencing or criminal 
 
5 Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating justice for victims at the International Criminal Court: Beyond rhetoric 
and the Hague(2015) 13(2)Journal of International Criminal Justice,281-311. 
6 Jonathan Doak,  Victims’ rights, human rights and criminal justice :Reconceiving the Role of third 
parties(Hart publishing 2008)11. 
7 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights , Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third 
(Hart Publishing  2008) 




justice in general, but rather these rights are needed to access justice and express their 
concerns. 
For this thesis, the ICC's jurisprudence, including court judgements and trial transcripts, 
shall be accessed and analysed, focusing particularly on two completed cases relating 
to the DRC situation, namely Lubanga and Katanga. This is necessary because, since 
the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 1998, the ICC has been hailed as the 
benchmark for victims' rights and interests in the arena of international criminal justice.  
1.2.Background of the study 
This section shall be discussing the background to the study to provide the context to 
the information of the subsequent analysis. This background also reviews the previous 
studies about the topic and the recent developments in the area. 
Over the years, soft laws like the United Nations Declaration on Basic Principles of 
justice for victims of crime and abuse of power 1985(herein referred to as 1985 UN 
Declaration) and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and 
reparations 2005(2005 Basic Principles.) have influenced the recognition of victims 
within the international criminal justice. Although these instruments are not legally 
binding, nevertheless, they are persuasive. The Rome Statute has duplicated some of its 
provisions. Jan Van Dijk' writes: 
 "This Declaration, although not legally binding by itself, is seen as 
a landmark achievement of the international movement to advance 




the interests of crime victims. It can also be used as a benchmark 
against which progress  in domestic policies can be measured."8 
Victimological studies have established that victims have preferences when 
encountering the criminal justice system.9These preferences are often examined in 
connection with the elements of respect, voice, and fair treatment. Some studies confirm 
that these elements ensure victims' satisfaction with the criminal justice system.10 
According to Garland, victims have become a yardstick for estimating criminal justice 
systems' effectiveness and legitimacy.11 Doak supports this proposition. He asserts that 
the involvement of victims in criminal justice systems legitimises the latter.12 
Also, Wemmers et al. note that victims of crime do get an overall satisfaction if, during 
participation, they perceive that the proceedings are fair.13 It connotes that victims are 
likely to recognise or accept an outcome if the procedures appear to be fair. This 
illustrates that procedural approaches to victims' rights and interests may play very 
 
8 Jan Van Dijk, “Benchmarking Legislation on Crime Victims:The United Nations Victims Declaration 
of 1985” in  Vetere and David Pedro  (Eds) , Victims of Crime and Abuse. 
9 Judith Herman, “Justice from the Victims’ Perspective”(2005) 11(5)Violence against Women,571-602; 
Joanne Wemmers, Van Deen Leenden and Steensman “What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by 
Dutch Victims to Assess the Fairness of Criminal Justice Procedure(1995) 8(4) Social justice 
Research.325-500 
10 Tom Tyler, ‘What is Procedural Justice?:Criteria used by Citizens to assess the fairness of Legal 
Procedures (1998)  22 (1)Law & Society Review p103-136. 
11 Mattew Hall, Victims snd Policy-Making;A Comparative Perspective ( First published 2010, Routledge 
2010)10. 
12 Jonathan Doak, ‘Victims’ Rights and the Criminal Process: an analysis of recent trends in regional and 
international tribunals’(2003) 23 Legal Studies 1;Francesca Klug, ‘Human Rights and Victims in  Ed 
Cape’s  (ed)Reconcilable Rights? Analysing  the tension between victims and defendants(Legal Action 
Group 2004)111-124. 
13 Joanne Wemmers, Van Deen Leenden and Steensman “What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by 
Dutch Victims to Assess the Fairness of Criminal Justice Procedure” (1995) 8(4) Social Justice Research, 
pp329-350 




significant roles in the administration of justice and perceptions of fairness is substantial 
in the administration of justice. If victims' rights and interests are recognised during the 
criminal process, it could give them a sense of belonging. In his study, Tyler found that 
procedural justice impacts victims' satisfaction and evaluation of their contact with legal 
authorities.14Voice and respect for victims' interests have been considered sacrosanct 
in assessing procedural justice for victims.15 The ICC grants victims some procedural 
rights, provided they made appropriate applications, and are qualified as provided for 
in the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These procedural rights ensure that 
the court hears victim's voices and concerns. It is a pathway to access justice. However, 
there are varying opinions in the literature about whether these procedural rights 
succeed in achieving the desired aims. Some have argued(perhaps cynically)  that the 
Rome Statute drafters considered the introduction of victim participation at the ICC as 
a means to validate the legitimacy of the court. 
Victims evaluate legal institutions based on their experiences and contacts with these 
authorities.16Some studies have found that how people and their problems are treated 
during dispute resolution by the courts have more influence on their perceptions of 
fairness, than the outcome of such dispute.17Therefore, these studies conclude that: 
'focusing on procedural justice is an excellent way to build trust and encourage 
 
14 Tom Tyler, ‘What is Procedural Justice?:Criteria used by Citizens to assess the fairness of Legal 
Procedures (1998)  22 (1)Law & Society Review p103-136. 
15 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts ( 2007)Court Review Vol 44 p.24. 
16 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, “A Theory of Procedure’ (1978) 66 California Law Review 541-
566; Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts ( 2007  )Court Review Vol 44 p.24. 
17 Ibid  




compliance irrespective of who the people using the courts are'.18 Thus, the fairness of 
procedure becomes a yardstick in determining the treatment of people in judicial 
proceedings. 
Wemmers, in one of her studies, posits that to understand how victims are treated within 
the criminal justice system, we should examine the system of criminal procedure.19It is 
noteworthy that cultural differences exist amongst countries and how they treat victims 
during criminal proceedings. While the common law jurisdictions' approach, which 
operates adversarial systems, is restrictive towards victims, civil traditions' judicial 
systems have a more accommodating policy towards victims. The civil law countries 
view the victims as a party to the proceedings. They are referred to as parties civile. 
On the other hand, the most common law countries do not recognise victims as a party 
to the proceedings. Somewhat, victims' participation in criminal proceedings is 
restricted, with the adversarial trial being viewed as a contest between the Prosecutor 
and the accused.20 Therefore, many countries recognise various degrees of victim 
participation in their criminal proceedings. Within the ICC, the Rome Statute is a 
 
18 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts ( 2007 )Court Review Vol 44 p.28. 
19 Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal Justice System:A study into the treatment of victims and 
its effects on their attitudes and behaviour.(Klugwer Publications) 
20 John Langbein & Lloyd Weinreb, Comparative Criminal Procedure : “Myth”  and Reality(1977) 
<https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/532/>;Jacqueline Ross & Stephen Thaman, 
‘Introduction:  Mapping Dialogue and Change in Comparative Criminal Procedure’ in Jacquiline Ross 
and Stephen Thaman’ s (eds)  Comparative Criminal Procedure (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 




compromise between negotiators from civil law traditions and common law 
traditions.21 Hence, this is reflected in its criminal procedure which is mixed. 
Ambos posits that the international criminal procedure(especially that of the ICC)has 
developed from an adversarial system to a 'truly mixed procedure.'22 A consequence of 
the Rome Statute drafting which merged civil and common law elements in one 
international procedure. However, he opined that it is no longer relevant if a rule is 
'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial', but what is essential is if these rules assist the court in 
fulfilling their tasks and whether it conforms with the fundamental fair trial 
standards.23While the court cannot compromise fair trial standards, the criminal 
procedure system may also contribute to the proceedings' structure and normative 
content  
 Kress submits that the ICC's procedural law does not take the pure form of an 
adversarial or inquisitorial criminal procedure model. Neither does it involve a mixed 
system. He describes it as a 'unique compromise structure.'24Hence, creating a  fair 
balance between the adversarial and inquisitorial has been left to judges to decide.25One 
can infer that a  reasonable amount of judges discretion is required here. 
 
21 Philippe Kirsch and John Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court’(1999)93(1)The American Journal of International Law2-12. 
22 Kai Ambos, ‘International criminal procedure: ‘adversarial’, ‘inquisitorial’ or mixed?’ 3(1) 
International Criminal Law Review,p.1-37.   
23 Kai Ambos, ‘International criminal procedure: ‘adversarial’, ‘inquisitorial’ or mixed?’ 3(1) 
International Criminal Law Review,p.1-37.   
24 Claus Stress, ‘The procedural law of the International Criminal Law in Outline: Anatomy of a unique 
compromise, 1(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
25 Ibid. 




Nonetheless, it remains the case that significant portions of the proceedings of the ICC 
are mainly adversarial. For instance, the judges do not perfume truth-finding function 
equivalent to their civil law counterparts. Besides, victims are not a full party to the 
proceedings. 
It remains the case that, in the aftermath of atrocity, justice is a crucial demand of 
victims, and it may play a vital role in restoring their dignity and delivering justice,26 
Provided, it is conducted in a way that is reflective of victims needs and 
expectations.27However, there is a debate that prosecutions alone cannot achieve this 
aim, which brings in the question of a complementary mechanism in the national 
jurisdiction, which will support victims' access to justice. There are other alternative 
mechanisms of transitional justice, like truth commissions that are not within this 
research scope. 
According to Moffett, procedural and substantive justice complement each other in 
criminal proceedings; this combination ensures a more effective remedy for victims' 
harm.28 However, this underscores the significance of the fairness of the procedure and 
the outcome of the proceedings. Previous studies submitted that most victims prioritise 
the fairness of the criminal process over the result.29 Therefore, victims' perceptions are 
 
26 ICTJ , ‘Criminal Justice’ https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/criminal-justice 
accessed 22 May 2016. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Luke Moffett, ‘Meaningful and Effective?Considering victims’ interests through participation at the 
International Criminal Court’(2015)  26Criminal Law Forum, 255-289.  
29 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts ( 2007 )Court Review Vol 44 p.28. 
 




influenced by the degree of fairness and respect accorded to them during the 
proceedings. 
Wyngaert, in her study, has drawn our attention to the attempt of the Rome Statute to 
strike a balance between restorative and retributive justice approach.30 From her 
perspective, the Rome Statute indicates a remarkable change in the role and needs of 
victims.31 Therefore, through victim participation, the  Rome Statute aims to combine 
the restorative and retributive justice approaches.32  However, some researchers like 
Findlay and  Henham have submitted that victim participation is ambiguous and that 
the incorporation of restorative justice is more of an aspiration.33 Arguably, victim 
participation does not fully incorporate restorative justice. Simultaneously, some 
restorative justice elements are present in the victim participation at the ICC. It is not 
certain if the restorative justice approach can reach its full potential within the ICC's 
jurisprudence. Given that the ICC is a court responsible for the prosecution of 
perpetrators of gross violations of human rights, there might be friction in striking a 
balance between restorative and retributive justice.  
In this sense, Moffett propounds that the use of restorative justice should be assigned 
to the domestic courts. Still, the ICC should focus on the effective use of procedural 
 
30 Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before the International Criminal Court:Some concerns and 
views of an ICC Trial Judge’,44Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law( 2011)p.475,476. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Vesselin Popovski, ‘The International Criminal Court: A synthesis of retributive and restorative 
justice’, (2000)15(1)International Relations,1-10.  
33 Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay, Transforming International Criminal Justice:Retributive and 
Restorative Justice in the Trial Process(Willan Publishing 2005) 




and substantive justice to ensure that victims attain justice.34  He reiterated that 
procedural and substantive justice complement each other as a means and ends to 
redress harm. Also, he highlighted that the active participation of victims is one of the 
underlying aims of justice. Through participation, he believes that victims have 'defined 
role rather than being objects of moral concern.'35 
Moffett also recommends that states should complement the ICC in delivering justice 
for victims of crimes. He argues that this complementarity contributes more to the 
attainment of justice than if states parties were entirely dependent on the ICC to deliver 
justice for victims.36 
In this respect, it is pertinent to investigate how victims' rights and interests are managed 
at various stages of the criminal justice process at the ICC; commencing from the 
charging phase to the sentencing phase. 
The debate about prosecutorial powers and discretion has gained new prominence with 
many arguing about checking the prosecution's powers. However, there is a limited, if 
growing, the body of research that examines how prosecutorial discretion affects the 
rights and interests of victims at the ICC. The research on this subject has been mostly 
focused on the parameters of prosecutorial powers. Not so much literature has treated 
in details how prosecutorial discretion affects victims at the ICC. Therefore. This 
 
34 Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating justice for victims at the International Criminal Court:Beyond 
rhetoric’(2014) Journal of International Criminal Justice,681-703 
35 Ibid . 
36 Ibid . 




research would contribute to knowledge by analysing the role of victims within the 
context of prosecutorial discretion. 
 As maintained by Doak, the criminal justice system should see victims' rights as 
entitlements rather than privileges granted to balance out the dichotomy between the 
accused and the victims.37 These rights entitlements are viewed on merit, which 
supports the framework of victims inclusion in the criminal proceedings as opposed to 
the balanced approach. 
In the opinion of  Zedner, Dignan and Bednarova, a framework that pits victims' rights 
against defendants' rights tends to polarise the debate and risks presenting the narrative 
as a zero-sum game.38  In their words: 
 'The metaphor of balance creates tension in criminal justice, 
simplifying the issues, and allowing complex controversies to be 
situated within a zero-sum game, in which you are either for or 
against victims, on the side of the offender or willing to take a stand 
against."39 
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The above excerpts collaborate Doak's assertion on granting victims' rights based on 
merit rather than using the balanced approach. One could infer that the 'balance 
approach' dichotomises the victims and the defendant, without addressing victims' 
rights and interests. One can assume that these victims' rights are due process rights that 
flow from their status as victims, and should be examined on their own merits, rather 
than by reference to the accused's rights. They are a means of achieving fairness of 
outcome and, also, a pathway to access justice.  
Arguably, the victim participation regime was intended to transform victims into 
stakeholders in the criminal proceedings at the ICC. The procedural rights may sanction 
their involvement in the proceedings. This empowerment could be in terms of voice 
and an extent of control in decision making. In this respect, Christie points out that as 
the conflict initially belonged to the victims, the justice system should restore the 
'property' to them.40A viable approach to accessing justice for victims. 
Some researchers studied the effectiveness of victim' participation at the ICC.41 
However, there is a scarcity of research on the role victims' rights and interests play 
during sentence hearing at the ICC. Little is known about the impact of victim 
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participation on sentence decision. Therefore, this indicates a need to understand 
whether and how victims' rights and interests are engaged during sentencing and how 
victim participation may influence the sentence decision. 
This section has analysed the background to the study. The following section sets out 
the research questions of this current study. 
1.3  The research question, its aims and rationale 
The central question of  this thesis is:  
• To what extent have victims' rights and interests been respected in Lubanga and 
Katanga's cases at the ICC? 
In order to address this central research question, I have structured and broken down 
my analysis across three main temporal stages  in the ICC criminal process, reflected 
in three sub-questions below: 
1. To what extent are the rights and interests of victims respected in the context of 
prosecutorial discretion? 
2. To what extent are the rights and interests of victims respected during the trial 
process. 
3. To what extent are the rights and interests of victims respected in sentencing 
decisions? 
These themes represent the pathways of victims' contact with the ICC, starting from the 
Prosecutor as the gatekeeper of the ICC via prosecutorial discretion, the trial 
proceedings, sentence hearing and decisions. Therefore, it assesses the progression of 




victims' rights and interests as they advance through different ICC stages. The 
researcher three themes will examine the three themes in more details in the following 
four chapters.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to critically analyse how the rights and interests of 
victims of international crimes have been managed during criminal proceedings at the 
ICC with particular reference to the Lubanga and Katanga cases. Most previous 
literature mainly focused on victim participation during these cases based on qualitative 
interviews and court decisions. This thesis is intended to complement those studies by 
extensively examining whether and the extent to which the rights and interests of 
victims have been respected based on an analysis of trial transcripts. One of the 
advantages of this approach is that it allows for a more detailed and richer analysis of 
the actual submissions of the legal Representatives of Victims( LRVs) and the court's 
response to them, during the various stages of the criminal process. However, this 
approach has certain limitations, which will be discussed below. 
This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to knowledge by shedding more light 
on how prosecutorial discretion affects victims' access to justice, particularly their 
rights and interests.  
Moreover, while there have been several studies on sentencing in international criminal 
trials, literature is scarce on victims' role during sentencing and if their roles influence 
the sentencing decision. Baumgartner emphasised the need for more research in this 




area.42This thesis responds to that call by examining the specific role played by victims 
in sentencing. 
1.4 Significance of the study /original contribution to knowledge  
This study intends to provide a significant opportunity to advance our understanding of 
how ICC has managed victims' rights and interests during criminal proceedings. While 
there is a growing body of scholarship examining victim participation at the ICC, this 
is the first thesis to explore the extent to which the rights and interests of victims are 
respected in the process based on data gathered from the trial transcripts of two ICC 
cases, namely, Lubanga and Katanga. As noted, It undertakes this analysis within three 
themes or stages:(1)prosecutorial discretion;(2)trial proceedings and (3)sentencing 
stage. It is noted that structuring my analysis under these themes enabled me to better 
address the overall research question. These themes provide a convenient and broadly 
sequential progression of victims' rights and interests at different ICC phases in the 
same vein. This use of transcripts as my primary data source is justified because it 
examines the various interactions between victims, their representatives, and other ICC 
stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the study aims to contribute to a growing area of research by exploring 
the extent of applicability of victims' rights and interests in criminal trials at the ICC. 
While the ICC has been hailed as the benchmark of victim participation in international 
criminal justice, this thesis will seek to establish, on the basis mainly of transcript data 
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from the above two cases, to what extent the rights and interests of victims have been 
considered and respected in two trials (Lubanga and Katanga).   
Exploring how victims' rights and interests have been managed in prosecutorial 
discretion and sentencing provides a more holistic approach to viewing victims. 
Recent developments in the field of victimology and human rights have led to a renewed 
interest in victims' roles and scope in the international criminal justice system.43 There 
is a growing body of literature on victim participation in international criminal justice, 
especially at the ICC. This thesis aims to complement the literature by focusing mainly 
on whether, and to what extent, victims' rights and interests have been respected at three 
stages of the ICC trial, and based on a relatively innovative source of information, 
namely, trial transcripts. While there has been a considerable amount of research done 
in the area of victims' rights during the trial, there is less research on victims' rights in 
the context of prosecutorial discretion and significant scarcity of such research on 
victims' rights and interests in sentencing. The treatment of victims during these stages 
of the ICC is a significant issue, because, as Tyler argues in conflict resolution, citizens 
tend to judge their contact with legal authorities based on how they were treated during 
the trial process, which is at least as important as the outcome or decision.44  
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He further hypothesised a direct connection between how disputes are handled by the 
courts and the people's evaluation of their experiences in the court system.45 Tyler 
believes that parties in conflict resolution tend to assess system based on procedural 
justice rather than the substantive outcome or decision. Therefore, how people are 
managed during conflict resolution has more influence than the verdict of the court. 
This hypothesis is contrary to the popularly held view that the court's decision or 
judgment goes a long way in satisfying the parties. Interestingly, this theory is 
supported by Moffett's article, which suggests that more attention should be given to 
procedural justice/fairness in criminal trials, rather than on restorative justice at the 
ICC.46 Additionally, Strang and Sherman also hold a similar opinion, emphasising on 
the significance of procedural fairness.47 
Hence, it is imperative to assess how victims are treated during criminal proceedings at 
the ICC from these commentators' studies. While a significant amount of attention in 
the scholarship has been given to the specific rights of victim participation, 
considerably less attention has been paid to how victims are being treated at the ICC. 
This study intends to shed more light on this particular subject. 
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Having discussed that, it is essential to define the treatment of victims within this 
research context. According to Oxford Dictionary, treatment is defined as 'how someone 
behaves towards or deals with someone or something'48 Wemmers suggests that the 
treatment of victims in a particular criminal justice system is highly dependent on the 
criminal procedure of that country.49At the same time, most civil law jurisdictions treat 
victims as parties with their rights during the criminal justice procedure. Common law 
countries do not generally treat victims as parties to the trial.50Moreover, treatment 
during the trial proceedings is only one, albeit important aspect of victims' experience 
in the criminal justice system.  
1.5  Research Method 
Watkins and Burton describe the research methodology as the procedure a researcher 
takes to enhance his/her knowledge and test his/her thesis.51 The aim of it is to attempt 
to answer the research question(s).Watkins and Burton highlight the importance of 
research methodology: 
'Every legal research project begins from a theoretical basis or bases, whether such 
bases are articulated or not. The theoretical basis of a project will inform how the law 
is conceptualised in the project, which in turn will determine what kinds of research 
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questions are deemed meaningful or useful, what data is examined, and how it is 
analysed.(method)….'52 
The methodological approach taken in this study is purely qualitative. The research 
undertakes a qualitative, thematic analysis of the trial transcripts of two ICC cases, 
namely, Lubanga and Katanga. Transcript analysis is a verbatim record of victims' 
verbal expressions during the trial. In this sense, this research's analysis and findings 
aim to complement other studies in the area, which have relied on other primary 
sources, such as statutes, court judgments, and empirical methods such as interviews 
and surveys. Transcript analysis is not often used as a data source for the thesis. In 
undertaking this research, the researcher read and analysed approximately 70 case 
transcripts from Lubanga and 80 case transcripts from Katanga, focusing primarily on 
the submissions of victims, prosecutor, defendants, and judges. 
The researcher chose these two cases because they were the two completed cases at the 
ICC, which address the development of victims' rights and interests in ICC's 
jurisprudence. They also explore issues within the same context(DRC). However, there 
were decided cases of Al-Mahdi53 and Bemba.54 In the Al-Madhi case, the accused was 
charged with, convicted, and sentenced for the destruction of cultural world heritage in 
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Timbuktu Malia.55The only charge in the Al-Madhi case was the destruction of cultural 
heritage.56 The researcher could not use the Al-Madhi case because the one-count 
charge against the convicted person was crimes against property. The Bemba's trial is 
not also suitable for this thesis because the Appeals Chamber acquitted the accused 
from the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
For purposes of this research, the researcher reviewed the pre-trial, trial, and appeal 
transcripts for the Lubanga case and Katanga case. Each transcript ranged from 32 
pages to 650 pages; the researcher read focusing on submissions relating to victims, 
prosecutor, defendants, and judges. She identified themes, patterns, and relationships 
via words and phase repetitions emerging from these submissions. Eventually, the 
researcher narrowed down the various submissions and decided to organise them into 
three broad themes: (1) Prosecutorial discretion; (2) Trial process; and (3) Sentencing. 
It is found that structuring the analysis around these three broad themes would allow 
the researcher to better address the overall research question, namely, to what extent 
have the rights and interests of victims been respected in the cases of Lubanga and 
Katanga at the ICC? 
This qualitative research explores victims' interaction, observations, representations, 
and experiences via written texts and documents. These documents are the product of 
verbatim transcription of audio recordings. "A transcript is a text that represents an 
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event; it is not the event itself ."57 The written texts and documents are comprehensible 
and meaningful.58 The researcher relies mainly on narratives and conversations 
contained in the transcript. Ochs notes that transcripts are "the result of a series of 
choices in need of explication."59  Examining the interpretative process of transcript is 
essential for the outcome of transcript analysis. 
With transcript analysis, the researcher can collect and analyse documents(transcripts) 
by making excerpts directly from the transcripts. One advantage of this qualitative is 
that it enables the researcher to preserve the integrity of the documents.  
To analyse qualitative data, there are two types of qualitative analysis: inductive and 
deductive analysis.60 Inductive qualitative analysis is divided into thematic analysis and 
narrative analysis.61 The inductive qualitative analysis requires obtaining data from an 
unstructured approach. 62This type of qualitative analysis enables the researcher to 
make a connection between the research objectives and the findings from the 
transcripts. The thematic analysis requires the researcher to identify and recognise the 
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pattern of themes. These themes are analysed from the data's recurring patterns- the 
interaction between the LRVs, parties, and other participants. The narrative analysis is 
focused on stories and accounts of personal experience.63 The researcher could not use 
this narrative analysis because it is more useful for face-to-face interviews. 
Nevertheless, some of the submissions of the LRV reflect victims' narratives and 
personal experiences. The deductive qualitative analysis enables the researcher to have 
a structured approach in advance of the analysis. Hence, the inferential analysis is the 
connection of the pre-structured approach to the data from the transcript.64 
The use of trial transcripts as a primary source for this analysis is innovative and 
intended to complement other existing studies in victims' rights at the ICC. Most 
academic studies of victim participation are based on final decisions and judgments, 
more extensive studies using empirical methods. 
The use of transcripts as a primary data source is justified on the basis that it provides 
a rich and detailed account of the various interactions between victims and their 
representatives and other stakeholders at the ICC. This detailed account includes but is 
not limited to story-telling/narratives, testimonies, examination and cross-examination 
of victims/witnesses, and other procedural contents of the trial proceedings. It should 
also be noted that transcripts are easily accessible from the ICC database (freely 
available on the ICC's website). One shortcoming of transcript analysis is the issue of 
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redaction and confidentiality of records. It is almost certain that these restrictions might 
affect the data's accuracy to create a gap in the data because the redacted documents are 
inaccessible. In a similar vein, there is a probability that meanings may get lost in 
language translations. As such, the intended interpretation may not be worded in the 
translation. 
The researcher started a collection of transcripts from the ICC website. Transcript 
included pre-trial, confirmation hearing, trial, judgment decision, sentence hearing, and 
sentencing decision. This qualitative data consisted of 87 transcripts for Lubanga and 
90 transcripts for Katanga. Concerning the analysis, the researcher observed the 
submissions of victims, judges' comments, and rulings and decisions. The researcher 
addresses the questions by building on theories of retributive and restorative justice. 
The data collection preceded the data analysis; both were not done simultaneously. This 
approach of data analysis is sought from broader literature, which is based on textual 
analysis. With textual analysis, the researcher can interpret the texts in multiple ways, 
rather than a single approach. Multiple meanings could be inferred via ideological, 
genre, narrative, rhetorical, gender, or discourse analysis.65 Multiple interpretations 
connote that the text is situated within a theoretical background is open to several 
meanings. Given this, the research conducted the thematic study by identifying the texts 
within a theoretical context. This method of analysis uncovered the findings effectively 
through inductive qualitative analysis.  
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While providing such a rich resource of victims' interactions, transcripts are not often 
used as extensively as the researcher had used them in this thesis in international 
criminal legal research. Transcripts also give a detailed and authentic account of the 
conversations, questions, and answers between the Prosecutor and victims, judges and 
the Legal Representatives of Victims and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims. 
With thematic analysis, the researcher can examine and identify the texts in smaller 
parts. This analysis makes it easier for the researcher to answer the researcher questions 
and draw conclusions about victims' expectations, needs, and concerns at the ICC. 
Thread is found in Victims' submissions and observations, which is demonstrated in the 
textual information and transcripts. It should be noted that the use of transcripts data 
entails certain limitations, which will be discussed further below. 
The research focuses on the Lubanga and Katanga case. The researcher chose the 
Lubanga case because it is the first completed case decided by the ICC. Therefore, both 
cases provide an essential glimpse into the treatment of victims in the ICC's early trials. 
These may be used to compare how the ICC treatment may evolve as the court gains 
experience. In both cases, there were a significant number of victims who suffered harm 
as a result of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the defendants. 
Naturally, however, as the Lubanga and Katanga cases are merely two of several cases 
involving victim participants before the ICC, the analysis of this thesis concerning these 
two cases is merely indicative, and the thesis is not able to make broader generalisations 
about the treatment of victims in other cases.  




1.6  Research Limitations  
Due to practical constraints and resource limitations, like severe financial and ethical 
constraints of contacting individual victims to participate in empirical research, this 
study does not directly engage victims(human participants). Moreover, it would have 
been very difficult to establish contact with a viable number of victim participants 
because of anonymity issues and because they are generally spread across the globe. 
The investigation method adopted in this thesis is, focusing on case transcripts as 
primary sources, is therefore economical and viable compared to fieldwork research, in 
view of the time and resources available to complete this research. 
This study has used a desk-based approach and is primarily library-based. Flowing from 
this, transcripts, documents, and historical records of the ICC have been analysed. 
These sources, and particularly transcripts, were selected because they provide a rich 
source of information while generally being under-used in research in this area. It 
should also be noted that another significant advantage of using transcript data is that 
there is no risk of secondary victimisation and negative impact on the victims since 
there is no contact between the researcher and the victims.  
However, the use of this source does imply significant limitations. Notably, It is not 
possible to detect non-verbal communication, like facial expression and body language, 
and other symbols used for transmission based on the transcripts. Moreover, in some 
cases, the submissions of victims were redacted in the transcripts. In reading and 
analysing the transcripts data, the researcher had to read and interpret the words and 
interactions between the victims, their representatives, and other court stakeholders. 




This research's analysis and findings are based on the researcher's understandings and 
interpretations of these transcripts. It should be noted that this limitation is significant 
because, while analysing the transcripts, some sentences/statements might have been 
ambiguous and open to differing interpretations. However, as I did not have direct 
contact with the victims or other players involved, I could not probe further, through 
empirical methods, to ascertain such subjective meanings.  
 Therefore, throughout the research process, the researcher was conscious that some 
extent of personal bias could come into play in the transcripts' interpretations, 
particularly given the researcher's support of victims' rights. However, to reduce the 
possibility of bias, the researcher has carefully read and re-read the victims' and other 
parties' submissions and compared findings with the court's official judgments before 
offering interpretations. 
One shortcoming of transcript analysis is the issue of redaction and confidentiality of 
records. It is almost certain that these restrictions might affect the data's accuracy to 
create a gap in the data because the redacted documents are inaccessible. In a similar 
vein, there is a probability that meanings may get lost in language translations. As such, 
the intended interpretation may not be worded in the translation. 
Another potential problem with using the transcripts is that the researcher could not 
probe deeper in case of any unanswered questions I may have had as a researcher. This 
is contrasted with other empirical methods, such as interviews. Furthermore, as noted 
above, The findings that emerge from this thesis on victims' rights and interests are 




limited by the number of transcripts of the two decided cases I examined. These cases 
happened within a similar context, the Democratic Republic of Congo, with related 
jurisprudence.  
Finally, given the focus of this thesis on Lubanga and Katanga's cases, any observations 
and findings that the research makes are not generalisable to other cases. 
1.7.Literature Review 
 This section examines prior studies and an overview of the literature that relates to the 
research questions. This section explores the literature related to prosecutorial 
discretion, trial, and sentencing, focusing on the extent of applicability of victims' rights 
and interests at the ICC. These themes provide a convenient and broadly sequential 
progression of victims' rights and interests at different ICC phases. 
Before reviewing literature in this aspect, the following section shall examine victims 
and victimhood's notion to broaden our understanding of victims within the ICC. It is 
also necessary to evaluate the meaning of victims since the research is focused on 
victims. 
1.7.1 Victims and victimhood 
It is necessary to examine the victim's notion first since each thematic chapter is related 
to victims' rights and interests. The following shall examine the legal framework of 
victims as well as the theory of victimhood. 




Rule 85a defines as "natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."66It should be noted that 
for this thesis. Victims are restricted to natural persons, organisations and institutions 
are included in the (b) part. The definition stipulates the conditions to be fulfilled to 
obtain the procedural status of victims. 
In line with the connotation of rule 85,  an ICC Trial Chamber found that victims' 
participation should be interpreted in conjunction with the test of 'personal interests' as 
enunciated in article 68(3).67This interpretation connotes that rule 85 and article 68(3) 
are mutually interdependent. Victims' compliance with Rule 85 does not automatically 
entitle them to participate, except if the condition of personal interest is satisfied.  The 
personal interest test will be evaluated based (i) on the presence of an evidential link 
between the victim and the evidence the court before the court or (ii) victims' interests 
are affected by the issues raised during the trial. The standard of proof that is applicable 
is prima facie credible grounds that the applicant has suffered harm due to a crime under 
the court's jurisdiction.68 
In this context,  the selection of charges directly determines the spectrum of victims to 
be granted procedural status.69 The charges determine the scope of the acts and the 
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events over which the court has jurisdiction. The dichotomy made by this pyramid of 
victimhood entrenches a selected few to access justice while the unrecognised victims, 
stay in the bottom of the pyramid as victims of harm who are not worthy of recognition 
to seek redress at the court.70 Sadly, this could foster secondary victimisation for this 
set of victims. An implication of this categorisation is the dilemma which arises 
between the concept of victimhood and victim status at the ICC. 
Zappala notes that declaring an individual as a 'victim' in legal proceedings, where the 
accused's guilt has not been proven robs the accused a presumption of innocence. This 
idea prejudges the situation surrounding the identity and culpability of the 
perpetrator.71Nonetheless, this may not be an issue where the commission of the crime 
is not in dispute.72 Where there is a dispute regarding the perpetrator's culpability, this 
prejudgment may sabotage the default rule of presumption of innocence.  
Regarding the concept of victimhood, Christie explores the 'ideal victim' theory. The 
'ideal victim' is a concept coined in criminology. The ideal victim refers to 'a person or 
category of individuals, who, when hit by crime, most readily are given the complete 
and legitimate status of being a victim.'73It is said that the ideal victim generates 'the 
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most sympathy' from society.74Victims that fall within this category are perceived as 
being 'weak', 'vulnerable,’ 'physically disadvantaged' or 'emotionally distressed'. 
On the other hand, the offender is perceived to be powerful and intimidating. Therefore, 
this is society's standard for whom the ideal victim is. It is believed that once these 
features are present in the individual, such an individual is a perfect victim. Christie 
proposes that the concept of the 'ideal victim' could be a subjective phenomenal, mostly 
depending on the personal conviction of the person involved and the circumstances 
he/she finds himself.75  
 In his terms, the ideal victim enjoys a kind of public status likened to the type and level 
of abstraction seen in 'hero' or a traitor'.76 While Christie's ideal victim theory helps 
understand how persons acquire the status of victim in society, in the framework of the 
Rome Statute, the victim's concept has a more specific, statutory definition. Victims are 
not automatically permitted to assume their status. On the contrary, victim-applicants 
need to go through procedures to be granted procedural status by the court.77 However, 
in line with Christie' analysis, victims at the ICC must fulfil the conditions to qualify as 
victims, such as reporting the crime to the police, making their case known and 
cooperating fully with the system by attending trials and presenting testimony when 
requested. It is the fulfilment of these prerequisites, coupled with the court's 
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authorisation that confers the applicants with victims' procedural status. Arguably,  an 
ideal victim might not qualify as a victim at the ICC if he/she does not meet the 
conditions set out in Article 85. 
Hall is critical of Christie's submission. Hall describes Christie's paradigm of the ideal 
victim as 'arguably incomplete' because it excludes collective victims and the position 
of corporate bodies into consideration.78Perhaps Christie intended to explore the 
individuality of victim and its attendant consequences on such individual. 
Furthermore, Elias and Rock contend that society's narrow perception of victims and 
victimisation flows from selective definitions of crime, which was aggravated by 
political purposes.79As such, the notion of victims and victimisation are consequences 
of both offender and victim's social construction.80 
In some situations, many victims do not fit into the concept of 'ideal victim.' Some 
victims may not be considered entirely innocent(e.g. child soldiers). In practice, one 
may not encounter an 'ideal victim' as a result of fluidity of status. The Dominic 
Ongwen case illustrates the difficulties and blurring of the boundaries in defining 
victims. Dominic Ongwen was conscripted under the age of 15 years and used to 
participate actively in hostilities.81He rose through the army ranks and became a 
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commander of the Lord Resistant Army(LRV). One of the issues before the ICC is how 
to classify him. Ongwen's position is a pendulum that swings between 
victim/perpetrator/witness. Ongwen's case questions the ideal victim theory and 
explores the relationship between victim and perpetrator. 
This fluidity of status demonstrates the need to be explicit about what exactly is meant 
by the victim within the ICC ambience. Rule 85 defines victims as a natural or legal 
person who has suffered harm as a result of any crime committed within the jurisdiction 
of the court.82There must be a connection between the crime and the harm suffered. As 
simple as this definition appears, the conditions listed must be elucidated conjunctively. 
Hence, an applicant must fulfil all requirements to be granted official status. Where the 
applicant does not qualify for one of the condition, his request may be rejected. 
A victim's definition as laid down in Rule 85 does not include the position of the 
offender/perpetrator-whether, the offender is 'apprehended', 'prosecuted', 'identified' or 
'convicted'.83 The definition of victims as enunciated in the 1985 Declaration recognises 
victims regardless of the offender's position. The presence of a link between the harm 
suffered and the crime committed, which must be under the court's jurisdiction, suffices 
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for victim-applicant to qualify as a victim. This definition may raise questions over the 
presumption of the innocence of the alleged offender. 
Human rights standard presume that an accused is innocent until the contrary is 
proved.84 This provision protects the accused during pre-trial and trial proceedings until 
the determination of guilt or innocence. The presumption of innocence is a fair trial 
right that sets the accused's treatment threshold in criminal trials. This right is 
inalienable for the accused/defendant.85It is essential protection with roots in human 
rights. However, by granting individuals the status of victims of a crime already at the 
early stages of the criminal process may appear to presuppose the guilt of the 
suspect/accused person before trial.  
The provisions of Rule 85 on victims enunciates the concept of victimhood as a legal 
category.86 This definition is also known as "juridified" victimhood.87 This concept 
gives such victims recognised status. This recognition filters which victims are given 
the procedural status to participate and those that are not authorised. Without 
recognition by law, victims' voices may likely not be heard; neither would the platform 
be accessible to them. It could be construed that the recognition of victims by law 
predetermines the selection of a few. This is an idea propounded by Kendall and 
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Nouwen-‘pyramid of victimhood'.88 The label polarises victims into two categories; the 
victims of harm and the recognised victims under the law.89It should be noted that 
victims of harm do not automatically qualify for recognition by the court. They are 
filtered in the process of victim applications and the Prosecutor's choice of charges. The 
filter goes through application for victims' status, fulfilling the criteria in Rule 85 and 
Article 68(3).90 As such, to qualify for participation, Rule 85 and Article 68(3) must be 
read conjunctively. 
1.8 Literature on the themes of this thesis 
Having discussed victimhood and victims, the following section shall review the 
literature on this thesis's three themes. The first will address the available literature on 
prosecutorial discretion's impact on victims' rights and interests. The second part will 
discuss the literature on victims' rights and interests during the criminal trial. The third 
and last question is the impact of victims' rights and interest on sentencing. 
While on the first sub-question, abundant literature exists on prosecutorial discretion, 
most of this literature concentrates on the independence of the OTP and academic 
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literature studies have examined the implications of broad prosecutorial discretion on 
victims' rights and interests.92 With respect to the second sub-question, regarding 
victims' rights and interests in their participation in criminal trials, quite a lot has been 
written on this. Nevertheless,  it appears more attention has been drawn to procedural 
fairness for the accused when compared to the victims, rather than on the management 
of the rights and interests of victims at trial, as a function of access to justice. 
Concerning the third sub-question, relating to victims' rights and interests in sentencing, 
a review of the literature suggests literature is scarce on the implications of victims' 
rights and interests in sentencing. The following section shall examine the literature 
regarding these issues. 
1.8.1 Prosecutorial discretion 
As mentioned earlier, while several studies have investigated the ICCprosecutor's broad 
powers, most of the debates are pitched on the controversies surrounding the 
Prosecutor's independence, particularly concerning selecting situations, Proprio motu 
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investigations,93 interests of justice and politics.94 However, a few works of 
scholarships examines how prosecutorial discretion affects victims. Aptel shows that 
the broad prosecutorial discretion of the Prosecutor precludes victims' right to 
remedy.95She argues that from the Prosecution' selection of crimes to the 
complementarity paradigm, many victims of severe violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law are denied access to a judicial remedy.96She suggested that the ICC 
ought to be opened to a broader range of charges. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Schabas, who examines prosecutorial discretion 
in the selection of situations and cases via the criteria of 'interests of justice' and 
'gravity'.97From his article, it appears that some victims inadvertently fall into the 
impunity gap because the Prosecutor decides the selection of situations. Some of these 
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decisions he thinks lack objectivity.98It is also noted that controversy exists as to the 
definition of 'interests of justice'. Given that it is within the ICC Prosecutor's ambit to 
determine the 'interests of justice', most times, the Prosecutor's conception of interest 
of justice may not be consistent. 
For instance, Guzman calls our attention to the former ICC prosecutor's reluctance to 
prosecute sexual violence. Guzman argues that gender bias assumptions are not 
unconnected to the recognition of substantive crimes.99They are deeply rooted in 
informal institutions that they permeate legal procedures, investigations and conduct of 
trials.100The failure to prosecute SGBV at the ICC could be due to the traditional belief 
that sexual violence is a lesser crime or the perception that sexual violence is 'weapon 
of war'.While some authors concluded that due to the nature of SGBV, it requires a 
higher evidentiary burden,101 one could argue that this statement is embedded in gender 
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bias assumptions. Civil society and activists called the Prosecutor's attention to his 
deliberate exclusion of sexual violence from the charges.102 
SaCuoto and Clearly criticised the prosecutor's insensitivity to the girls and women who 
suffered sexual violence and several challenges this category of victims faced103. The 
girls were targeted as sex slaves of soldiers and forced to be soldiers or 'wives' because 
of vulnerabilities, which was exploited.104  
It is also necessary to mention that there are instances in which the Prosecutor has 
developed an intertwined relationship with victims as a competing/ contradicting 
relationship. While the Prosecutor represents general or community interests, the 
victims represent their interests. Interestingly these interests may overlap. However, 
this is not always the case. In either of these contexts, victims are independent 
parties.105Kofi Anan noted that '[t]he overriding interests must be that of the victims', 
and the international community as a whole'106It is believed that since victims are not a 
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homogenous group, this leaves room for a differing(possibly competing) opinions, 
views and interests.107 
This thesis intends to explore the impact of the Prosecutor's decisions on victims' rights 
and interests at the ICC. Which will enable us to understand how the role and functions 
of the OTP contribute towards victims' access to justice at the ICC. 
1.8.2 Trial Process 
In dispute resolution, research indicates that participants prioritise the process more 
than the outcome. This positively impacts their experience and perception of the 
court.108Voice is a form of participation in the procedure which gives victims a sense 
of belonging. One of the concerns of parties in conflict resolution is the desire to be 
heard.109 It follows that they would want to voice out and get the opportunities to 
convey their needs and give an account of their stories. Before the case is determined, 
possibly, it may impact victims' experience on the system, regardless of the decision. 
Procedural justice ensures that due process is granted to victims during their interaction 
with the court.110 It has been reported that victims' derive satisfaction if the procedures 
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are fair. Procedural fairness influences the reactions as well as responses of people at 
the receiving end of decision-making processes. Arguably, the fairness of the procedure 
does have a strong impression on the recipient of the decision-making.111 
When victims' voices are considered, it gives them a sense of belonging. However, one 
question that arises is the extent of the influence of their voice. Does it come in the form 
of information gathering, consultation or expression? Some participation types may 
amplify the victims' voice, but this does not mean that their views would influence the 
decision. Therefore, having a say in proceedings may serve other, non-justiciable 
purposes, such as therapeutic purposes.  
In this respect, Haslam and Dembour found that victim-witnesses were 'effectively 
silenced' during the  Krstic proceedings at the ICTY.112An implication of the demands 
of the legal process on participation as witnesses.113As such, the ICTY failed to meet 
these victim-witnesses' needs because they had to act primarily as witnesses, without 
giving them the platform to tell their stories. 
In international criminal justice, the Legal Representatives of Victims(LRVs) often 
serve as conduits or voices of the victims. These LRVs make opening and closing 
statements, as well as observations. They do these on behalf of the victims because they 
are not permitted to participate directly, only in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, the 
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majority of victims reported that they had a voice in the ICC during the pre-trial 
stage.114Some victims opined that the submission of individual applications was an 
indication that the court acknowledged their views. However, we should bear in mind 
that the submissions of applications are not an automatic qualification for being 
considered a victim within the ICC framework. It is best described as recognition of 
their suffering, but this is subject to conditions set out in Rule 85.  
SaCouto and Cleary in their study submit that instead of granting participation 
rights(mostly theoretical)  at the investigation stage, the court should place more 
attention on making information available to victims and prompting them to 
communicate with the court. Information also includes notifying potential victims about 
the range of specific rights available to them and clarifying to victims how participation 
might affect them.115Providing victims with information at the investigation phase 
cannot replace their involvement because they crave for recognition at this Stage. 
Some victimological studies have suggested that victims have preferences when 
encountering the criminal justice system.116 These preferences include respect, voice 
and fair treatment. 
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Recognition and respect for victims may enhance their sense of belonging. Meredith 
contends that it is pertinent to differentiate between victims who have suffered harm 
and those who can access redress for their harm.117He reports that the official 
recognition of a victim's right may restore their dignity and enable them to seek 
redress.118The principles of fairness and respect create an equal platform and give them 
a sense of belonging. Therefore, this aims to strike a balance in the criminal 
proceedings. Previous studies by Thibaut and Walker and Tyler have highlighted the 
significance of these principles-fairness and respect. They opine that the people judge 
an adequate and fair trial based on the process and procedures employed rather than the 
outcome in criminal justice. Also, they believe the effectiveness of criminal 
proceedings based on their contact with the legal authorities.119 
The recognition by the court to a large extent determines which voices are heard and 
which are not.120 This recognition is likened to a double-edged sword because at this 
stage, and some victims do not qualify by the discretion of the court. This could be on 
the basis that their situation is not considered as an 'international crime'.121This may 
filter and subsequently polarise the victims, Kendall and Nouwen observe that the 
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Prosecutor's selection distinguishes between "juridified" and victims in the bottom of 
the pyramid.122The ICC recognises the "juridified" victims while the latter victims are 
victims with no legal recognition. This recognition does not preclude the unrecognised 
victims from being victims. It is a polarisation that reduced their chances of obtaining 
justice. Thus, victims that fall in this category. In addition, Nouwen and Kendall also 
highlight the danger of legal representation of victims. They posit that the ICC's 
representational practices preclude each victim's individual specifics; rather, the victims 
are represented on a general level, which 'suggests a symbolic unity' and authority'.123 
From their perspectives, this generalisation seems rights because it is founded on the 
notion that victims' experiences emanate from the' uncontested' facts that they have 
suffered harm/loss. On the other side, this generalisation of victims through 
representation(LRVs)  subverts their ability to hold accountable those who represent.124 
Thus, victims here have no legal personality nor power to hold accountable, their legal 
representatives. This is referred to as 'abstract victimhood'.125 
Similarly, Killean and Moffett contend that the use of common legal representation 
restricts individual victims' voice. They submit that victims' voices through common 
representation have been 'collectivised'.126  In Donat-Catin's words, "there is no 
effective access to justice without skilful and responsible representation".127This 
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underscores the importance of victims' access to justice. Mejijian and Varughese point 
out that the right to legal representation is the most' procedurally challenging' aspect in 
the ICC.128 As noted earlier, victims are not allowed to choose their LRV directly. 
Selection of LRVs is always made by the Chambers(registry). Perhaps the most severe 
disadvantage of the ICC's method is that it could undermine the crime victim agency. 
Crime victim agency is defined as the autonomy of crime victims to make a 
fundamental decision about their lives.129The crime victim includes their right and 
power to make crucial decisions that could affect their situations. Since it is not within 
their powers to choose LRVs, this reduces the degree of control they may exercise. The 
right to legal representation and the quality of the interaction between the LRVs and 
victims should be respected. Chapter three shall explore this fully. 
1.8.3 Sentencing 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated victim participation at the ICC. 
Hence, an increasing body of published studies describes victims' role during victim 
participation and its evolution. However, literature is scarce on the management of 
victims' rights and interests during sentencing, and the impact of victims' involvement 
on sentence decision is? Clearly, victims have interests in reparations, justice truth, 
protection from potential harm and sentence (disposition). 
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It is noted that not much has been written about victims' rights and interests in 
sentencing. This thesis intends to examine the rights and interests of victims in the 
sentencing decision. Baumgartner was one of the first to draw our attention to how 
victim participation may influence sentencing and punishment.130However, when she 
conducted her research, none of the cases before the ICC had reached the sentencing 
stage.  
Ashworth contested victims' legitimate interest in the disposition of the offender. From 
Ashworth's perspective, "it would be wrong to suggest that the victim has no legitimate 
interest  in the disposition of the offender in his or her case, but the victim's interest is 
surely no greater than yours or mine."131 Here he compared the victims' interest to 'one 
of many citizens' who is part of the community. Ashworth's assertion is flawed because 
he failed to sufficiently differentiate that victims' interest emerges from the personal 
harm they have suffered because of the offender's crime inflicted on them. The 
community interest is classified into the category of 'general public interest'.Which 
means that the ordinary citizens are remotely affected as opposed to victims. Therefore, 
the reference of Ashworth to the social contract reasoning does not dig deeper. One 
other reasonable explanation for his thinking could be because his argument was limited 
within the ambience of restorative justice. Victims look forward to the determination 
of the punishment. 
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Henham suggests that international tribunals and courts should attempt to articulate 
substantive justifications for sentencing.132He also argues that these courts do not 
clearly distinguish between the general grounds for punishment and the specific aims 
of punishment in concrete cases. In his opinion, there exists fluidity between objectives, 
purposes, principles, function or policy. 
In the same vein, Van Zyl Smith points our attention to the limitations of sentencing 
provisions in the ICC Statute. He posits that challenges that flow from establishing 
reliable processes through international agreement reflect the confined nature of the 
punitive rationale for international sentencing, 133given that the maximum penalty that 
the court could award is 30 years or life imprisonment. 
Goldstone cautions against always equating justice with the number of convictions. In 
his words, "the fairness of any criminal justice system must be judged by acquittals and 
not by convictions…..acquittal does not necessarily follow from any inadequacies in 
the office of the prosecutor."134  Therefore. Justice could be the discharge of the accused 
where there are doubts as to his guilt. 
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This statement brings to light the fact that the Prosecutor is not under an obligation to 
always secure convictions, especially where the rights of the accused to a fair trial is at 
stake. The presumption of innocence precludes unwarranted conviction where the 
Prosecutor is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In some domestic jurisdictions, Victim Impact Statement(VIS) in sentencing is used to 
inform sentencing.135 In some common law jurisdictions, the Court permits victims to 
participate during sentencing. Some victims are allowed to give narratives on how the 
convicted person's harm or wrongdoing affects them. Through the use of VIS, victims 
are permitted to inform the court how their victimisation impacted them.136 The VIS is 
presented to the Court after determining the guilt of the accused but before sentencing. 
This statement is taken into consideration in the decision of sentencing. Reasonably, 
VIS lightens the burden of the victim and gives them a sense of belonging. VIS 
proponents contend that it is a medium for victims to emote and express themselves 
about how the crime affected them. 
In contrast, VIS critics have cautioned that the stage of intervention-sentencing is rather 
too late to address victims’ suffering.137 Particularly in common law jurisdictions, 
where victims are not directly engaged in the trial process. Critics of VIS proposes that 
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victims should have been involved at an earlier stage.138Moreover, another argument 
has been that VIS tilt the balance of justice because it is a subjective expression of 
victims, influencing the sentencing process.139 
VIS  could increase victim satisfaction through procedural fairness at the sentencing 
stage.140This assertion recognises victims’ voices in the sentencing hearing without 
necessarily considering their interests.141However, one set back for the application of 
VIS at the ICC would be the negative impact on the court proceedings' efficiency, given 
a large number of victims, it will be impracticable.  
VIS narrates the experience of the victim about the offence and its attendant 
consequences on the victim. A classic example is The Stanford case.142 In this case, 
Turner, a former Stanford University swimmer, was convicted of sexually assaulting a 
woman. The victim submitted a written statement, where she outlined the impact the 
attack had on her.143This victim read her statement in court directly to the defendant 
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during the sentencing process. However, the court sentenced the convict to six months 
of imprisonment. Contesting the sentencing is beyond this literature review. However, 
the VIS read out by the victim highlights the importance of victim participation during 
sentencing. From this case, it seems the VIS did not influence the declared sentence. 
In Henham’s words,  sentencing represents “the point in the trial where the aims of 
punishment are given concrete and public expression in a specific case”.144Hence, the 
sentencing decision could be considered as the legitimacy of the punishment. This 
legitimacy goes to the root of effective governance of criminal justice.145 
Strang and Sherman, Doak and Moffett highlight the need for the criminal justice 
system to be victim-oriented.146 According to these commentators, this can be achieved 
if there is a move towards more procedural rights, especially the right to information, 
participation, protection and compensation.147 Thus, it can be suggested that procedural 
justice plays a vital role in shaping the perception of how victims feel the legal 
authorities have treated them.  
However, Strang and Sherman found, for instance, that the amount of information that 
would be released to the victims was limited, but depended on the value of their 
testimonies to the prosecution or defence. They also found that victims’ satisfaction 
started to decline most times at the investigation stage due to the lack of information 
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about their case's progress.148Thus, one may assert that the availability of information 
about the development of their case, updates and requirements is essential to giving 
victims a sense of belonging. Principle 6(a) lends credence to this finding. According 
to this provision, the need to inform victims of their role, scope, timing and progress of 
the proceedings may facilitate how the judicial and administrative authorities respond 
to their needs.149 Consequently, victims are under the impression that the courts and 
criminal justice professionals do not have sufficient information to handle their case in 
such a way that would reflect in any outcome produced. This outcome has to take into 
account what happened to the victims. 
In 2014, Zehr, ‘the father of restorative justice’ classifies information as a type of 
victims’ need.150 His studies reveal victims’ need for real information about why the 
offence happened as well as updates after the commission of the crime. Interestingly, 
he points out that this information should go beyond ‘speculation’ and ‘legally 
constrained’ details, emanating from trial proceedings or plea bargaining.151Instead, 
this information should update the victims and clear out speculations. It is noteworthy 
that this commentator’s analysis restricts victims’ informational needs to why the 
offence was committed and, what has happened after the crime; he termed this as ‘real 
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information.’ From his findings, little is known about the informational needs of victims 
during the trial process. He believes these victims’ needs were not being adequately 
met in the international criminal justice system.152Moffett also recommends enhancing 
victims' needs in the criminal justice system; more consideration should be given to 
procedural and substantive justice, rather than focusing on restorative justice.153This 
submission highlights the importance of victims’ contribution to criminal proceedings, 
sentencing and decision-making. 
Victims need to get information about the kinds of services available to them before, 
during and after the criminal investigation and during criminal proceedings.154They 
need to know if provisions will be made for victim protection programs, what it entails 
and medical services. Similarly, victims also need to understand how the police and 
criminal justice processes operate. The information will enable them to know at what 
point they can get involved in the investigation or trial. Victims will also want to know 
if the state will provide any medical care or compensation.155 Inadequate information 
may frustrate victims or lead to secondary victimisation. It follows that if victims 
receive this information, it will assist them pursue other rights and entitlements. 
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Doak, Henham and Mitchell suggest that the conferment of procedural rights on victims 
may undermine the accused's process rights.156By implication, if rights are granted to 
victims to even out the imbalance between the victims and the defence, this may 
increase victims' access to justice. Still, caution must be taken so that such rights do not 
impede the accused's right to a fair trial.  
Moffett believes that victimology and human rights play a central part in the 
development of victims’ rights.157 However, this development is still in process because 
most victims’ rights struggle to find stability in the criminal justice system. Some of 
these rights are still very much contentious.158 One reasonable explanation is that 
victims’ procedural rights have to be balanced against the accused's rights. 
The debate over the rights of victims has now become central to the discussions of 
international criminal justice. Commentators like Spiga Hoyle and Ullrich observe that 
victims' rights in international criminal justice have become a focal point.159 Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier, this is partly due to the argument that victims’ involvement in 
international criminal justice is essential to international criminal proceedings' 
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legitimacy and effectiveness.160Therefore, it has been theorised that victims’ 
perceptions of the proceedings confirm the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.161 
As such, one may conclude that victims are gradually becoming more significant in the 
criminal justice system. The quality of criminal trials and victims' willingness to accept 
and abide by their cases' outcome/decision can be enhanced by the victims’ 
involvement in criminal investigations, judicial processes, and legal decision-
making.162  
The more the contact, the higher the satisfaction.163However, Maquire reiterates that 
the process is more important than the actual outcome of the case. Hence, victims were 
quite happy if police had been interested or had kept them informed. They rate the 
procedure more than the outcome.164 
Principle VII of the Basic Principles and guidelines on the right to remedies and 
reparations allow victims to access relevant information concerning violations and 
reparation mechanisms.165 Principle VIII also provides that states should publicise 
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information about available remedies on gross violations, through private and public 
mechanisms.166 
Tyler’s study attests that the authority put their views into consideration before 
pronouncing the judgment.167 It is important to note that Tyler contends that although 
‘customer satisfaction’   is not an objective of the court, however, courts need to 
consider the needs of people, since they are responsible for conflict resolution. Hence, 
whether people feel that justice has been done is central to their trust and confidence in 
the judicial system.168 One may infer that this trust and confidence serve as the 
legitimate basis for the criminal justice system. 
Set against this background, this thesis will explore the impact of victims voice on 
sentencing at the International Criminal Court.  
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the research background, the research questions, 
significance of the study and the research limitations. The literature review highlights 
the available scholarship on victim participation in criminal justice, generally and, in 
particular, at the ICC. It also identifies a gap in the knowledge, particularly the 
management of victims’ rights and interests concerning prosecutorial discretion, trial 
process and sentencing. This Chapter has set the scene for this thesis. The second 
chapter examines the degree to which prosecutorial discretion affects victims’ rights 
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and interests. The third chapter deals with the extent to which the court respects victims’ 
rights and interests at the trial. The fourth chapter assesses the degree to which the court 
respect victims’ rights and interests during sentencing decision. Finally, the conclusion 
gives a summary and recommendation. 
The next chapter shall explore prosecutorial discretion, mainly how it affects victims 
rights and interests. 
  




2.0 Chapter 2- Prosecutorial discretion  
 
“[t]he ICC can never be in a position to try all perpetrators of all 
crimes in situations where international crimes have occurred. 
Unfortunately, the ICC often acts more as a substitute for non-
existent domestic prosecutions than as a complement. It can, 
therefore, do justice partially, because as indicated above, it can only 
focus on a relative number of situations, entities, individuals, factual 
allegations, legal qualifications or crimes, and calling some of the 
victims as witnesses.”1 
2.1 Introduction 
Studies of Megret, Schiff, Robertson, and Chazal propound that politics and reciprocity 
influence the development and establishment of the ICC as well as its functions within 
the international community.2Hence, this has led to tension in the pursuit of justice. 
Arguably, this tension transcends situations and case selection to the prosecution of 
crimes.  
The Office of the Prosecutor(OTP) is at the heart of our understanding of the ICC’s 
function in combating impunity. Article 42 set out the powers of the OTP as an 
independent body of the Court. The OTP plays an essential role in the investigation and 
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prosecution of crimes at the ICC. The prosecutor has been referred to as ‘the Gatekeeper 
of the ICC’.3A large and growing body of literature has described the role of 
prosecutorial strategies4 and its broad discretionary powers.5  
Recently, questions have been raised about the role of prosecutorial discretion on 
victims’ rights and interests. This issue has grown in importance in light of the disparity 
in the international criminal justice system and national jurisdictions. This chapter seeks 
to examine the impact of prosecutorial discretion on victims’ rights and interests. 
This chapter begins by giving a brief overview of the role of actors in the Rome 
negotiation. The Rome negotiations address the controversial issue on whether it would 
be appropriate to grant the OTP  broad discretionary powers. The Rome Negotiations 
gives a background into the origin of Prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. The second 
section ascertains the statutory powers of the Prosecutor to explore the extent of these 
powers. The following section carefully examines the distinction between victims’ 
interests and prosecutor’s interests. It is necessary to clarify the differences between 
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them because of the seemingly overlap between both interests. This distinction will 
enable us to understand how the prosecutor's role could potentially affect victims’ rights 
and interests. The fourth section clarifies the position of the prosecution in the framing 
of charges. The following section investigates the charging document in the Prosecutor 
v Thomas Lubanga. It is necessary to assess the impact of Prosecutorial discretion on 
victims. 
Similarly, the sixth section evaluates the charging document in Prosecutor v Germain 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui. Having established these parts, the following areas assess 
Regulation 55 and its relationship with the prosecutor’s powers. This explores the 
prosecutor's role in the application of Regulation 55 and how the exercise of power in 
this regard influences victims’ rights and interests in the Lubanga and Katanga cases. 
Building on this idea, the following section discusses the findings. The final part 
concludes this chapter.   
2.2The role of actors in the Rome Negotiations 
The absence of a settled normative and institutional hierarchy has led to multiplicity 
norms.6 Consequently, fragmentation in international law and the international 
community implies the emergence of different tribunals and institutions. There is a need 
to provide unification within these complexities; however, the provision of 
consolidation could inadvertently foster the parties' selfish interests. 7Hence, groups 
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tend to identify and interact provided they have common ideas.8Their ‘personal’ 
interests mostly dictate this. This strategy may unify different groups, promote their 
common interests and give them power. 
The establishment of Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals contributed to the clamour for 
the demand for the ICC.9 The United Nations Security Council created the Yugoslavia, 
and Rwanda tribunals as ad-hoc tribunals in response to serious crimes committed 
within their respective jurisdictions.10 Some commentators suggested that a permanent 
International Criminal Court would preclude the reoccurrence of problems and 
challenges that afflicted the tribunals.11Hence, it is guaranteed that the establishment of 
a permanent court would expedite investigations and prosecutions.12Nonetheless, the 
question posed by creating a permanent criminal court remained a political one that 
might threaten national sovereignty.13 
In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly decided to establish an Ad Hoc 
committee to discuss and elaborate on the “major substantive and administrative issues” 
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which emerged from the International Law Commission’s 1994 draft statute.14The Ad 
Hoc committee had two sessions that led to emergent issues in creating ICC. 
Subsequently, the Ad Hoc Committee’s work led to the establishment of the 
Preparatory Committee.15The Preparatory Committee was to continue the Ad Hoc 
Committee's work on the establishment of the International Criminal Court. In its 
address, the General Assembly mandated the Preparatory Committee to “to draft text, 
to prepare a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as the next step towards consideration by a conference of 
plenipotentiaries.”16 
The negotiations' delegates consisted of individual actors, collective participants, 
government delegations, Non-Governmental Organisations, United Nations Diplomats, 
senior servants, public and private experts,  Bureau members, and politicians.17 
The Rome Conference revealed the polarised interests between the United States quest 
for “a Security Council-controlled Court” and the demand of some other countries for 
a permanent court with universal jurisdiction on war crimes, crimes against humanity 
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and genocide.18One reasonable explanation for the USA’s objection was the 
implications of an independent ICC Prosecutor; potentially, an independent Prosecutor 
could exercise its power to restrict the  U.S.A’s military personnel and officials.19Thus, 
the USA intended for a Court with relatively restricted powers. 
The final stage addressed the prosecutor's roles, amongst other issues(triggering 
mechanisms, complementarity, Court’s jurisdiction).20Chazal notes that during the 
Rome Statute Conference, the key strategy was the groups' constitution around shared 
interests and ideas.21 He also observes that the processes of negotiation and interactions 
during the conference denote the responsive ability of actors to impact change as well 
as how powerful these actors become when they create groups based on shared ideas 
and interests.22 However, Schiff, Megret and Chazal have shown that actors use ideal 
Politik and realpolitik to develop their interactions with ICC.23 Such is seen by the 
Human Rights Watch's interactions, The Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
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and Amnesty International with the ICC. It is above the scope of this thesis to discuss 
the interactions between these groups. 
Moreover, during the Rome Statute negotiations, there were three main groups. The 
United Nations Security Council members- China, United Kingdom, United States, 
Russia and France. Their idea was that the Security Council should closely monitor 
ICC. The second group consisted of Mexico, Egypt and India. This group was against 
the involvement of the Security Council with the Court. In addition, they proposed the 
inclusion of nuclear weapons in the Rome Statute. The third and most influential was 
the Like-Minded Group(LMG).24This diverse group materialised from the Ad Hoc 
Committee's initial meetings, and the Preparatory Committee consisted of 
approximately sixty states, including Canada, Australia, Austria, Argentina European 
countries, Latin American States, and the African States. This group proposition was 
based on jurisdiction over international crimes -crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide and aggression with a focus an independent and impartial court jurisdiction 
over international crimes. They also clamoured for an independent prosecutor who has 
the authority to initiate proceedings while maintaining a working relationship with the 
Security Council. Driven by these ideas, the LMG supported the states with less power 
and agenda to achieve their aims. It also aligned with NGOs; as such, it received support 
from these NGOs.25 For instance, Amnesty International described the Court as ‘a 
judicial body’ which required an independent Prosecutor to ensure whether to 
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investigate or prosecute.26 The interaction highlights the cooperation between actors 
and groups to use their ideas to construct the ICC to achieve their interests and identities 
socially. 
The discretionary powers of the Prosecutor was a controversial topic during the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute. Some delegations submitted that the role of the 
Prosecutor under article 25 was limited.27  Therefore, this restriction, for ‘political 
reasons’  would curtail States and Security Council to complain. Drawing from the 
prosecutor’s role in the Statute of the ICTY and ICTR, they proposed for broader 
prosecutor power to initiate investigations. The ILC’s first draft of the Statute, which 
was submitted in 1994 granted the prosecutor a restricted prosecutorial power, with the  
Security Council or State party, the ability to make referrals.28 They canvassed for a 
Prosecutor empowered with an proprio motu to initiate investigations.29 Some delegates 
criticised granting the prosecutor with the power to commence proceedings proprio 
motu power based on the argument that this would negatively impact the international 
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legal system( it was in its early stage of development).30They argued that an 
independent Prosecutor would stretch “the limited resources of the prosecutor with 
frivolous complaints.”31 The United States of America(USA)vehemently opposed the 
independence of the Prosecutor. It argued for a Court whose powers would be mostly 
dependent on the Security Council referrals.32Although the USA did not contest the 
likelihood of Prosecutor becoming political, it posited that a Prosecutor with a self-
initiating power is likely to overwhelm the Court with complaints, ‘political decision-
making’, ‘risk diversion of resources’ and ‘confusion’.33Likewise, some delegates 
agreed that the prosecutor's vast discretionary powers are likely to have adverse effects. 
They submitted that this would indirectly politicise the court, with accusations of a 
politically motivated prosecutor.34 Hence, they suggested judicial review by the PTC 
would check the prosecutor's powers' excesses or abuse. The Delegate stressed that 
judicial review would serve as an adequate balance without affecting the prosecutor's 
independence.35 
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On the other hand, An organised group of over sixty states called ‘Like-minded’ states 
proposed for a more independent prosecutor.36 The Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights asserted that if the Court actively worked towards the proscription and 
punishment of most serious crimes of concern to the international community, the 
Prosecutor must be given a degree of independence.37 These delegates advanced for the 
prosecutor’s autonomy as a basis for efficient prosecution at the ICC. Their 
recommendation included the prosecutor’s power to trigger investigative or prosecution 
proceedings on her initiative.38 For instance, Amnesty International proposed that given 
that the Court is “a judicial body….its Prosecutor must have the independence to decide 
whether to investigate or prosecute.”39 The preparatory committee also supported the 
proprio motu power of the prosecutor during their meeting. Subsequently,  a division 
arose between States on whether to grant the Prosecutor with a proprio motu power or 
not. The proponents posited that a broad prosecutorial power would ensure the 
prosecutor fulfil his duties from their perspective, an independent prosecutor would 
likely promote the administration of justice.40Therefore, this will necessitate the 
independence of the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute.41 
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This dichotomy between the States reflected the idea that prosecutorial independence 
was at the heart of a competent criminal court. Prosecutorial independence could 
underscore the legitimacy and competency of the ICC. The supporters of an 
independent prosecutor submitted that a criminal court subject to the Security Council's 
mandatory powers would undermine the “credibility and moral authority of the 
court.”42By implication, the Court’s legitimacy could be subverted by political 
influence while making the court a pawn in external powers' hands.43The opponents 
cautioned that an independent prosecutor with broad discretionary powers would leave 
the prosecutor with unchecked powers which, in turn, would ‘embroil the court in 
controversy, political decision-making, and confusion’.44It appears both sides of the 
delegates were for and against endorsing politically motivated prosecutor. 
Consequently, a consensus emerged amidst the division between the delegates. They 
unanimously consented to provide the prosecutor with an independent power to initiate 
investigation and prosecution.45 However,  the Prosecutor’s power would be subject to 
checks by the Pre-Trial Chamber at an early investigation stage.46 Accordingly, the 
delegates reached a compromise to grant the ICC prosecutor broad discretionary powers 
 
42 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Report of the Adhoc Commmitte on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,par.121, United Nations Document Doc A/50/22, 
Fiftieth Session,September 6,1995 
43 Ibid. 
44 Statement of David, Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S 
Delegation at the U.N Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International 
Criminal Court, The Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S Senate , July 23, 1998 
45 Zoe Pearson, ‘Non—Governmental Organisations and the International Criminal Court:Changing 
Landcapes of International Law, (2006) 39(2) Cornel International Law Journal p243-284. 
46 Zoe Pearson, ‘Non—Governmental Organisations and the International Criminal Court:Changing 
Landcapes of International Law, (2006) 39(2) Cornel International Law Journal p243-284 




regarding whether to prosecute or not. The power is subject to a check and balance by 
the PTC. The compromise reached is embodied in Article 15, particularly article 15(3) 
of the Rome Statute. 
The preamble of the Statute and the Policy papers provide that the OTP’s investigative 
efforts and resources should be directed on the perpetrators that bear the most 
significant responsibility for the commission of the most serious crimes of international 
concern.47 
So far, this section has demonstrated the origin of the powers of the prosecutor. What 
follows is an outline of the Prosecutor’s statutory powers to familiarise the readers with 
laws and rules on prosecutorial powers. 
2.3 The Statutory powers of the Prosecutor. 
The prosecutor’s powers to initiate prosecution is spelt out in articles 53(2) (a) (b)(c), 
54, and 58. Moreover, Article 53(1) (a)(b)(c) stipulates the conditions to fulfil for the 
prosecutor to initiate an investigation. 
Article 15 grants the Prosecutor the power to commence an investigation independently 
after receiving information from any source without any State or Security Council 
 
47 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor , Paper on some Policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, 
September 2003. 




referral. Also, the OTP has the power to independently decide how to conduct 
investigations and method of presentation during the whole trial.48 
The Prosecutor shall commence an investigation after he must have evaluated the 
information made available to him.49 Where the prosecutor starts an investigation, he 
is duty-bound “to establish the truth” and to “investigate incriminating and exculpatory 
circumstances equally.”50 Also, for the guarantee of effective investigation and 
prosecution, the prosecutor is obliged to ‘respect the interests and personal 
circumstances of victims …’51 The fulfilment of these requirements establishes an 
objective condition as an obligation on the Prosecutor as opposed to politicising 
investigations and prosecutions. Besides, the Prosecutor shall not proceed with the 
initiation of the investigation if he or she determines that there are no reasonable 
grounds to continue under the Statute. The Prosecutor shall consider three grounds to 
decide whether he should initiate an investigation. The grounds are : 
(a) “The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe 
that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed ; 
(b)The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and 
 
48Rome Statute 1998, article 54;article 13(c); article 15(3); ICC Rules, Rule 48;Rule 63(5) ;International 
Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, accessible at  <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp> last accessed 
on 11 January 2020. 
49 Rome Statute 1998, Article 53(1) 
50 Rome Statute 1998, Article 54(1)(a). 
51 Rome Statute 1998, Article 54(b). 




(c)Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice.”52 
However, suppose the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed, which is determined based on subparagraph (c). In that case, the Prosecutor is 
under an obligation to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.53This provision seems to control 
the Prosecutor’s powers in this respect. One could argue that this section's composition 
sets standards for judicial scrutiny or review of the prosecutor’s powers. Article 
53(3)(b) grants the PTC the authority to review on its initiative the OTP’s decision  
where an “an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.’54 
Article 15(3) of the Statute grants victims the right to be heard by a Pre-Trial Chamber  
when “the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation.” 
Following this, the prosecutor's power to interpret and apply ‘the interests of justice’ is 
subject to review and judicial determination by the Pre-trial Chamber. The assessment 
grants victims the avenue to provide the PTC with relevant information concerning 
crimes committed in the situation. The judicial scrutiny by the PTC takes place 
regardless of if the OTP decides to initiate prosecution or not. It follows that with the 
relevant information, the Chamber can effectively evaluate the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to proceed with an investigation. It appears that this judicial review is not an appeal 
 
52 Rome Statute, Article 53 (1) (c ) 
53 Rome Statute, Article 53(3) (a). 
54 Rome Statute, Article 53(3) (b). 




against the decision of the Prosecutor, but a scrutiny of the decision-making process 
and factors involved. 
Notably, the Powers of the PTC  to review the prosecutor's decision not to initiate 
prosecution or discontinue prosecution is well-founded in some domestic jurisdictions 
like the United Kingdom.55 Many a time, the review may be necessitated if doubts arise 
as to the objectivity and interpretation of the Prosecutor’s decisions.56 Such review 
borders on the legality of the decisions  which finds support in excerpts from Lord 
Diplock’s statement: 
“By  “illegality” as a ground for judicial review, I mean that the 
decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his 
decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has 
or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the 
event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges by whom the 
judicial power of the states is exercisable”.57 
For this reason, one may infer that the power of the Pre-Trial Chamber to control the 
decision-making power of the Prosecutor seems to reconcile the powers of the 
prosecutor with the principle of legality. An idea which is not strange to some national 
jurisdictions. Mireille Delmas-Marty holds the view that Article 53 is ‘a compromise 
between strict legality and prosecutorial discretion’.58Arguably, where the prosecutor's 
 
55 R(Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions(Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) 
[2002] 1AC 800 ; Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecution[2003] 4 LRC 712,736 . 
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decision not to proceed with an investigation is based on the presence of substantial 
reasons to believe that investigation would not serve the interests of justice, regardless 
of the gravity of crime and interest of victims enunciated in Article 53. The PTC power 
comes into play with the caveat that Prosecutorial powers are not absolute. 
In addressing which category of victims should take part at this stage, the PTC made a 
distinction between victims of a case and victims of a situation.59It found that at the 
situation phase, the victims are not required to fulfil the causal link between the crime 
and the harm; neither do they need to know the identity of the perpetrator.60 At this 
stage, the threshold is not high because most times, the suspect's identity or alleged 
perpetrator remains sketchy. 
A scholar exhibits another line of thought, in 2011, Schabas, in his book likens the 
position of the Prosecutor to that of an investigating magistrate or juge d’instruction in 
civil law countries.61He posits that this role is distinct from what is applicable in a 
predominantly adversarial setting with a common law's prosecuting attorney.62Schabas 
cautions that the prosecutor's role at this stage should be neutral and impartial, without 
any political considerations.63 He acknowledged that politics is involved in the selection 
of situations and cases. Schabas believes that Prosecutorial discretion is unfettered, 
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given that the PTC reviews the Prosecutor ‘s decision. In that case, the most it can do 
is ‘request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision’ the PTC’s review does not go 
beyond requesting the prosecutor to reconsider such a decision. Arguably, the PTC’s 
checks and balance is not sufficient. By implication, it can be inferred that the ICC 
Prosecutor is not fully accountable to the PTC. He could apply the reasonable basis test 
to discontinue an investigation. He is empowered with the discretion to select cases 
from situations based on his judgment. Consequently, from the Prosecutor’s selection 
emerges the classification of victims that could potentially be qualified to access justice 
with the opportunity to make their interests known to the court. 
As discussed earlier, the Prosecutor is selective when considering which serious crime 
to investigate and prosecute. Most times, he makes decisions based on the extent of 
gravity of the crime, a large number of victims, and the most responsible perpetrator. A 
possible implication of this is that in choosing the gravest crimes, the Prosecutor may 
dismiss some gross violations of human rights or rules of international humanitarian 
law. It is believed that when selecting which serious crimes to investigate or prosecute, 
the Prosecutor would have to make comparisons between/amongst these serious 
allegations. This comparison is not entirely devoid of personal convictions. A decision 
mostly based on the Prosecutor’s perception of morals or justice-which could entirely 
be devoid of objectivity. 




 The prosecutor is obligated to consider ‘interests of victims’ amongst other criteria for 
an investigation's commencement.64The addition of victims' interests to the provision 
signals the Rome Statute's intention to advocate victims’ visibility and voice at the pre-
charge and investigation phase. The inclusion may stress a fair and responsive approach 
to exercising prosecutorial discretion. Interestingly, Article 15(3) sanctions victims' 
participation because some are identifiable as stakeholders at this juncture. Hence, it is 
fair to consult them for effective investigations amidst another component like the 
crime's gravity. Nonetheless, the scope of their participation will be subject to judicial 
discretion.  
From this section,  it is clear that the Prosecutor has a considerable role in victims’ 
access to justice at the ICC. From the situation stage to the selection of cases arise a 
new set of potential victims, we should also bear in mind that some potential victims 
would be unrecognised based on the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate a situation 
selection of cases from such situations. It is not the intention of this thesis to delve into 
this category of victims. The following section will distinguish between victims’ 
interests and the prosecutor’s interests to understand the roles performed by both and if 
there are any overlapping interests. Besides, it will identify the implications of the 
prosecutor’s role on victims’ rights and interests. 
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 2.4 Victims’ interests versus the Prosecutor’s interests 
 
“Mr President, …………..thank you for giving us leave to address the court…..Today 
for the first time in the history of the international criminal justice victims can address 
their viewpoints and concerns through their counsel.[…]Today, they can express 
themselves.”65 
 
The above is an excerpt from one out of the four legal representatives of victims' 
opening statements. The LRVs narrated the background of the case and expatiated on 
the role the accused, Lubanga played in recruiting children under the age of 15 years to 
participate actively in hostilities. Also, he brought the Court's attention to the 
implications of the alleged crime on his clients. The repercussions included post-trauma 
experiences and the inability of the former child soldiers to continue their education. 
Also included are the effects of the crimes on the victims’ family and relatives.66 In 
addressing the need for recognition of victims, An LRV posits that ‘[T]he primary 
concern of the victim is his recognition as a human being who is entitled to the dignity 
and respect that we are all entitled to…’67  
 
He reiterated the importance of victims’ recognition in the sight of the world and the 
presence of the culprit/perpetrator. The recognition of victims is seen as acknowledging 
 
65 The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30, Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 9 November 2006,P.75-76, 
statement of Mr Luc Walleyn. 
66 Ibid , p.76,77 and 81. 
67 Ibid , Prosecutor v Lubanga , ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN, statement of Mr Gebbie,p.96-98. 




the harm they have suffered, which complements addressing the wrong committed by 
the perpetrators. The LRV focused on the damage which has been the victims suffered 
rather than the wrong. 
 
Similarly, an LRV said: 
“[O]ne of our child clients was wounded and remains disabled, but the physical wounds 
that the militias left are not the worst…..These children ...were deprived of all contact 
with their families. They saw their friends die. They were forced to kill…One of my 
clients who is now barely 15 years, told us, the psychologist, I am not all right, I don’t 
know what to do. My body’s not all right. My head hurts…..”68 
 
These excerpts illustrate victims’ views and concerns through their LRVs to the Court, 
including the judges(decision-makers), which is considered a response to the court’s 
consultation. Through these excerpts, the LRVs were able to express the victims’ 
interests. The reaction of the presiding judge supports this: “We are listening to you 
carefully, because what you have to say is perhaps what is most important, especially 
given the Statute of the ICC.”69 The Judge’s remarks show an acknowledgement of 
victims’ voice, which relates to victims consultation while the judges listen. It depends 
on the if the judge decides to take these views and concerns into consideration while 
balancing it against the defence rights and fair trial. 
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Furthermore, the Prosecutor addresses the wrong because it is considered a disruption 
in the social order. To remedy the disorder in the social order, the Prosecutor represents 
the international community's interests, which includes seeking truth and 
justice.70Victims, as independent parties also have interests in obtaining truth and 
justice. However, victims' concerns mainly lie in the harm they have suffered from the 
perpetrators' actions and inactions. Therefore, the interests of both Prosecutor and 
victims emerge from the disruption in the social order. However, there are different 
perspectives and consequences for both participants. Sometimes, their interests may 
align or overlap. The Chamber addressed  the overlap in roles below: 
“The two Legal Representatives consider that, while it is agreed that the 
victims cannot assume the role of the Prosecutor, with whom the burden of 
proof solely lies, and that their intervention must in no way have the effect of 
their replacing the latter, they nevertheless have – as does the Court – an 
interest in the determination of the truth. Furthermore, they emphasise that the 
proliferation of victims in the instant case will have no implications for the 
Defence’s workload since  not all the victims will want or be able to 
systematically present evidence.”71 
“With respect to the possibility of the Legal Representatives conducting 
investigations, they recall that their sole objective is to gather evidence 
seeking to prove the harm suffered by the victims and not to investigate the 
guilt of the accused.”72 
 
70 Preambular paragraph 4;preambular paragraph 5. 
71 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of victim 
participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 22 January 2010,p.16,para.36 
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The above statements demonstrate the blurry intersection between the prosecutor's roles 
and interests and the victims in criminal trials at the ICC. Evidently, there have been 
instances of overlapping functions and interests between the Prosecutor and the victims. 
As a third party with no full party rights, the victims explain this indistinct 
intersection—an unforeseen implication of the compromise reached in  Rome 
negotiations. 
In this instance, the chamber distinguished the prosecutor's role and defence from the 
victims’ by drawing clear boundaries on victims’ ability to present evidence and 
conduct investigations, thus striking a balance between the participants' functions. To 
some extent; it is noteworthy that the PTC was not meant to determine truth pertaining 
to the suspect's innocence or guilt, as this is the function of the trial chamber. At this 
phase, what is required is to provide sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds 
to believe that the suspect committed the crimes.73 
Some scholars have acknowledged the difference between the interests of the 
Prosecutor and the interests of victims.74As mentioned earlier, the prosecutor represents 
the interests of society. There are situations in which victims’ interests may overlap 
with the prosecutor’s interests. Similarly, the victims’ role may also coincide with the 
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prosecutor’s role. For instance, the role they perform in ascertaining the truth reflects 
their interests in determining the truth. The interests of victims could be interests 
general to all the victims or claims distinct to each victim. Ascertaining the latter 
requires a case-by-case basis. The Chambers have interpreted victims' general interests 
to include reparations, safety and security measures, presenting their views and 
concerns, verifying specific facts, and ascertaining the truth, protecting their dignity at 
trial.75In the same vein, general interests also include identification and prosecution of 
the alleged perpetrators.76 
The role of victims in criminal proceedings is not unconnected to their personal 
interests. For instance, the ICC incorporated two different approaches to determining 
the role of victims in proceedings. The first is a systematic approach, while the other is 
a casuistic approach.77The systematic approach illustrates that once victims' procedural 
status has been verified at the initial stage(investigation stage of a situation or a 
preliminary stage), where a new situation or case arises, such victims do not require 
new verification.78 Conversely, the casuistic approach precludes the application of a 
one-way verification for the procedural status of victims. It is suggested that the 
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systematic approach fosters efficient trial and promotes time management for criminal 
trial at the ICC.  
 In some parts of continental Europe, victims are referred to as ‘parties civile’,79 
Auxillary prosecutor.80As parties civile, the victims are encouraged to participate in 
proceedings to facilitate civil compensation. This is limited to establishing a civil 
compensation claim.81 Within the inquisitorial criminal procedure, victims are seen as 
separate parties in the criminal proceedings.82They are independent of the prosecutor 
as they pursue their interests without being subject to the prosecutor's control. In this 
instance, victims submit evidence, respond to submissions made by the prosecution and 
the defence.83Also, they express their opinions on decisions made by the court. They 
are independent and have the right to legal representation, with an independent voice. 
The inquisitorial system of procedure, which is predominant in civil law jurisdictions, 
reveals victims' independence in criminal procedure, a deviation from the norm in 
traditional common law jurisdictions. Funk refers to victims as “formally independent, 
co-equal participants” in the proceedings.84 One reasonable implication of the civil law 
jurisdiction is the distinction between victims’ interests and prosecutor’s interests. By 
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analogy to the ICC, it is believed that victims pursue their interests while the Prosecutor 
represents general or community interests. 
Many times, the adversarial procedure applies during the trial.85 Nevertheless, It seems 
the PTC is more inquisitorial than the TC, especially in relation to the confirmation of 
charges. Article 60 provides for the charging process of a person-initial appearance 
before the PTC. The process continues until confirmation of charges before trial.86 It is 
observed that the Pre-Trial Chamber plays an active role in the initial proceedings. It is 
actively involved in truth-seeking-a feature of the inquisitorial system of procedure. 
The PTC is responsible for the confirmation of charges hearing.87  It also supervises the 
Prosecutor’s submission of charging document and evidence disclosure which is 
required at the hearing.88 It appears the process for evidence disclosure aligns with the 
inquisitorial system. A perfect illustration is seen in the Lubanga case, which empowers 
the PTC to analyse the evidence89-an investigative power. Scheffer notes that the 
disclosure system has transformed the judge into an active one with investigative 
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powers control over the parties and evidence as opposed to a passive judge and active 
parties.90 
 
To some extent; it is noteworthy that the PTC was not meant to determine truth 
pertaining to the suspect's innocence or guilt, as this is the function of the trial chamber. 
At this phase, what is required is to provide sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that the suspect committed the crimes.91The adversarial criminal 
procedure is cautious about granting victims extensive role and rights in the 
proceedings.92 In sharp contrast, the inquisitorial criminal procedure, with its roots civil 
law traditions, grants extensive rights and victims roles. However, within the ICC 
context, victims' rights are restricted because the trial process is primarily adversarial. 
The parties have the full rights to participation as well as control over the presentation 
of evidence.93 Although one may infer that the ICC's criminal procedure is mixed, 
arguably, the ICC is largely adversarial than inquisitorial because of the limitations on 
the exercise of victims’ rights. As was mentioned in the introduction, the victims are 
third parties in the proceedings. 
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92 John Spencer, ‘Adversarial v.inquisitorial systems: is there still such a difference(2016) 20(5) 
International  Journal of Human Rights,p601-616. 
93 Carsten Stahn, “International Criminal Justice Procedure” in Carsten Stahn (ed) A Critical Introduction 
to International Criminal Law”(Cambridge University Press 2018)269-380. 





As stated previously, Article 68(3)  provides the most general provision for victim 
participation. It expressly indicates the significance of ‘personal interests’ as a 
yardstick for victims’ involvement in the proceedings. Victims interests may also 
include reparations, truth, justice and protection. It is worth mentioning that the roles 
victims play during the trials depend on their personal interests. It follows that if their 
personal interests are not affected, they may be precluded from participation. It would 
be beneficial for victims if they were included from the early stages like the preliminary 
examination, investigation or situation. Arguably, inclusion at initial phase might 
increase their sense of belonging. 
Nevertheless, it may also heighten their expectation. While it is feasible if considered, 
one implication of victims inclusion at the initial phase is that there might be a risk of 
victims’ identity being compromised. Similarly, the perpetrators or allies of the 
perpetrators may threaten the life or safety of the victims. One approach to fostering the 
effectiveness of victims' inclusion at the phase is assessing the risk and providing 
protective measures. 
Donat-Catin and Spees criticised the criminal tribunals’ function because they failed to 
focus on victims’ interests. They argued that the tribunals' inadequacies to consider 
victims’ interests led to a separation between the work of the tribunal and the victims 




of the Rwanda genocide.94An illustration of the previous tribunals’ failure to recognise 
victims’ interests led to a gap in their functions. An emphasis on this gap reveals the 
importance of victims’ interests during criminal trials. 
It is settled that the ICC’s mandate is to prosecute the perpetrators of international 
crimes95-a means to achieve justice. This mandate is known to be the primary function 
of the Prosecutor. This raises the question of the place of victims interests during the 
initiation of prosecution.  Article 53(2) highlights victims’ interests as one of the factors 
the prosecutor is required to consider if he decides not to prosecute in the interests of 
justice. Article 53(2) grants the prosecutor the power to conclude that there:  
“is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution” if, among other things a “prosecution is 
not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the 
gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime.”96 
The “interests of victims” is deemed a factor to be considered amongst other elements 
for the prosecution to make the decision “in the interests of justice.” At the same time, 
the meaning of this concept might seem ambiguous because it is not stated in Article 
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53. Nevertheless, its meaning could be inferred from the context, object and purpose of 
the Rome Statute.97From the provision of Article 53(2), victims' interests are a factor 
to be considered in determining the interests of justice. Impliedly, it is inferred that at 
this stage, victims interests should be taken into account. Arguably, since victims’ 
interests cannot be considered in their absence or without their participation, 
presumably, victims interests are deciphered through their roles before and during the 
investigation. Victim participation ensures their interests are relayed before 
investigation-a viable factor to be considered by the Prosecutor. However, we should 
bear in mind that victims interests are distinct from the prosecutor’s interests. Victim 
participation becomes meaningful where they are permitted to exercise their right to 
justice in connection with knowing the truth and obtaining reparations. Victims 
contribution to truth-finding displaces symbolic participation.98Meaningful 
participation is an integral function of criminal proceedings in contrast to the widely 
held view that victims' involvement offsets the balance of arms; a necessity for the 
determination of the truth, justice and reparations. 
Besides, the LRV argued that Article 69(1) and Article 68(3) are not legally 
incompatible given that the victim would have to swear an oath as to the truthfulness 
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of their testimony.99This assertion displaces the contention that a person cannot have 
the status of both victim and witnesses. Arguably, the trial’s purpose is to determine 
legal truth, and the Chamber has the power to weight testimony and evidence.100 The 
LRV buttressed her point for the legal compatibility between the victim's status and that 
of the witness. She explained: 
Moreover, it follows from paragraphs 97 and 99 of the Judgement o
n the appeals of  The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Cha
mber I’s Decision on victims’ participation 
that if victims can tender evidence at trial and discuss evidence addu
ced by the parties, then, a fortiori, they have the right to appear as 
witnesses, the interest being the determination of truth. 
Testimony constitutes evidence just as much as other 
materials and evidence 
We respectfully submit that the main eyewitnesses in series of 
crimes 
presented to the Chamber are most often the victims and the perpetr
ators.101 
 
In this situation, the Statute and the RPE do not grant victims the unfettered right to 
lead evidence or question witnesses. Nevertheless, they could tender evidence or 
 
99 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo, Written Submissions from the Legal Representative of Victims 
a/0009/08,a/0110/08.a/0011/08,a/0012/08,a/0013/08,a/0015/08,a/0016/08 on the Issues Raised at the 
Confirmation Hearing,Pre-Trial Chamber 1, ICC-01/04/01/07-690-tENG, 22 July 2008,paras,22-25,p.11 
100 Ibid( n 11)para. 25;The Rome Statute 1998, Article 69(4) . 
101 Ibid ,p.12,paras 26-28 




challenge evidence provided they have shown that the trial proceedings affect their 
interests. Where a victim testifies as a witness, their role as a victim is suspended under 
oath. Presumably, their position as a victim is reactivated after the testimony. 
As stated previously, Article 68(3)  provides the most general provision for victim 
participation. It expressly indicates the significance of ‘personal interests’ as a 
yardstick for victims’ involvement in the proceedings. Victims interests may also 
include reparations, truth, justice and protection. It is worth mentioning that the roles 
victims play during the trials depend on their personal interests. It follows that if their 
interests are not affected, they may be precluded from participation. It would be 
beneficial for victims if they were included from the early stages like the preliminary 
examination, investigation or situation. Arguably, inclusion at initial phase might 
increase their sense of belonging. Yet, it may also heighten their expectation. While it 
is feasible if considered, one implication of victims inclusion at the initial phase is that 
there might be a risk of victims’ identity being compromised. Similarly, the perpetrators 
or allies of the perpetrators may threaten the life or safety of the victims. One approach 
to fostering the effectiveness of victims' inclusion at the phase is assessing the risk and 
providing protective measures. 
Be that as it may, McDermott classified the participants in criminal trials into two.102 
From her perspective, the accused is the only actor with ‘enforceable rights’ because 
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of his ‘status at the trial.’ The ‘other actors’ such as the prosecutor, witnesses, victims, 
and the international community are seen as ‘interest-holders’, and holders of personal 
rights as human rights. An analysis of this literature views victims as 
stakeholders/interests. The victims are considered as ‘others’ with no enforceable 
rights. This argument connotes that their rights do not emerge from their status in 
criminal proceedings. Rather, the set of rights they are entitled is called procedural 
rights by their status. With this analysis, it shows criminal trial is offender centred. The 
accused rights are prioritised over the prosecutor and victims. McDermott’s comment 
seems to corroborate the opinion of Judge Wyngaert in the Katanga case.103This 
displaces the idea that victims' rights are needed to balance against the rights of the 
accused. 
Interestingly, the majority decision in Katanga shows the prioritisation of the 
Prosecutor’s interests over the accused right to a fair trial. One could also argue that 
victims benefited from the conviction largely because the impunity gap was moderately 
closed. Although, some authors have argued that victims have no interests in 
conviction/sentencing.104 This argument is not totally correct because victims crave for 
justice for the harm suffered. Since conviction and sentencing are the outcomes of 
criminal prosecution, it is only reasonable for victims to have interests in 
conviction/sentencing. 
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Notwithstanding, it is argued that it is not the prosecutor's duty to ensure/secure 
conviction where evidence shows that the accused is innocent. While the prosecutor's 
role spans from investigation to evidence gathering, the collection of evidence is not 
predicated on securing a conviction. Still, such evidence should be collected to establish 
the truth. The prosecutor’s role in establishing the truth continues throughout the 
investigation of the situation to trial.105It is expected that the prosecutor would carry 
out his duties objectively. 
The prosecutor is in charge of exculpatory evidence/material, which could acquit the 
accused; it is incumbent on him to submit the exculpatory evidence. In Goldstone’ 
words, “the fairness of any criminal justice system must be judge by acquittals”106 It is 
worthy to note that acquittals most times does not indicate justice; instead, it is a result 
of insufficient proof. The Prosecutor did not prove any of the charges filed against 
Katanga. The court convicted  Katanga based on charges that were singlehandedly re-
characterised by the judges.107From the above, both the prosecutor and the accused have 
interests in conviction. 
One of the rulings of the AC illustrates this distinction. The Appeal Chambers has 
refused the victims’ plight to participate under Article 68(3) concerning the 
admissibility of an appeal by the defendants because the victims failed to show that 
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their interests are affected.108 In considering  ‘personal interests’, the AC found that the 
requirement is on a case-by-case assessment. It also held that victims could not claim 
personal interests in matters that fall within the Prosecutor’s role. This ruling shows 
that victims are not assistant prosecutors, nor do they fit into the prosecutor's allies. 
Nevertheless, it seems that this decision fails to consider that there is an overlap 
between the personal interests of the prosecutors' victims and interests. One may argue 
that securing the conviction of the perpetrator falls within this category. Victims are 
interested in obtaining punishment or sentence of the perpetrator, which may be 
considered justice for the harm they have caused them. Most times, the roles of  
Prosecutor and victims are usually in line with their interests. These interests may 
intersect, as opposed to the contrasting interests between the Prosecutor and the 
defendant. 
For instance, the PTC ruled inter-alia that article 68(3) allows victims to participate in 
proceedings(situation) based on their personal interests.109 The Pre-Trial Chamber II 
found that ‘privacy and protection of victims themselves and possibly the preservation 
of evidence’,110 qualify as personal interests. This ruling sheds more light on protective 
measures, as a personal interest of victims, enabling them to present their views and 
concerns. The victims were permitted to submit their opinions and concerns based on 
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the Court's protective measures before the Chamber considers the merits of the 
application.111 
From the previous discussion, one can see that some of the Prosecutor and victims’ 
interests overlap while some are watertight. The following section will explore the 
victims’ needs. 
The next section will examine the charging documents for both Katanga and Lubanga 
cases. It is necessary to explore the content of the charges to assess the role of the 
Prosecutor in drafting the charges  and  to what extent prosecutorial discretion affects 
victims’ rights and interests  in the proceedings 
 
2.5 The Charging Document: Double-edged sword 
Of equal importance is the role of the prosecutor in framing the charging document. 
This section seeks to critically examine the charging document and its attendant 
implications for victims. 
After the prosecutor decides on whether to investigate or not, the next phase is the 
charging documents. The prosecutor must determine what charges to include, which 
also raises the question of victims’ interests in charges and charges reduction. The 
Chamber addressed the question. In the AC’s findings, for trial proceedings: “the harm 
alleged by victims and the concept of personal interests under article 68(3) of the Statute 
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must be linked with the charges confirmed against the accused”.112 This ruling 
established a connection between the personal interests of victims, the damage and the 
charges. The charges set a foundation for the victims and their interests. 
Given that the Prosecutor is responsible for drafting the charging document, where the 
Prosecutor by intention or omission fails to include one or two alleged crimes in the 
charging document, it may potentially create an impunity gap. The AC ruled that a 
person is considered a victim if they can prove they suffered harm due to the crime 
included in the charges relevant to the case.113 The definition of victim finds its roots 
in the charging document. A person is not qualified to be a victim if the harm he suffered 
from is excluded from the charges. Hence, this highlights the significance of charges 
and their connection to victims. 
Prosecutor has a general interest in determining truth;114 This transgresses through the 
investigation stage to the pre-trial, the main trial and sentencing. The determination of 
this truth starts from investigations to the drafting of the charges. It is within the 
Prosecutor’s powers to draft the charges. Plausibly, the selectivity of offences is 
reflected in the charges. In this process,  the charging document may reveal the partial 
truth. If this is left unchallenged, presumably, the whole truth may become lost in the 
process. 
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Due to the ICC's mostly adversarial system, it appears that the determination of truth 
suffers from a considerable drawback. Previous studies have demonstrated that the 
adversarial system does not promote truth-finding because of the two parties' 
polarisation. The prosecutor and the defence are pitched against each other to persuade 
the judge in their favour.115It has been reported that the inquisitorial system of 
procedure promotes truth-finding than the adversarial system where the judge is 
passive. 
The Prosecutor’s broad discretionary powers are not regulated provided he acts within 
his mandates. Particularly concerning temporal, jurisdictional material and personal 
competence.116 He decides whether to press charges or to initiate prosecution. Cecile 
asserts that in selecting situations and cases, the Prosecutor does not consider credible 
evidence; instead, he considers the gravity and interests of justice.117Recourse to 
‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice’ further enhances the prosecutor's powers because 
these concepts are not well defined in the Statute.118 
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According to Aptel, there are five determinative factors which restrict the scope of 
international criminal prosecutions.119 The first factor is the determination of specific 
entities which falls within the applicable jurisdictional scope.120 This component tends 
to restrict the scope of investigation by focusing on a specific entity. The entity could 
be a State or geographic area. 
The second component is the individual targets to be investigated and prosecuted.121 It 
is believed that in hostilities/armed conflict, a lot of perpetrators are involved in the 
commission of crimes, but the mandate of the ICC is to try the most responsible. It 
follows that the ICC is under an obligation to filter through a large number of 
perpetrators to capture the masterminds or most responsible perpetrators. Consequently, 
this reduces the amount of suspects/culpable persons for trial. A possible implication 
of the selection is the limitation of the number of potentially affected victims. The 
exclusion of lower-ranked officers may marginalise some victims unless they are 
prosecuted in the national jurisdiction. For instance, the ICC Prosecutor felt Lubanga 
was the most responsible for crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Hence, the main reason for his arrest and arraignment is that there were other 
masterminds. Kambale concluded that some other high ranking instigators escaped 





122 Pascal Kambale,  ‘The ICC and Lubanga :Missed Opportunities ‘ SSRC Forums:African Futures, 16 
March 2012, available at http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/03/16/african-futures-icc-missed-
opportunities/  last accessed 16 March 2019. 
123 Ibid.  




contended that the most severe crimes in Ituri were committed by the RCD-
ML(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie—Mouvement de Libération), of 
which Lubanga was just a minister. 
Furthermore, the third component is the selection of specific factual allegations to be 
listed in the charges.124 Limitation of factual allegations is usually done to limit the 
number of situations or cases to be tried to a few ‘illustrative events’. An illustration is 
seen in the Prosecutor v. Katanga, where the Prosecutor limited the charges to crimes 
committed on 24 February 2003 during the attack on the village of   Bogoro(DRC).125 
Multiple attacks occurred in other districts within that period. Similarly, in the Lubanga 
case,  at the commencement of the investigation, the Prosecutor’s declared he would  
‘investigate grave crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the DRC since 1 July 
2002’.126He mentioned reports from States, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations on ‘thousands of death by mass murder and summary 
execution in the DRC since 2002’.The Prosecutor observed ‘a pattern of rape, torture, 
forced displacement and illegal use of soldiers’ from the information.127 Unfortunately, 
the Prosecutor failed to investigate these allegations.  The charges were very narrow 
that it overlooked the massive scale of armed conflict and some of its consequences. 
The limitations of these illustrative events are often not unconnected to the challenges 
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inherent in evidence gathering. Combs and Del Ponte points our attention to the 
problems encountered in collecting evidence for a large scale crime.128Challenges of 
this nature may constrain the powers of the Prosecutor to expand the content or events 
in the charges 
In addition, the fourth component is the decision to restrict the legal characterisation of 
the offence. A constrained legal characterisation may inadvertently result in narrow 
charges. Such may restrict the charges to a one-count or two-count charges, thereby 
disregarding the other alleged crimes. For example, in the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor 
framed a  two-count charge of recruitment of children under the age of 15 years and 
using children under the ages of 15 to participate actively in hostilities.129 By 
implication, this two-count charge in the Lubanga case marginalised other crimes like 
SGBV and cruel and inhumane treatment. Kambale observed that after two years of 
investigation, it was disappointing that the OTP could only come up with one count of 
charge-conscription and enlistment of child soldiers- amongst other serious crimes 
committed in Ituri.130  
Besides, some human right organisations, NGOs and victims’ association across the 
country questioned the Prosecutor’s motives for not taking into account other serious 
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crimes committed in Ituri, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. They opined 
that the Prosecutor’s failure in this aspect might affect the ICC’s credibility.131It may 
be inferred that the public trust in the ICC’s prosecution of crimes increases its 
legitimacy. It has commonly been assumed that the ICC's legitimacy springs from its 
mandate; to prosecute persons responsible for the gross violations of human rights. A 
derogation from the mandate may question the court’s legitimacy.  
Aptel describes the fifth component as selections made by the Prosecutor, which affects 
the scope of accountability as a result of their  ‘discretionary choice of witnesses and 
victims-witnesses.’132’ As such, Aptel submits that the Prosecutor makes decisions 
which decides the victims to appear before the Court and tell their stories, while other 
victims are deprived of telling their stories or participating. The  Lubanga case confirms 
Aptel’s submissions. The selection of witnesses and victim-witnesses who appeared 
before the court to testify, but the court dismissed them and, declared their testimonies 
unreliable and non-credible. Aptel also notes that the prosecutor's discretionary powers 
to select situations and cases have “fundamental ethical, political and historical 
consequences.”133 An honest mistake in the prosecutor’s selection might emanate from 
personal conviction or other indispensable irregularities. 
These taken together suggest restrictive access to justice for victims due to the 
Prosecutor's sweeping discretionary powers. Unfortunately, the ICC cannot try all the 
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perpetrators because it will slow down the Court's efficiency. However, it is inferred 
that these determinant components provide access to justice for the selected 
few(victims). 
To further our understanding of the impact of Prosecutorial discretion on victims’ rights 
and interests, the next section explores the charging document in Lubanga and Katanga 
cases. 
2.5.1Charging Document: Lubanga case 
Before discussing the prosecutor's charges against Lubanga, it is necessary to analyse 
the background to the charges. This section will also explore significant issues which 
came up before the initiation of prosecution of the suspect. 
2.5.2 Background to the Charges 
Thomas Lubanga was a suspect awaiting trial in a national court in Congo on charges 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the DRC’s military 
criminal code.134 According to his proprio motu powers to obtain a State referral in the 
situation of the Democratic Republic of Congo,135 the DRC referred the situation to the 
Court after Prosecutor specified that he would use his proprio motu powers to 
commence investigations in the DRC.136The President of the DRC referred to the 
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situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The President wrote, addressed 
and signed to the Prosecutor. Subsequently, the DRC requested the Prosecutor to 
conduct investigations to ascertain if they could prosecute one or two individuals. The 
main request was to investigate and prosecute crimes that happened within its 
jurisdiction since July 2002. Therefore,  to foster the investigations, the National 
authorities committed to working together with the ICC. 
Following several communications and correspondences from individuals and non-
governmental organisations to the Prosecutor, On July 2003, the Prosecutor announced 
that he would examine and follow the situation in the DRC. He specified that the 
situation would be a matter of the most significant concern for the office.137 
Subsequently, the OTP continued its working in making enquiries into the situation in 
the region of Ituri, in  DRC. In September 2003, the Prosecutor notified the Assembly 
of States  Parties that he was prepared to receive permission from the  PTC to commence 
an investigation on his motion., nevertheless, referral and support from the DRC will 
expedite the functions of the OTP. Pursuant to the Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
application for an international warrant of arrest of  Lubanga, as a warlord.138 The 
suspect, Lubanga, was arrested and transferred to The Hague.  
In a press statement addressing Lubanga’s arrest warrant, the Prosecutor said “[f]orcing 
children to be killers jeopardises the future of mankind”139 This sentence highlights the 
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severity of the crime allegedly committed by Lubanga. However, one should note that 
Lubanga was awaiting prosecution for the alleged commission of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide in one of Congo’s military tribunal before the 
intervention of the Prosecutor. It is somewhat surprising that the Prosecution charged 
Lubanga on a single count of child soldiers' recruitment and, using them to participate 
actively in hostilities. At first, one may think that he was charged for using child soldiers 
to preclude the rule against double jeopardy since there were other charges against him 
at Congo military tribunal. Nonetheless, the crimes Lubanga was awaiting trial in DRC 
were umbrella crimes with no elements of crimes. It is inconceivable why the 
Prosecutor decided to focus on a one-count charge. 
Schabas criticised the Prosecutor for this single charge. In his words: “the justice system 
of the DRC was doing a better job than the Court itself because it was addressing crimes 
of greater gravity”.140  From Schabas’s assertions, it seems that the single charge made 
by the Prosecutor did not meet the expectation of the community, given that national 
jurisdiction had charged him with three crimes. Thus, it is thought that the Prosecutor 
dropped the threshold drastically. Arguably, if the victims within the domestic 
jurisdictions had hoped for severe punishment given the gravity of these three crimes 
against Lubanga, a probable implication of the Prosecution’s actions would be a 
reduction in the number of victims of crimes, and sabotage of their right to remedy. 
Possibly, the one-count charge might not have met their expectations. 
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 Schabas points to the possibility of the hierarchy of crimes; genocide and crimes 
against humanity are considered higher crimes than war crimes.141It is believed that 
based on this argument, the Prosecutor decided to investigate and prosecute the use of 
child soldiers. However, where genocide and crimes against humanity are considered 
of more gravity than war crimes, it is only reasonable that the Prosecutor initiates the 
prosecution of higher crimes than war crimes. As previously stated, it could be that the 
Prosecutor wanted to commence investigations on the crime which the suspect was not 
being charged at that time to prevent disrupting the local investigations or trial. 
 Furthermore, a reassurance of the Prosecutor’s promise to further investigations is 
shown in the same statement: 
 “[T]he investigation is ongoing, we will continue to investigate more crimes 
committed by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and us……[].”142 
The above extract(without mincing words) seems to pass across the message that the 
prosecutor will continue to investigate more crimes committed by Thomas Lubanga. It 
is believed that this statement implied further investigations into other alleged crimes 
committed by the suspect, Lubanga. It is not certain if the prosecutor conducted more 
investigations, given the absence of new or additional charges against the 
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suspect/accused. The Prosecutor did not subsequently investigate allegations of sexual 
and gender-based violence and cruelty. 
The trial of Lubanga commenced on 26 January 2008, according to ICC’s jurisdiction 
on gross violations of human rights.143The Prosecutor charged Lubanga for the alleged 
enlistment and conscription of children under 15 years and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities.144 It appears there was a discrepancy between charges contained 
in the arrest warrant obtained by the Prosecutor and the charges against the Lubanga at 
the national court(Congo).145While Lubanga was awaiting prosecution for genocide 
and crimes against humanity at a national court in DRC, the Prosecutor brought a one-
count charge of the enlistment and conscription of the use of child soldiers to participate 
actively in hostilities.146According to his arrest warrant, the suspect, the Prosecutor 
arraigned Lubanga at the ICC. 
Schabas notes the inconsistencies surrounding the commencement of the prosecution 
of Lubanga.147In the Prosecutor’s statements, one could infer that he had to choose to 
initiate Lubanga's prosecution or address civilians' wilful killing by British troops in 
Iraq. In addressing these issues, the Prosecutor submitted that this wilful killing was 
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insufficient to require further investigation. 148 The arrest of Lubanga was effected 
within days; the Prosecutor made this statement.149The Prosecutor made a distinction 
between his initial statements and ‘thousands’ of deaths in the DRC. Subsequently, the 
Prosecutor initiated the arrest of Lubanga on the allegations of enlistment and 
conscription of child soldiers. The claims of the recruitment of child soldiers are devoid 
of accusations of homicide. In Schabas’ words, ‘the Prosecutor was comparing apples 
to oranges. 150 He saw no reason why the Prosecutor had to choose between initiating 
investigations in Iraq or commencing investigations on Lubanga(Congo). Schabas 
criticised the Prosecutor’s exercise to prioritise the enlistment and conscription of 
children in DRC over the wilful killing of civilians in Iraq.151 From his perspective, the 
PTC determined the gravity of the one-count charge against Lubanga on zero 
thresholds, which explain the fault in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in selecting 
situations and subsequent framing of charges. 
The Prosecutor identified gravity of crime under the Court's jurisdiction; he proceeded 
to investigate the court's authorisation. This point underscores the prosecutorial 
discretion in the selection of cases.152As mentioned earlier, The Prosecutor chose the 
DRC situation over the ‘thousands of death in Iraq’. However, there was no information 
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followed’ in his communications.153In this communication, the Prosecutor did not 
specify if the situation was of ‘sufficient gravity’.154 In line with the OTP’s policy 
paper, the specification for determination of ‘gravity of a case’ is the act that constituted 
the crime, and the degree of participation in its commission.155 The criteria clarify the 
fact that gravity of a case is not exclusively attached to the act that constituted the crime. 
The degree of participation in its commission connotes the perpetrators who “bear the 
greatest responsibility” In 2005, the Prosecutor, in his statement, came up with two 
factors to be taken into account in determining the gravity of the crimes. The total 
number of deceased people, victims and the impact of the crimes.156 The prosecutor’s 
conception of justice might influence his choices. 
 It has commonly been assumed that an independent Prosecutor without limitations or 
accountability to anybody/institution could be a threat to protecting international peace, 
security and the Court itself. The Prosecutor determines which situation warrants 
investigations and prosecution. At this phase, it is believed that the prosecutor's actions 
and inactions have consequences for the victims. Danner opines that if the public 
discerns that the Court is politically biased, it is likely that the Court would lose its 
moral authority.157 This argument is notable because it might affect its effectiveness 
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and legitimacy if the Court is perceived to be politically biased. Buchanan believes that 
the ICC suffers from “legitimacy deficit” on the grounds of prolonged inconsistency 
between its performance and its justifying functions.158The supposed deficit could be a 
consequence of institutional barriers or boundaries beyond the powers of the ICC. The 
jurisdiction of the ICC is subject to the state party consent.159The ICC may not have the 
authority to initiate State investigations that have not ratified the Rome Statute.160It is 
found that the ICC’s legitimacy deficits boil down to selective prosecution and 
“arbitrarily circumscribed jurisdiction”.161 This chapter is concerned with the former. 
Where the Prosecutor fails to initiate investigations and prosecute a case, ascribing such 
failure of role to the ICC as the umbrella institution is acceptable because it underscores 
the significance and sensitivity of the OTP’s office, one cannot separate the function of 
the OTP  from the ICC. The gap in the role of the OTP may inadvertently call into 
question the legitimacy of the ICC. While it is observed that there is an academic debate 
on the legality of the ICC, the controversy on legitimacy should not be a criterion to 
withdraw support for the ICC's role within the international community.162 
Nevertheless, debate on the ICC's validity should not override the ICC mandate; it may 
serve as checks and balances from the public.  
 
158 Allen Buchanan, “The Complex Epistemology of Institutional Legitimacy Assessments, as Illustrated 
by the Case of the International Criminal Court” (2019)33(2) Temple International and Comparative 
Law Journal, 323-339,p335. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Margaret de Guzman & Timothy Kelly, “The International Criminal Court is Legitimate Enough to 
Deserve Support”(2019)33(2) Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 397-404,p404. 




Therefore, gaps in selecting situations and conduct in investigations could have a 
snowball effect on both victims and the trial process. 
After this, the next section will explore the charging document's content and the 
relationship with the prosecutor's role. 
 2.5.3 The charging document 
On 28 August 2006, the Prosecutor filed the first charging document before the PTC. 
The document is structured into two sections. The charging document's main content 
was the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities. It was divided into two sub-headings.163 The 
first was a series of general allegations called “Pattern of the FLPC in enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities.”164 The second subheading described a series of more specific 
allegations concerning six identified former child soldiers entitled “individual 
cases.”165  It is noteworthy that the first section had equivocal formulation with no 
specific reference to dates, location or identities of victims. 
On the other hand, the second section gave comprehensive details of the six alleged 
former child soldiers' individual stories. This section set out the accurate mention of the 
locations of their alleged conscription or enlistment, approximate dates, as well as their 
alleged participation in hostilities and the training/activities during their time in the 
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UPC/FLPC.166 Lubanga objected to the charging document, particularly the first section 
which was very vague. He argued that the factual allegations were ambiguous and 
violated the defendant's right to be informed of the charges' nature and details. In his 
written submission, the Prosecutor argued that the ‘pattern’ portion was different from 
the ‘individual cases’; as such, it was not specific like the latter. He pointed out that the 
‘individual cases section’ contained precise details on victims' identities, dates, and 
locations of the crimes. 
Judge Usacka described the content of the charging document as ‘vague’, especially the 
first part which was referred to as ‘pattern.’ Such part represented a  ‘contextual or 
background information’167  Judge Usacka opined that the two counts-‘pattern’ and 
‘individual cases’ were independent of each other. Hence, the ‘individual cases’ 
specificity cannot be imported into the content of the first section, the ‘pattern’ since it 
does not contain the minimum level of detail required by the court's legal framework.168 
One implication of this is that the allegations in ‘the individual cases’ is not an extension 
of ‘the pattern’ neither does it give it an ‘independent value’.169 On account of this, the 
prosecutor restricted the allegations against Lubanga to the two-count charge. 
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These previous sections have explored the prosecutor's role to the charges of Lubanga 
case and the charges of Lubanga. This section shall examine the charging document of 
Katanga in to understand the charges. 
 
2.6 Charging Document: Katanga 
2.6.1Background to the case 
On April 19, 2004, by referral, the DRC government requested the ICC to determine if 
it could investigate the DRC situation and ascertain one or more culpable persons, 
accused of crimes that fall within the court's jurisdiction.170On June 23, 2004, the ICC 
Prosecutor commenced an official investigation into the Ituri district's alleged crimes. 
The investigations revealed sufficient evidence to establish the joint military operations 
carried out by the FRPI and FNI members during an attack on the village of Bogoro in 
February 2003.171The members of these militias specifically targeted civilians of the 
Hema ethnicity. The combatants committed pillaging, the murder of civilians, sexual 
slavery, rape, and children under fifteen years to participate actively in the 
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hostilities.172The classification of these criminal acts fell under war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
 On June 25, 2007, the Prosecution requested arrest warrants for both Katanga and 
Ngudjolo.173In response to the request, the Chamber issued unsealed arrest warrant 
against Katanga and Ngudjolo on October 18, 2007, and February 7, 2008, respectively. 
On March 10, 2008, The PTC 1 joined the two cases because the suspects, Katanga and 
Ngudjolo allegedly shared responsibility for crimes committed during the joint attack 
on the Bogoro and, the available evidence linked these suspects together.174It is also 
noted that joinder of the case would not be prejudicial to the victims' interests, and 
witnesses would it adversely affect the defendants.175 
The ICC arraigned Germain Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui as the former leaders of the 
Forces de Resistance Patriotique Ituri(FRPI) and Front des Nationalists et 
Integrationistes(FNI) respectively. They were charged for the alleged commission of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity during an attack in the village of Bogoro, in 
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Ituri district of eastern DRC on 24 February 2003.176 The crimes spanned from January 
to March 2003. However, the charging document limited the main crime under 
investigation to 24 February 2003. 
On 26 September 2008, PTC 1 issued the Decision on the confirmation of charges. It 
found unanimously that  “there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds 
to believe that, during the attack on Bogoro of 24 February 2003, Katanga and 
Ngudjolo, as principal indirect co-perpetrators, jointly committed through other 
persons, within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the following crimes with 
intent: 
1.war crime of wilful killing under article 8(2)(a)(i); 
2.the crime against humanity of murder under Article 7(1)(a); 
3.The war crime of directing an attack against a civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities under article 8(2)(b)(i); and 
4.the war crime of destruction of property under 8(2)(b)(xii); 
5.the war crime of pillaging under article 8(2)(b)(xvi); 
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6.the war crime of using children under the age of fifteen years to participate actively 
in hostilities as set out in article 8(2)(b)(xxvi)’.177 
7.the war crime of sexual slavery under article 8(2)(xxii); 
8.the crime against humanity of sexual slavery under article 7(1)(g); 
9. The war crime of rape under article 8(2)(b)(xxii); 
10.the crime against humanity of rape under article 7(1)(g).178 
It is observed that the charges reveal different crimes committed within one single event 
on a day. The charges are considered to be comprehensive as opposed to the narrow 
charges in Lubanga. However, these charges were limited to a single day and event 
rather than a more extended period. The ICC prosecutor reduced the scope of his 
investigation to the Ituri region because of the gravity of crimes which occurred in Ituri 
conflict.179 
The LRV also adduced evidence to prove that the Lendu and the Ngiti attackers 
massacred civilian population in the events that emerged at Bogoro on 24 February 
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2004, without making a distinction between the UPC combatants and 
civilians.180Corroborated evidence reported that the combatants killed roughly 200 
people on the 24 February 2004. The evidence indicated that the intention behind the 
attack was the elimination of civilians and not military objectives. The LRV reminded 
the Chambers that it heard specific corroborating testimonies which emphasized several 
cases of women being raped and taken into sexual slavery181 
However,  Judge Anita Usacka, in her dissenting opinion held that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the accused persons jointly committed through other people, 
within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the charges of rape and sexual 
slavery, both as war crimes and crimes against humanity within the meaning of articles 
8(2)(b)(xxii) and 7(1)(g) of the Statute, based on Article 61(7)(c)(i).182She requested 
the Prosecutor to provide further evidence in respect of these charges.183For this reason, 
it is shown that SGBV requires a higher evidentiary burden. 
The ICTJ notes that the ICC prosecutor could have charged the accused persons of 
fewer crimes committed during several events over a long period.184The charges 
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contained multiple attacks which occurred in one day, 24 February 2004. To this end, 
the charging document factored out hostilities which took place in the same period. 
On November 21, 2012, Trial Chamber severed the cases and, announced its intention 
to the participants that Katanga’s mode of liability as an indirect co-perpetrator and 
principal under Article 25(3)(a)may be subject to legal re-characterisation in 
accordance to Regulation 55, to assess his responsibility as an accessory (Article 
25(3)(d).  Subsequently, Trial Chamber II acquitted Ngudjolo of all charges, because 
the Prosecutor could not provide sufficient evidence to prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Chamber commented on the prosecutor's inadequacies in 
evidence gathering and the flawed testimonies of the prosecutor's three principal 
witnesses.185 Accordingly, the TC changed Katanga’s mode of liability from 
indirect(principal) co-perpetrator to an accomplice(accessory) 
Although, the counts of these charges, to some extent, are comprehensive. However, 
the content is limited to a single day event, thereby neglecting the other multiple attacks 
during that period. 
Jon Heller and Jacobs criticised the deficiencies of the prosecutor’s 
investigations.186They argue that the Prosecutor failed to prove any of the allegations 
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in the charges. As previously discussed, Judge Usacka, in her dissenting opinion, 
requested the Prosecutor to conduct further investigations into the allegations of rape 
and sexual violence.187It is not sure if the Prosecutor conducted more investigation into 
SGBV because the TC acquitted Katanga of SGBV. The acquittal shows the 
consequences of insufficient investigations at the OTP. 
Having discussed the background to the case, the next part shall critically analyse 
Regulation 55 vis-à-vis the prosecutor's powers and its implications on victims' rights 
and interests. 
2.7 Regulation 55 
The Court's Regulations may be described as an official document made by the Judges 
of the Court to adopt rules for the Court's functions.188It is also referred to as judge-
made laws. ‘A routine function’ necessary for the operations of the court.189This 
Regulation is adopted according to Article 52 of the Rome Statute. One of the most 
crucial section of this Regulation is Regulation 55.  
 A poorly drafted or ambiguous charging document could sabotage victims access to 
justice or remedy. From this, charging documents are significant for victims. 
Regulation 55 permits the Chamber to change the legal characterisation of facts 
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provided the recharacterisation does not exceed the facts and circumstances described 
in the charges.190 
This section explores the extent of influence prosecutorial discretion has on victims 
through the interpretation of Regulation 55 by the court. 
Regulation 55 provides: 
1. “In its decision  under Article 74, the Trial Chamber may change the legal 
characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6,7 or 8, or 
to accord with the form of participation of the accused  under articles 25 and 
28, without exceeding  the facts and circumstances described in the charges 
and any amendments to the charges.”191 
2. [i]t appears to the Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to 
change, the Chamber shall give notice to the participants of such possibility and 
having heard the evidence, shall, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, give the 
participants the opportunity to make oral or written submissions..”192 
 
From observation, the provision vests the Chamber with the power to modify the 
charges. It makes it incumbent on the Chamber to notify the participants of such 
possibility and time to prepare their evidence. One key issue which this provision 
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introduces is the amendment of charges. As explained earlier, the Prosecutor is 
responsible for drafting the charges. However, an omission of allegations in the 
charging document raises the question of who amends the charges. The above provision 
infers that the Chamber ‘may’ change the legal characterization of facts to correspond 
with the crimes or the accused's form of participation. There is a condition; such 
amendment must not exceed “the facts and circumstances described in the charges and 
any amendments to the charges.”193The last part of the provision imposes a cap on the 
recharacterisation of facts, which limits radical alteration of the content of charges. 
Regulation 55 empowers the court to modify the legal characterisation of facts in the 
charges. A commentator contends that this provision transgresses some Rome Statute 
provisions because it enables the judges to amend the charges under Article 61(9),194 
an encroachment on the prosecutor's exclusive role. By comparison, it is possible that 
Regulation 55 could be activated to enable the judge in the interpretation of the law 
where, otherwise if an action is not taken, it could potentially lead to injustice or 
prejudice the fair trial rights of the accused. 
At this point, it is necessary to analyse the application and consequences of Regulation 
55 for victims at the ICC. By focusing on the legal re-characterisation of facts in both 
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Lubanga and Katanga cases, the following section intends to analyse how the activation 
of Regulation 55 affects victims’ rights and interests. 
 
2.7.1 Legal re-characterisation of facts: Lubanga case visited 
Arguably, the narrow scope of the charges against Lubanga restricted the number of 
victims affected and the alleged crimes. The omission raised questions about the gaps 
or inadequacies of the OTP’s strategy.195 Kambale observed that after two years of 
investigation, it was disappointing that the OTP could only come up with one count of 
charge-conscription and enlistment of child soldiers- amongst other serious crimes 
committed in Ituri.196 
In response to the narrow charges, some human right organisations, NGOs and civil 
society across the country questioned the Prosecutor’s motives for not taking into 
account other serious crimes committed in Ituri, which falls within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. They opined that the Prosecutor’s failure in this aspect might affect the ICC’s 
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credibility.197Right from the PTC’s issuance of  Lubanga’s arrest warrant, the charges 
omitted rape and sexual violence allegations.198The PTC confirmed the charges of war 
crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers.199 
An NGO, Women Initiatives for Gender Justice(WIGJ)  brought the Prosecutor's 
attention via a letter, to narrow charges against Lubanga. They referred to the 
Prosecutor’s statement where he reported that he would investigate the reports by states 
which included: ‘alleged  pattern of rape, torture, forced displacement and the illegal 
use of child soldiers.”200 They reminded the Prosecutor that he had made statements 
over 12 months which confirmed that the DRC situation included summary executions, 
mass murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced 
displacement.201 They lamented about the restrictive nature of the charges to the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. Although, they acknowledged the ICC’s 
selectivity and limited resources in conducting investigations. 
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Nevertheless, they opined that if the ICC proceedings were to be fair and just, it was 
‘necessary that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a transparent and principled 
way’.202 Also, they noted that the willingness of victims/survivors and witnesses of 
SGBV to come forward. In expressing their concerns, they complained about the 
prosecutor's reluctance to investigate sexual violence crimes effectively, given its 
challenges. In conclusion, they persuaded the Prosecutor to include the crimes of SGBV 
in the charges. Apparently, this raised the question of whether sexual violence was an 
intrinsic part of child soldiers' recruitment and use. Despite the persuasion of the WIGJ, 
the Prosecutor was indifferent to their objection. 
Subsequently, under a joint request made by the legal representatives of victims, in May 
2006, the LRV filed a motion requesting the Trial Chamber to modify the facts of the 
charges to include charges of inhumane treatment and sexual slavery as war crimes. 
The TC notified the parties of its intention to characterise the facts under Regulation 
55. The LRV requested the Trial Chamber to apply Regulation 55  for an ‘additional 
legal characterisation to the facts and circumstances contained in the charging 
document; the charging document had a one-count charge of conscripting, enlisting and 
using children to participate actively in hostilities(as war crimes). In the LRV’s 
argument, the TC had the authority to change the facts' legal characterisation because 
the additional charges were part of the facts and circumstances of the charges confirmed 
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against the accused by the PTC.203These additional charges were not new to the content 
of the charging document. 
In addressing the victims’ request, Majority of Trial Chamber included the LRVs 
additional charges, with Judge Fulford dissenting, he ruled that “that legal 
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 
55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”204The majority noted that it was willing to hear 
arguments from the parties and consider whether these facts could be re-characterised 
to include inhumane/cruel treatment and sexual slavery under articles 7(1)(g) and 
Article 8(2). According to the majority, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)are distinct 
provisions from 55(1).205 As such, they can be interpreted separately. At the same time, 
Regulation 55(1) permits legal re-characterisation of facts unless the factual basis for 
such re-characterisation exceeds the facts stated in the charges. Subparagraphs (2) does 
not restrict legal characterisation to the fact and circumstances stated in the Charges. 
This provision envisages that any re-characterisation can exceed the factual scope of 
the charges.206  The Majority held that Regulation 55 is applicable to re-characterise the 
facts to include allegations of inhumane treatment and sexual slavery. The majority also 
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noted that it ‘was not bound’ by the facts and circumstances contained in confirmed 
charges by the PTC.207 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fulford found that Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute 
and Regulation 52 confers the PTC with the exclusive authority to frame and amend 
charges. Additionally, Article 74(2) stipulates that the TC’s final decision is restricted 
to the facts and circumstances stated in the charging document.208He criticised the 
majority’s interpretation of Reg.55 in view that understanding the said regulation 
cannot be divided into two distinct stages. Instead, the sub regulations should be 
interpreted together.209 
Article 61(9): 
“After the charges are confirmed, and before the trial has begun, the 
Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the 
accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or to 
substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those charges 
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must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with the 
permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.”210 
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Fulford, he notes: 
“inevitably, it follows that a modification to the legal characterisation of the facts 
under Regulation 55 must not constitute an amendment to the charges, an additional 
charge, a substitute charge or a withdrawal charge, because these are each governed 
by Article 61(9)”.211 
It appears Judge Fulford's reasoning followed strict adherence to the black letter law, 
without making an assumption. He also criticised the Majority’s attempt at dividing the 
interpretation of the subparagraph of Regulation 55. He stated that the subparagraphs 
should be read conjunctively instead of separately because the latter application would 
likely infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial.212 
On appeal, the Defense accentuated the incompatibility between Regulation 55,  the 
Rome Statute and the accused fair trial rights.213In a similar vein, the Defense 
contended the TC’s decision on the subparagraphs' disjunctive interpretation. It stated 
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that these subparagraphs are interdependent rather than distinctive.214The Prosecutor 
opposed the TC’s decision on the division of the subparagraphs of Reg.55 into two 
stages.215 The AC reversed the TC’s decision; it rejected the defence’s argument that 
Reg.55 is “inherently incompatible” with the Rome Statute or rights of the accused to 
a fair trial. While stressing that Regulation 55 was ‘necessary for the Court’s routine 
functioning’.216It also stressed the consolidated interpretation of subparagraphs because 
they are interrelated provisions.217 
Besides, the AC highlighted that the Prosecutor has the exclusive power to select 
charges and the underlying factual elements. Hence, the decision of the TC on 
Regulation 55 was contrary to the Statute. The AC decision confirms the exclusive 
power of the Prosecutor to draft and amend charges. The AC emphasised that ‘new 
facts and circumstances which are not contained in the charging document may only be 
added under the procedure of Article 61(9) of the Statute.218 This incorporation would 
change the scope of the trial. It is only within the Prosecutor's powers under Article 
54(1) to effect this change.219The AC observes: 
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“[i]t is the prosecutor who, pursuant to Article 54(1) of the 
Statute,..is tasked with the investigation of crime under the 
jurisdiction of the Court and who, pursuant to Article 61(1) and (3) 
of the Statute,…proffers charges against suspects. To give the Trial 
Chamber the power to extend proprio motu the scope of a trial to 
facts and circumstances not alleged by the Prosecutor would be 
contrary to the distribution of powers under the Statute.”220 
 The ruling heightened the prosecutor’s function in amplifying the scope of the trial. It 
also revealed that it is ultra vires the TC's power to extend the scope of the trial to facts 
and circumstances that exceeds the content of the charging document. It seems the TC 
has the powers to modify the charges, given that it does not introduce new facts and 
circumstances into the subject matter of the trial. This ruling begs whether sexual 
slavery and cruel and inhumane treatments are new facts and circumstances in this 
situation. If cruel and inhumane treatment is categorised as a constitutive part of child 
soldiers' recruitment, then it is not considered ‘new facts and circumstances’. Thus it 
would mean it is within the Chamber's power to concede to the request of the LRV and 
modify the charges. 
By contrast, where these alleged crimes are considered a  separate crime from the 
crimes contained in the charges, it is within the prosecutor's exclusive power to amend 
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the charges. Conceivably, these distinct crimes may be construed as ‘new facts’ and 
‘circumstances’. 
A cursory look at the impugned decision reflects that the judge is either pro-victims’ 
rights or a judge from the civil law system, an active judge in proceedings with 
extensive control over the proceedings. Jon Heller describes the impugned decision : 
“The Judges, whether at the pre-trial phase or at trial, have no power whatsoever in 
relation to the content of the charges……..The judges, in their never-ending quest to 
maintain control over the proceedings, included in the Regulations of the Court….”221 
The judges of the Trial Chamber's impugned decision and the attempt to modify the 
charges indicated a more receptive stance towards the victims’ plight. One could argue 
that it demonstrates a civil law tradition with active judges. In addition, it seems the 
reasoning behind the impugned decision encapsulates the alleged crimes of sexual 
violence and cruel and inhume treatment as inevitable consequences or an intrinsic part 
of the recruitment of child soldiers. The AC reversed this decision because it infringed 
on the prosecutor’s power, reasoning that the proposed charges were separate and 
independent crimes that would introduce new facts. 
Arguably, the AC’s decision points out the legal technicality in the interpretation of 
Regulation 55  as well as the role of the prosecutor in the framing of charges. The 
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technicality that arose, in this case, was left unaddressed by the AC decision, regardless 
of the impact it had on victims of SGBV and cruel treatment. The AC  applied the Law 
as it is-positive law-not as it ought to be. The decision confirms that it was beyond the 
TC’s power to amend the charges regardless of the victims' situation. 
The AC decision also underscores the fact that the TC  or the victims cannot challenge 
the prosecutor's discretion to draft and amend charges. It is only within his exclusive 
power to amend the charges, notwithstanding that his actions could potentially lead to 
injustice for the victims involved. 
Specifically, one could argue that TC attempted to initiate Regulation 55 to fill the 
impunity gap and, obtain justice for victims. One commentator thinks that if a gap in 
the legal characterisation(at the pre-trial stage) would acquit the accused of allegations 
against him, such decision prejudices the statute's aim to end impunity.222  However, 
the  AC reversed TC’s decision. AC’s decision highlights the principle that decisions 
must conform to positive laws instead of morality. Jon Heller argues that judicial 
activism often breaches the principle of legality and the rights of the defence.223  
Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that where technicalities arise during the 
interpretation of the law, it may be acceptable if the judges make recourse to morality 








formalism).224Unless if this could lead to abuse of judicial power. The judge has to 
interpret the law and fill gaps in positive law.225 Judicial activism is defined as rulings 
influenced by the judge’s personal decisions where a judge decides to reach a verdict 
based on their preference instead of strictly applying the law.226The judge may be 
politically motivated while performing the judicial role; a derogation from the norm.  
Judicial Role is described as “normative expectations shared by judges and related 
actors regarding how a given judicial office should be performed.”227 According to 
Gibson, role orientations is described as what judges “think they ought to do.”228 
Therefore, judicial decisions are believed to be a product of judicial role 
orientations(doctrinal and jurisprudential principles) rather than the political factors.229 
It is thought that judicial activism encourages political interference instead of adhering 
to the law. In contrast, the judge could interpret the law to enhance desirable outcomes, 
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especially where adherence to the law would lead to injustice. Notwithstanding, the 
rationale for such decision deviates from the stated law. 
From the above, it is clear that the prosecutor's role in framing charges inevitably 
influences the possibility of victims accessing justice. The charging document's content 
may reflect the whole truth or the partial truth about the atrocities, and partial truth 
might negatively impact victims' interests and their ability to access justice. Therefore, 
the Prosecutor must be cautious to ensure that his powers' exercise does not sabotage 
victims’ rights and interests. 
While some of the PTC judges have been liberal to accommodate victims' interests 
amending the charges, further interpretation by the appellate judges entrenched the 
prosecutor's powers to determine the scope of the charges. Thus, tension still exists in 
acclimatising victims rights and interests within criminal trials. 
So far, this section has analysed the impact of prosecutorial discretion on victims’ rights 
and interests; the next section shall explore Regulation 55 and the Katanga case. 
2.7.2 Legal re-characterisation of facts-Katanga visited 
To further understand the role of the Prosecutorial discretion on  victims’ rights and  
interests, this section explores the implementation of Regulation 55 in The Prosecutor 
v. Katanga 
The majority of the Chamber gave notice that the mode of liability for Katanga may be 
subject to legal re-characterisation in conformity with Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 




Statute.230Subsequently, the majority activated Regulation 55 to change Katanga’s 
liability mode from indirect co-perpetrator to an accessory.231 It is noteworthy that the 
chamber entirely changed from the first mode of liability to a new mode of liability. 
They submitted that the application of  Regulation 55 did not violate the accused right 
to a fair trial.232 For this reason, the evidence presented by the Prosecutor during the 
confirmation of charges had no link with the new legal characterisation of facts. 
Jacobs noted that the “Prosecutor essentially did not prove any of his allegations”233, 
while Jon Heller posited that the OTP ‘failed to prove any of its legal claims.234  In 
Wigley’s opinion: “the majority redefined the case to favour the prosecution and 
conviction, at the expense of the rights of the accused”.235 To ascertain the prioritisation 
of the accused rights over other parties, she stated that “considerations about procedural 
fairness for the Prosecutor and the victims and their Legal Representatives, while 
certainly relevant, cannot trump the rights of the accused.”236   
While the pendulum of this radical change in the charges seems to swing to the side of 
the accused’s right to a fair trial, mainly what is considered as an unfair trial, it also 
 
230 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No.ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Implementation of 
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid 
233 Kevin Jon Heller, “Another Terrible Day for the OTP” accessible at 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/08/another-terrible-day-otp/> last accessed 12 December 2019 
234 Dov Jacobs , “The ICC Katanga Judgment :A commentary  (part 1)Investigation, Interpretation and 
the Crimes “  
235 Sophie Rigney, “The Words Don’t Fit You: Re-characterisation of the Charges, Trial Fairness, and 
Katanga “ [2014] 15(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law ,p 515 
236 Ibid 




reveals the indifference towards victims’ rights and interests. Presumably,  the accused 
was released based on insufficient evidence to hold him responsible for the crime. The 
acquittal does not preclude the accused’s blameworthiness. It means the accused’s 
innocence was a product of insufficient investigations and evidence. 
Surprisingly, the interpretation of  Regulation 55 became an issue in the Katanga case. 
The judges introduced new characterisation, which led to new liability.237 
Consequently, the Chamber acquitted him of allegations of recruitment of child soldiers 
as well as SGBV. 
It identifies an interesting viewpoint on the implications of acquittal on victims’ rights 
and interests. Using Combs’ analogy, ‘international victims often view acquittals 
through an ideology lens’238 The acquittal of Katanga based on insufficient evidence to 
link the accused with the crime illustrates a perceived injustice for the victims within 
this category. We should also bear in mind that the radical change of the charges, 
especially the mode of criminal responsibility could be described as a result of 
procedural issues which affected the original charges. By inference, procedural defects 
may affect victims’ possibility of achieving justice. 
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The acquittal could mean justice for Katanga and injustice for the victims. It is worthy 
of mention that the acquittal of Katanga for these crimes still left an impunity gap which 
is unconnected to the lack of insufficient evidence(an illustration of the  prosecutor’s 
investigative failure) 
Interestingly, Judge Wyngaert in her dissenting opinion held that the majority 
overstretched the provision of the regulation and ‘changed the narrative of the charges 
so fundamentally that it exceeded the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges’239 She observed that the majority’s re-characterisation of facts ‘fundamentally 
encroached upon the accused’s right to a fair trial’.240 In Judge Wyngaert’s opinion, 
the Trial Chamber system of procedure is mostly adversarial; thus, the adversarial 
procedure should have precluded the judges from applying the Regulation.241It is 
believed that judges in the adversarial procedure are passive instead of active judges in 
pursuit of truth-finding in an inquisitorial system. Arguably, the judges should not have 
taken control of the proceedings to the extent of re-characterising the fact beyond the 
initial charges. It could be that the judges that constituted the Trial Chamber wanted to 
close the impunity gap. Nevertheless, this does not disregard the fact that these judges 
usurped the prosecutor's role because the Prosecutor is solely responsible for drafting 
and amending the charges.  
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On appeal, the AC addressed the change in legal characterisation.242The chamber 
submitted that it was not initially apparent that the intended change in the legal 
characterisation of the facts “would exceed the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges”243 The AC acknowledged TC’s recognition of the accused rights. It decided 
that the TC did not encroach on the accused(Katanga)’s fair trial rights.244 The AC 
noted that “a principal purpose of Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, a 
purpose that is fully consistent with the Rome Statute.”245The strength of such an 
approach lies in addressing impunity and bringing the accused to justice.  
Jon Heller avers that the TC’s application of Regulation 55 was ‘ultra vires’ because 
the Regulation was not in conformity with Rome Statute’s procedures for amending 
charges.246 It appears that amendment of the charges is within the exclusive discretion 
of the Prosecutor. Heller also argued that the activation of Regulation 55 by the Trial 
Chamber violated the Prosecutorial independence and the accused’s rights to a fair trial. 
While this could be true, one may argue that the Court succeeded in filling the impunity 
gap; however, it did this in detriment to the accused’s right to a fair trial because it 
changed the legal characterisation of facts and the mode of liability made by the 
Prosecutor initially. One reason for this may be connected to the fact that the Prosecutor 
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could not conduct an effective investigation and, provided insufficient evidence to 
establish the accused's guilt.  
In addressing how the court’s interpretation of Regulation 55  affected victims’ rights 
and interests, the researcher shall refer to the AC’s decision on the activation of 
Regulation 55 in Lubanga’s case. The decision in the Lubanga case established the 
exclusive power of the prosecutor to amend charges. It is somewhat surprising that in 
the Katanga case, the judges independently changed the charging document's content, 
the accused’s mode of liability. The original charges differ from the subsequent charges 
framed by the judges. While this recent decision of Katanga reveals inconsistencies in 
some of the Chamber’s rulings, it is also worthy of mention that the content of a 
charging document plays a vital role in ascertaining who gets what and the scope of the 
trial. However, with the changes made to the TC's charging document, prosecutorial 
discretion's role or influence became unclear. We have a charging document framed by 
the judges, which questions the prosecutor's exclusive power in drafting the charges 
and the implications of the new charges on victims’ interests and the accused. 
In her article, Rigney concluded that the Court secured a conviction for the prosecution 
by relegating the rights of the accused247:  
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“ [i]n Katanga, the rights of the accused were not considered to be integral, and the 
interests of ‘correcting’ the prosecution’s case to ensure conviction was given 
precedence.”248 
The prosecutor’s original charges could not sustain the conviction of Katanga. 
Ordinarily, Katanga should have been acquitted by the principle of in dubio pro re. The 
Principle of in dubio pro re stipulates that the defendant may not be convicted by the 
court when there are doubts about his guilt.249 Thus, to clear all doubts, the case should 
be resolved in favour of the defendant. The presumption of innocence guides criminal 
prosecution at the ICC. The principle of in dubio pro re is entrenched in the human 
right to the presumption of innocence.250 It is possibly easier for the prosecution to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor might find it challenging to provide sufficient evidence to 
prove the defendant's culpability; hence, there was no substantial evidence that 
established the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. There might 
be insufficient evidence to prove the individual responsibility of the defendant. The 
evidence must be convincing and sufficient, beyond a reasonable doubt. Anything short 
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of adequate evidence to establish the defendant's guilt could question the court's 
integrity and legitimacy. Since the accused's freedom is at stake during criminal trials, 
the odds should be resolved in his favour; acquittal of the accused does not indicate 
justice's circumvention. Arguably, it appears the court was not willing to repeat what 
happened in Ngudjolo’s case-inadequate evidence. Therefore, the Court introduced new 
charges and liability to fill the impunity gap and ensure victims' justice.  
The conviction of Katanga highlights the pressure on the Court to uphold the rights of 
the accused persons, the prosecutor's role in drafting charges, and victims' ability to 
obtain justice. It could be argued that victims’ interests and claim for justice are not 
always the focal point during these proceedings. 
Moreover, the Katanga case brings to our attention the battle of supremacy between the 
accused's rights and securing a conviction. The fairness of procedure for the accused is 
questionable, but the victims' interests were not in dispute here. It remains uncertain if 
Katanga’s conviction indicates justice for victims. If we go by Goldstone’s words, “the 
fairness of any criminal justice system must be judged by acquittals and not by 
convictions […]Acquittals do not necessarily follow from any inadequacies in the 
office of the prosecutor. ”251 From the first lap of Goldstone’s words, arguably, based 
on insufficient evidence to prove the original charges against Katanga, the Chamber 
could have acquitted him. 
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On the other hand,  the submission in the last lap is flawed. It is the responsibility of 
the Prosecutor to gather evidence. Presumably, where there is no sufficient evidence, 
he could have been released on the presumption of innocence. However, it is not 
reasonable for an accused to be released based on inadequacy in the prosecutor's Office. 
What is the fate of victims? 
While one could argue that this legal characterisation of the facts impacted Katanga’s 
rights to a fair trial, Whiting’s opinion is contrary. Whiting contends that the legal 
description of facts and the change of Katanga’s mode of Liability had no impact on 
Katanga’s conviction. According to Vos, if Katanga had been tried under the original 
charges drafted by the Prosecutor and the initial mode of liability, the charged mode of 
liability could not warrant a conviction for the crimes committed by Katanga. The TC 
had to change the liability to fit the charges while giving the Defence notice and 
opportunity to be heard.252Whiting avers that the Defence was aware that it was within 
the TC's prerogative to use this approach.253Whiting’s argument seemed flawed 
because the Prosecutor had the exclusive power to draft and amend charges; the change 
effected by TC is equal to hijacking the Prosecutor’s power. The AC’s decision in the 
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legal re-characterisation of facts in the Lubanga case stressed that the Prosecutor has 
the sole responsibility to draft and amend charges. 
2.7.3The victims status before the initiation of the investigation 
The Prosecutor is responsible to the victim,254 the international community255 and the 
accused.256Therefore, on the prosecutor's request to initiate an investigation, Article 
15(3) invites victims to make representations to the PTC. The PTC may consider these 
representations before making decisions on the Prosecutor’s request to commence an 
investigation.257The interpretation of this provision provides a platform for victim 
participation via the provision of information. Victims’ role at this stage is to provide 
information to assist the Prosecution in an investigation. This form of participation 
includes “submitting observations”  and “making representations” to the  Pre-Trial 
Chamber.258 It appears victims’ empowerment under Article 15(3) is restricted 
compared to the umbrella provision of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, which seems 
to grant an extensive role for victim participation. Understandably, article 15 intends to 
limit victims' roles before the PTC authorises the investigation's initiation. Regulation 
50(1) grants victims a time limit of 30 days to make representations after the 
prosecutor's notice.259Victims engagement at this level is low, but it secures their sense 
of belonging. There is no evidence to suggest that victims were allowed to participate 
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before the authorisation of an investigation in the Lubanga and Katanga case. One 
reasonable explanation for this is that Article 15(3) does not apply to investigations 
initiated on Referral by the Security Council or State. Article 15(3) applies to 
investigations which are commenced by the Prosecutor proprio motu- which explains 
the absence of victim participation before the authorisation of an investigation. 
 
2.7.4 Victim and participation during the investigation 
The following section shall assess the prosecution's role and victims' rights and interests 
during the investigation stage. Article 58 grants the PTC the power to consider whether 
to issue an arrest warrant to the Prosecutor. Article 58(2)(b) stipulates that the 
Prosecutor should specify the particular crimes which justify the application for an 
arrest warrant. The PTC may endorse the arrest warrant provided there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the suspect committed that crimes.260 At this phase, presumably, the 
role of the PTC seems to be supervisory. 
At the commencement of investigations by the Prosecution, the PTC may request the 
victims to present their views and concerns.261The role of victims at the investigation 
stage is not specific. This uncertainty questions the place of the victims’ rights and 
interests at the investigation stage. This stage encompasses the pre-trial phase /situation 
phase as the investigation stage intends to unravel the perpetrator's identity. There is no 
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express statutory provision for victim participation during the investigation stage. 
Hence, the identity of victims, as well as their role during the investigation, may be 
limited. The recognition of victims at this stage is unsettled. Since victims' identity is 
sketchy at this stage, it is expedient to give victims rights and explore their interests in 
the investigation.  
At the heart of criminal investigations is the Prosecution with exclusive power to 
conduct investigations and determine which crimes should be prosecuted. It is observed 
in most domestic jurisdictions, that victims are involved in criminal investigations.262 
Many a time, when the victim reports a crime to the police, the state commences an 
investigation. From this point, the victim becomes engaged and receive information on 
the progress of such an investigation. Victims cooperation during investigation and 
prosecution enhances their engagement and empowerment. One implication of victims’ 
involvement in domestic jurisdiction is that they have a more recognised role as 
information providers-their primary role includes identifying offenders.  It is worthy of 
mention that the Rome Statute does not grant victims the power to report or make 
referrals to investigate the situation at the ICC. We should also bear in mind that there 
are substantial differences in criminal investigations at the local jurisdictions and 
international level. Perhaps, the absence of enforcement authority at the international 
level and the massive scale of crimes at the international level may restrict victim 
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participation in investigations. Victims’ cooperation in criminal investigations may 
foster accurate and effective investigations. 
 
Therefore, given that Victims’ cooperation with the prosecutor, especially concerning 
investigations and testimony.263The Prosecutor represents the international 
community's interests and owes the offender a right to a fair trial. An effective and 
objective investigation should be at the forefront. This analysis explains the 
independence of the victims from the prosecutor. Victims’ participation may question 
the objectivity of the investigations. The identity of victims at the investigation is not 
yet settled. 
 
It seems the PTC is more inquisitorial than the TC, especially concerning the 
confirmation of charges-the PTC is involved in truth-finding with active judges in this 
phase.264 With its roots in civil law traditions, the inquisitorial criminal procedure grants 
extensive rights and victims roles. Although one may infer that the ICC's criminal 
procedure is mixed, arguably, it appears that the ICC is mainly adversarial than 
inquisitorial. Because of the limitations on the exercise of victims’ rights. As was 
mentioned in the introduction, the victims are third parties in the proceedings. 
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One could argue that the provision and availability of rights for victims are instruments 
required to enhance their voice and access to justice. However, one drawback is that 
the exercise of these rights is not absolute. They need to be exercised in consideration 
of the fair trial rights of the accused. This underscores the restriction placed on victims 
rights at the ICC. These rights are seen as empowerment for victims but do they 
empower victims in the criminal justice system, or is it just a means to an end? 
 
The Statute, Rules and Regulations are silent about the standard of proof to be applied 
in evaluating victims’ applications. The TC ruled that prima facie credible grounds are 
sufficient in assessing victims' application for an applicant who has suffered harm due 
to a crime committed within the Court's jurisdiction at the Pre-trial stage, the facts and 
issues are sketchy and less detailed. As such, it would be far-reaching to use a 
‘substantive assessment’ in evaluating the credibility/reliability of victims’ application 
at this stage.265On the other hand, a substantive assessment would be needed in 
evaluating the credibility/reliability of victims’ application at the trial stage. The reason 
being that there are inadequate detailed facts and issues on grounds for consideration. 
 
The victim application came up in the DRC Situation. The PTC had to determine 
whether a victim has a right to participate during the investigation of a situation.266Mr 
Sidiki Kaba submitted applications for victims' participation labelled VPRS 1.VPRS 2, 
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VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, VPRS 6.267The President appointed Emmanuel Daoud as 
their legal representatives. In their response, the OTP filed a motion opposing the victim 
applications. He argued that it was too early for victims to get involved in the 
proceedings; investigation. 
 
Furthermore, he posited that the Statute did not intend victims to take part in the 
proceedings at such an early stage. The Prosecutor noted that only victim participation 
under proceedings in Article 15(3), was permitted at the investigation stage. As such, 
any other form of involvement except the one set out in Article 15(3) would undermine 
the objectivity of the proceedings and the OTP’s office's integrity.268The ad hoc defence 
counsel(no suspect or identifiable perpetrator) filed its observations. 269  
 
By using the terminological and contextual approach, the PTC analysed the position of 
victims. With each approach, the judges considered if victims could participate before 
the identification of a suspect. The Court found that the Statute and rules allow victims 
to participate in the early stages of participation. Additionally, the Court held that the 
term ‘proceedings’ encompass the investigation, pre-trial and trial stage. Hence 
proceedings are not restricted to court proceedings. This rejected the Prosecutor’s 
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argument- the Court acknowledged that although article 68(3) is classified under the 
statute's trial section, this does not limit its application to trial proceedings only. 
 
Besides, the TC has noted that appearing as a victim before the court is voluntary. 
Victim participants are independent of the Prosecutor as well as the defence.270They 
pursue their interests independent of the parties. Although, they may work with the 
Prosecutor during investigation or trial. Their cooperation with the Prosecution does 
not mean their role is subsumed under the Prosecutor. They are not an ally of the 
prosecutor or assistant prosecutors271. Rather, the Statute and Rules grant them an 
independent voice and role in the proceedings. 
 
Therefore, the victims' role in the trial include : 
1. making opening and closing statements; 
2. consulting the record of proceedings; 
3. receiving notification of all public filings and those confidential filings that 
affect their personal interests; 
4. tendering and examining evidence if the Chamber feels it will assist in 









5. legal representatives can attend and participate in the proceedings, question 
witnesses experts and the accused.272 
 
The confirmation of charges is an integral part of the Pre-Trial stage. There are 
restrictions on victims’ rights at this phase because they cannot tender new evidence, 
nor can they access Prosecution’s case.273 The scope of the confirmation of charges is 
limited to the determination of the availability of sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the suspects are criminally responsible for the crimes 
contained in the charging document.274 Victims interests lie in the confirmation of 
charges because it is necessary to commence the suspect's trial. The victims must prove 
that their interests are affected by the crimes stated in the Prosecution’s charging 
document. On confirmation of charges, the PTC found that victims would be able to 
participate during the hearing for the accused/suspect-Thomas Lubanga. This 
participation includes making opening and closing statements. 
 
Nonetheless, the Chamber restricted victims participation on the grounds of anonymity. 
As a result of security and protective measures,  victims a/001/06, a/0002/06 and 
a/003/06 participated anonymously.  Given their anonymous participation, the Chamber 
ruled that they would not question witnesses and add any points or facts of evidence. 
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To protect the rights of the accused, the Chamber moderated the degree of participation 
given the parties' inability to verify their identities.275 A check towards the plausible 
prevention against the falsification of evidence from sources that cannot be verified. 
This restriction filters potential discrepancies, which might arise due to unidentified 
victims in the trial process. 
 
The TC held that ‘victims’ are individuals who have suffered harm from any crime that 
falls within the Court's jurisdiction. With this definition, ‘any crime’ grants a non-
restrictive approach regardless of the charging document count.276This ruling includes 
victims of crimes which were not committed by the suspect or accused on trial. Besides, 
the Majority ruled that victim participants could lead evidence. Surprisingly, Judge 
Blattman in her minority(dissenting) opinion opined that victims' broad definition 
relays an ‘imprecise definition of victims.’Therefore, it is believed to endanger the 
rights of the accused.277 This interpretation ensures that the accused is held responsible 
for crimes he allegedly committed in contrast to ‘any crime within the Court's 
jurisdiction.’ The ‘any crime’ tag may be very vague, rather than being specific. A 
possible explanation is that a vague description of the crimes could potentially result in 
challenges that may arise from the inability to find nexus between the victims, crimes 
committed and the accused. ‘Any crime within the Court’s’ jurisdiction’ will be broad, 
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especially where the accused on trial is not responsible for the alleged crime committed. 
This will create a gap, and it may also threaten the fair trial rights of the accused. 
 
On appeal brought by the Defence against the decision,  the Appeal Chamber overruled 
the TC's conclusion and found that for victim participation, ‘victims’ are persons who 
have suffered harm either directly or indirectly from the counts in the charging 
document.278It affirmed that victims could lead evidence. According to Article 69(3), 
the AC found that victims have the right to adduce evidence on the Chamber's request, 
whenever it considers it necessary for the determination of the truth. 279The AC's 
decision restricts qualified victims to individuals who have suffered harm as a result of 
crimes listed in the charges.  
 
With Judge Pikis and Judge Kirsch dissenting, Judge Kirsch opined that victims could 
not lead evidence before the Court because they are not obligated to make a 
disclosure.280This is based on the fact that they are not full parties to the trial. Judge 
Pikis observed that the Statute exclusively permits the parties the Prosecutor and 
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Defence to challenge the charges. As such, the victim-participants were not allowed to 
contend the charges.281   
 
Turning now to the context within which modalities of participation is permissible, the 
PTC  determined that by rule 85, it is expedient to grant victims procedural status to 
applicants who qualify under the RPE, a status outside judicial proceedings.282The 
single judge referred to the earlier decision of the PTC on 17 January 2006.283 This 
decision stated the need to accord victim procedural status at the investigative stage 
because victims' personal interests are affected in general during this phase. It is noted 
that victims' participation at this stage may lead to clarification of facts to punish the 
perpetrators of crimes and seek reparations.284 Also, the PTC pointed out the fact that 
victims ‘presentation of views and concerns to the ‘ongoing investigation’ is required 
because it is “at this stage that the persons allegedly responsible for the crimes from 
which they suffered must be identified as the first step towards their 
indictment[…]”285The PTC ruled that victim participants would be permitted to 
participate in proceedings by presenting their views and concerns and, to file documents 
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concerning the ongoing investigation of the situation, provided their personal interests 
are affected.286According to the PTC, the stage of investigation into a situation is 
deemed appropriate for the proceedings. 
 
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber reversed the PTC’s decision and held that  
“participation can only occur within the context of judicial proceedings”.287 As such 
investigation was not considered judicial proceedings as it is a phase where the 
prosecutor examines the commission of crimes.288 Furthermore, the AC determined that 
the PTC exceeded its power because it cannot grant victims the procedural status, which 
entailed a general right to participate in the investigation.289 The AC states: 
[...]authority for the conduct of investigations vests in the Prosecutor. 
Acknowledgement by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a right to victims to participate 
in the investigation would necessarily contravene the Statute by reading into it 
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Proceedings have been defined in Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.291 
Before the Chamber, the main issue was to decide if ‘situation’ qualifies as 
‘proceedings.’ Six persons applied to participate in the investigation of ‘situation’ in 
the DRC. The main issue for determination was whether an investigation of a situation 
falls under ‘proceedings’ as stated in article 68(3). The Prosecutor argued that 
investigation of a situation does not fall under ‘proceedings, because article 127(Part 
13-final clauses) distinguishes the terms ‘investigation’ and proceedings’.292 The PTC 
rejected the Prosecutor’s argument. The PTC reasoned that many human rights court 
decisions have recognised and interpreted their conventions to grant victims 
participatory rights during the investigation stage of alleged human rights abuses.293The 
Chamber further stated that according to the teleological point of view, victims 
participation during the investigation is ‘consistent with the object and purpose of the 
victims' participation regime established by the drafters of the Statute”.294 As such, 
article 68(3) encompasses investigation proceedings, which means that the said victims 
can exercise their procedural rights pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Statute by : 
• presenting their views and concerns; 
• File documents  
• Requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to order specific measures.295 
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This ruling's significance reflects an inclusive platform for victims to get involved in 
both investigations and trials. Therefore, as enunciated in article 68(3), proceedings 
encompass both the investigation and criminal trial stages. Also, as mentioned 
previously, applicants must pass the personal interests test. For instance, the TC's 
decision on 18 January reveals a seemingly ambiguous interpretation of victim 
participation regime.296 The TC held that the assessment of victim participation in 
proceedings should be regulated by personal interests test, provided in article 68(3). 
Rule 85 and Article 68(3) are interdependent. Hence, they should be interpreted 
conjunctively. This decision gives a broad interpretation of victims' participation as it 
does not make restrictions based on the connection between the harm suffered by the 
victims and the crime contained in the charges. In his opinion, Judge Blattman dissented 
from the Majority decision, ‘the over-inclusive and imprecise definition of victims’ 
would threaten or endanger the accused's rights.297  
 
Surprisingly this decision was set aside in the appeal brought by the defence.298The AC 
found that application of victim participation should be limited to victims of the 
situation or a case. Rather than victims of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The AC confirmed TC's decision to allow victim participants to submit evidence and 
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question witnesses.299 Judge Pikis, concurring with Judge Kirsch, stated that the 
Prosecutor and the accused as full parties to the case are the only parties with the rights 
to dispute the charges' content.300In his words:  
“[i]n an adversarial hearing the two sides are cast in the position of 
adversaries, in connection with the determination of the only issue 
raised before the Chamber, the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
The adversary of the accused is the Prosecutor and none other. The 
defendant cannot have more than one accuser. It is not for the 
accused to prove his innocence. He is presumed to be innocent. The 
ultimate question is whether the Prosecution proved its case beyond  
reasonable doubt.”301 
 
Judge Pikis’ opinion draws our attention to the nature of adversarial proceedings and 
its requirements. The emphasis on disrupting the equality of arms if victims were 
permitted to tender evidence in the determination of truth explains that an extended role 
for victims could prejudice the accused's rights as he is supposedly against two 
accusers. 
 
Stahn and Olasolo opine that victims role commences before the case phase.302 
Nevertheless, some interpretation of the provisions could compound the role of victims 
 
299 Ibid. 
300 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis, Appeals Chamber Decision,11 July 2008.  
301 Ibid , para.14. 
302Carsten Stahn and Hector Olasolo, ‘Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings’(2006) 4 Journal 
of Criminal Justice,219-238. 




during the pre-trial phase.303These ambiguities make the determination of the scope of 
victim participation challenging for this phase.304 The inconsistencies in the chambers’ 
rules reiterate the unsettled position of victims’ role before and during the 
investigations. It is recommended that victims should be granted participatory rights 
during investigations and pre-trial because this phase affects victims’ interests. 
 
In the initial years, the victim participation regime has been described as ‘unworkable’ 
for the victims because judicial decisions were made based on concession rather than 
rights enshrined in the Rome Statute.305 Chung argued that this approach ignores the 
compromises made at the Rome negotiations-an approach, which defeat the mandate of 
prosecuting the perpetrators of grave crimes.306In the interpretation of victims 
participation, we should always keep in mind the ICC mandate. 
 
Perhaps the judges struggle with ascertaining the limits of the regime. Consequently, 
some judges may exceed the judicial role in a bid to exude the intention of the Statute 
and Regulations. Differing interpretations might connote judicial orientations or 
judicial activism. Thus, inconsistent rulings and decisions from the chambers mirror 
varying comprehension of the victim participation regime. 
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That said, victims' procedural status emerges a set of procedural rights that ensure 
victims can participate and put forward their interests. These procedural rights 
encompass the pathway which enables them to fight for substantive claims. The 
participation comes in different forms, which is also called modalities of participation. 
It falls within the volition of the Chamber to determine. The subsequent section will 
discuss the findings. 
 
2.8 Discussing findings 
This chapter set out to assess the impact of prosecutorial discretion on victims’  rights 
and interests. As mentioned in the literature review, broad prosecutorial discretion may 
preclude victims’ right to remedy.307 The exercise of broad prosecutorial discretion 
starts from the preliminary and investigation phase to prosecution. Therefore,  the 
effects of prosecutorial discretion transcend these phases to the trial. The prosecutor has 
the discretion to select a situation for investigations and also select potential cases from 
situations. The impact of prosecutorial discretion is shown in alleged crimes the 
prosecutor chose to investigate and the charges contained in the charging document. 
For the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor restricted the charges to the conscription and 
enlistment of children under 15 years and used them to participate actively in hostilities.  
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While it is found that the PTC can check the decision of the prosecutor not to prosecute, 
the check is mainly in terms of judicial review. The Prosecutor is empowered to frame 
charges which will be subject to confirmation by the PTC. It is within the exclusive 
power of the prosecutor to draft charges. Nevertheless, contention arises as to the power 
of the Prosecutor concerning the modification and amendment of charges. Surprisingly, 
the Katanga and Lubanga cases delivered divergent rulings on the prosecutor's powers 
regarding the revision or amendment of charges. The different outcomes in the legal 
characterisation of facts for both cases reveal some judges' activism in granting victims 
a more expansive role by challenging the status quo. The court decisions contribute 
towards the development of jurisprudence at the ICC. 
Article 15 demonstrates the victims' power to ‘make representations’ in response to the 
Prosecutions’ decision to suspend investigations or not to prosecute. Arguably, it is 
reasoned that  Article 15(3) entrenches a form of a participation-a restrictive approach 
to participation. It could be that an indiscreet approach to participation could jeopardise 
the investigations at this phase. Nevertheless, victim involvement is required based on 
their interests, in the investigation and initiation of prosecution. Such participation is 
streamlined restrictively by the Rome Statute. In a similar vein, the Prosecutor’s 
exercise of power may restrict victims’ inclusion and active involvement in the early 
stage. Perhaps, a more encompassing approach to participation could be made by the 
judges via interpretation or decision-making. 
Some of the activities by the Prosecutor undeniably filters victims and separates them 
into qualified and not qualified. This finding supports the previous study of Aptel, 




which links the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with victims’ access to remedy.308 
Notably, the Lubanga case found that victims harm must be charge-based.309This 
decision creates a connection between victims and the charges. 
It is somewhat surprising that some of the prosecutor’s interests overlap with some 
victims’ interests. However, while there are observed differences between the 
prosecutor’s interests and victims’ interests, these differences reiterate the 
independence of victims’ role from the prosecutor’s role.310Nevertheless, these 
overlapping roles include presenting evidence to determine the truth—the 
Determination of the accused's guilt or innocence and questioning witnesses.311 
Regarding victims, their roles in the criminal proceedings are determined by their 
personal interests.312Prosecutorial functions also reflect their interests. 
The investigation and pre-trial phase demonstrate that victims are concerned with 
obtaining recognition to exert influence because the identity of the perpetrator(s) 
remains unknown, and their interests lie in investigations. The situation contrasts with 
 
308 Cecile Aptel, “Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and Victims’ Right to Remedy(2012) 10(5) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice,1357-1375 
309 Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber 1, ICC-01/04-01/-6-1432, 11 July 2008, 
pars.53-65 
310 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of victim 
participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, 22January 2010,p.16,paras 36 and 37; Prosecutor 
v.Lubanga,  Appeal Chambers, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, 13 October, 2006, para.52 
311 Ibid. 
312 Rome Statute 1998, article 68(3); Lubanga, Decision of the Appeal Chamber on the Joint Application 
of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the Directions and Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber of 2 February 2007,ICC-01/04-01/06-925 13-06-2007 CB PT OA8,para.45. 
312 Ibid ,para 28. 
 




what is applicable in some domestic jurisdictions where the victim triggers the 
investigation.   
2.9.Conclusion. 
The first question in this thesis was to identify prosecutorial discretion's impact on 
victims’ rights and interests. In addressing the first research question, the transcripts 
were analysed for findings. 
The charges, which is a Prosecutor’s product, can shape the truth, whether partial or 
whole truth. The content of the charging document can potentially restrict victims’ 
interests or access to justice. This may inadvertently influence the categories of victims 
or the number of victims linked to the charges. 
The inconsistent ruling on the extent of participation demonstrates some of the judges 
attempt to accede to victims’ request. The different outcomes in the legal 
characterisation of facts for both cases reveal some judges' activism in granting victims 
a more expansive role by challenging the status quo. The court decisions contribute 
towards the development of jurisprudence at the ICC. 
The broad prosecutorial discretion is probably a consequence of the delegates' 
compromise at the Rome negotiations.313 However, the PTC has the power to check 
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prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute. This chapter has shown that the PTC, to some 
extent, can scrutinise the decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate investigations. Still, 
it appears the Prosecutor has the upper hand although, the outcome of the Rome 
negotiations granted the Prosecutor wide-ranging powers, regardless, this discretionary 
powers is subject to checks and balances by the PTC. It seems the PTC’s use of the 
checks and balances cannot entirely curtail the prosecutor’s power in this regard. 
It has been shown that victims are interested in recognition at this early phase because 
their status is not settled nor acknowledged given investigation.  When the Prosecutor 
determines the scope of the trial via filtering of cases from situations and framing of 
charges, the exercise of these roles may intentionally or inadvertently affect victims’ 
access to justice. While some victims may obtain justice through criminal prosecution, 
some victims may fall into the investigation phase's impunity gap. Consequently, the 
exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion may preclude them from progressing at this 
phase. 
As the court's ‘gatekeeper’, the Prosecutor represents the international community's 
interests while their personal interests propel the victims.314 While they both perform 
distinct roles, there are times in which their functions overlap. This overlap is not 
unconnected to the position of victims during the proceedings. Victims’ interest 
intersects with the prosecutor's interests, especially in the determination of truth and 
justice. At this phase, the court must strike a balance between these interests  
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It has been established that the  Prosecutor has sweeping discretionary powers which 
are not well regulated provided he acts within his mandate. These unlimited powers 
encompass about temporal, jurisdictional, material and personal competence.315 Aptel 
asserts that in selecting situations and cases, the Prosecutor does not consider credible 
evidence; instead, he evaluates the gravity and interests of justice.316 This further 
enhances the powers of the Prosecutor because these concepts are not well defined in 
the Statute.317 Most times, the challenges of obtaining sufficient evidence is the basis 
for acquittal. The OTP must enhance his strategy on investigation and evidence 
gathering. 
These taken together suggest that the charging document significantly influences 
victims' rights and interests due to the prosecutor's vast discretionary powers. Some 
times, the charging document may contain partial truth. While the decision is within the 
judges' power, as illustrated in the Lubanga case, they cannot exceed the charges' 
content.318 Unfortunately, the ICC is also restricted in criminal prosecution as it cannot 
try all the perpetrators because it will slow down the Court's efficiency. 
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So far, this chapter has discussed the influence of prosecutorial discretion on victims’ 
rights and interests. The next chapter will critically analyse the victims’ rights and 
interests during the trial process. 
  




 3.0 Chapter 3-Trial Process 
 




“Fairness of international criminal trial legitimises the Court as opposed to the 




The trial process is a fundamental phase of criminal prosecution. It is a platform where 
the prosecutor, defence and victims persuade the judges for the primary purpose of 
obtaining a favourable outcome. This phase is mainly structured with rules and 
procedures. This chapter shall discuss procedural fairness to create a better 
understanding of this topic. There has been an increased recognition that more attention 
needs to be focused on procedural fairness in criminal trials. Stahn states that: ‘fairness 
are too precious to be traded off against vengeance and effective sanction’.3  One 
cannot relegate the significance of criminal procedures at the ICC because recent 
research findings suggest that participants in the criminal justice process rate the 
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procedure more than the outcome.4Several researchers have reported on the necessity 
of procedural fairness. 
 
Traditionally, when procedural fairness comes up, it is not unconnected to the position of 
the accused during the criminal process. For instance, there are a plethora of provisions on the 
fair trial rights of the accused.5 Given that the ICC is a criminal court, and by virtue article 
66(1) and (2), the accused's rights take priority other issues at the proceedings. One question 
that comes to mind is the impact of procedural fairness on victims during criminal trials. 
Participation as an essential aspect of procedural fairness cannot be sidelined. For this purpose, 
it has become necessary to address the fairness of procedure for victims. It is worthy of 
mentioning that the ICC statute grants victims some procedural rights. These rights might 
ensure a balance between the rights of the victims against the rights of the accused. One 
reasonable implication of this is that, in practice, it could become a challenge to implement this 
balance, as it may sabotage the existing rights of the accused. Suppose rights are given to 
victims to amend the power disparity between the accused and the victims. In that case, the 
‘balance approach’ may defy rational reasoning, even though the argument appears self-
evident, it does not provide a satisfying perspective on the approach.6Ashworth describes it as:  
“balance is a rhetorical device of which one must be wary”7 Ashworth suggests that 
more attention should be given to victims' values and interests.8Therefore, one could 
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infer that to maximise victims’ satisfaction, their values and interests should be 
prioritised over the clamour for balancing victims’ rights against the accused. It is 
worthy of mention that Ashworth’s assertion does not downplay victims' role in the 
criminal trial; Rather, it proposes a more substantive address to victims’ satisfaction. It 
appears that the rationale behind advancing for victims’ rights is to create a competition 
between the victims and accused. Edwards describes it as “as simplifying the issues and 
allowing complex controversies to be situated within a zero-sum game”9 The Balance 
approach gives a narrow narrative of the victim involvement.   
 
Doak’s arguments confirm Ashworth’s findings. Doak thinks that victims’ rights should 
be seen as entitlements rather than an avenue to compete with the accused 
rights.10Therefore, if the focus is on victims’ interests, victims’ rights are seen as 
instruments to promote their interests. 
 
In a way, it seems the pendulum of procedural fairness favours the accused more than 
the victims.11 Where the procedure is fair, it may increase satisfaction for every party. 
However, given the accused's primacy right to a fair trial, sometimes, there may be a 
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Parties (Hart Publishing  2008)26,27 and 28. 
11 Christine Chung, ‘Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court:Are Concessions of the 
Court Clouding the Promise? (2008) 6(3) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
p459,506. 




clash between competing interests of Prosecutor and Defendant, defendant and victims 
or victims and  Prosecutor. 
 
The chapter seeks to review Katanga and Lubanga's transcripts to assess the application 
of victims’ rights and the extent to which victims’ interests are taken into consideration 
during trial proceedings. Interestingly, it appears that the Court envisages fairness for 
victims. The PTC in its decision elucidates on fairness: 
“[I]n the view of the Chamber, the fairness of the proceedings includes respect for the 
procedural rights of the Prosecutor, the Defence, and the Victims as guaranteed by the 
relevant statutes (in systems which provided for  in criminal proceedings)”12 
 
However, this is not within a different context. The relationship exists between the 
Prosecutor, defendant and the victims.  In chapter three,  the thesis intends to analyse 
the extent to which victims’ rights and interests are taken into consideration during trial 
proceedings. It shall assess this by using Edwards’ theory of participation-the 
dispositive and non-dispositive category.  
 
Therefore, Chapter three begins with a brief overview of the context of procedural 
fairness. The second section explores the significance of victims’ voice and respect. 
The third part reviews Ian Edwards’ theory of participation. At the same time, the next 
 
12 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal the Chamber ‘ Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Application in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, 
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-135-Teng, 31 March 2006, para.38. 




section assesses the modalities for participation. The following section evaluates 
victims’ procedural rights. Afterwards, the next section addresses the modalities of 
participation through Edwards’ non-dispositive category. In this part, the non-
dispositive theory subdivisions shall be used to examine the applicability of victims’ 
rights and interests. The remaining part of the section presents this chapter's findings, 
while the last section concludes the chapter.  
 
So far, this section has focused on the introduction and the structured parts of the 
chapter. It is now necessary to briefly explain the criminal procedure of the ICC. 
 
3.2The criminal system of procedure and the ICC 
In order to examine the extent of applicability of victims’ rights, it is imperative to 
consider the criminal system of procedure in place at the ICC. It is this context which 
dictates the position of victims in criminal proceedings. Over the years, the place of the 
procedural system within the international justice system has been unsettled.13 Instead, 
more attention has been given to “jurisdiction” and “substantive law.”14 Plausibly, the 
procedural system connects the court's function, the parties, victims and outcome of the 
criminal proceedings; with its connecting lines. The procedure dictates the role of 
victims, the parties and the judges.  Victims’ involvement is restricted in the adversarial 
 
13 Gregory.Gordon , “Toward an International Criminal Procedure” (2007) 45 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law,p635,637 
14 Carsten Stahn, “International Criminal Justice Procedures” in Carsten Stahn (ed),A Critical 
Introduction to International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2019) 269-380 




system of procedure, while victims play active roles in the inquisitorial system. Some 
countries with civil law traditions allow victims to prosecute perpetrators 
independently.15 Similar instances are exemplified in some common law jurisdictions 
where the victims’ legal representative may participate in sexual history evidence 
issues.16 Although, the role of the LRV is a restrictive one in this instance. Additionally, 
in some circumstances, victims may participate in the criminal proceedings as ‘private 
prosecutor.’17In England and Wales, private prosecutions have been referred to as 
“historical right” that was  “rarely exercised”.18However, factors like the financial 
implications of hiring a private investigator, Legal Representative,  and obtaining 
consent from the Director of Public Prosecutor restricts victims access to act as a private 
prosecutor.19Victims cannot initiate private prosecution without the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ consent. He commenced such criminal prosecution, the progression of 
the case's progression will be declared null and set aside. 
 
Similarly, in the context of the United States jurisprudence, it is found that some State 
courts permit victims to act as prosecutor.20 The right of victims to employ private 
 
15 John Spencer, ‘Adversarial v inquisitorial systems: is there still such a difference(2016) 20(5) 
International  Journal of Human Rights,601-616 
16 Sex Offenders Act 2001, s.34;The Criminal Law (Rape)Act  1981 
17 Prosecution of Offences Act  1985, Section 6(1);Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers 
[1978] ,UKHL 5,[1977] 3 ALL ER 70 
18 Lord Wilberforce , Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] AC 435,UKHL 5,[1977] 3 ALL 
ER 70 
19 Ibid. 
20 Salvador Guerro Palomarres, “Common and Civil Law Traditions on Victim Participation at the 
ICC”,(2014)4(2)International Journal of Procedural Law,217-235,231;Brianne McGonigle Leyh, 
Procedural Justice ?Victim Particpation in International Criminal Proceedings (Antwerp 2011).66 




prosecutor to assist the public prosecutor depends on the judge's discretion.21 Victims 
are permitted to prosecute minor offences-simple assault and battery.22 These cases 
demonstrate the progression of victim participation in common law jurisdictions. It 
should be noted that the projection of victim participation is higher in civil law 
jurisdictions than common law jurisdictions. It seems victims interests thrive largely 
within the context of civil law traditions, while the recognition of victims interests is a 
gradual process in common law tradition. 
 
In common law jurisdictions, the criminal procedure pitches prosecution and defence 
against each other in the presentations of their cases to the judge.23 As such, they are 
referred to as ‘adversaries’24 Both parties compete to convince the judge that their 
version of facts is the most convincing. The judge acts as an impartial umpire. The 
judge or decision-maker is very passive. The role of victims in this system is restricted 
to giving testimonies as witnesses.25They do not have a party or quasi-party status.26 
Their roles are passive because the adversarial system of procedure focuses on the 
defence and prosecution; victims' involvement is limited. 
 
21 Ibid;State of West  Virginia v.Calvin Atkins,261 S.E.2d 55(1979), Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia. 
22 Ibid; State of New Jersey v William Kinder,701 F.Supp.486(D.N.J.) December 15,1988 
23 Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson,The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process( Oxford 
University Press2002); Jacqueline Hodgson,‘The Police, the Prosecutor and the judge 
d’instruction:Judicial Supervision in France ,Theory and Practice’ (2001) 41(2)British Journal of 
Criminology342-361 
24 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne The Criminal Process (Oxford University Press 2005) 
25 Jonathan Doak, ‘Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials :Prospects for Participation’(2005) 32(2) Journal 
of Law and Society ,1-26. 
26 Ibid. 





In most civil law jurisdictions, an investigating judge actively controls the trial and 
directs witnesses.27The victim plays a central role; he may initiate proceedings or seek 
compensation. This system refers to them as a “partie civile”(civil petitioner).  The 
victim has the right to join civil claims with criminal prosecutions. Also, he can exercise 
his rights to challenge evidence. 
 
Similarly, some jurisdictions allow victims to act as auxiliary prosecutors.28This 
comparison explains the position of victims within these jurisdictions. The Rome 
Statute, being a product of compromise between civil and common law jurisdictions, 
gives the role of the victim as a third party to the proceedings. The victim is not a full 
party, as opposed to the defence and the prosecutor with competing interests. 
 
Ambos identifies the shift from a purely adversarial procedure to a truly mixed 
procedure in the international criminal procedure.29 This came into existence by 
merging common and civil law procedures into one international procedure. He 
contends that it is less significant if a rule is ‘adversarial’ or ‘inquisitorial’, but opines 
that what matters is if the rule facilitates the tribunals in accomplishing their tasks.30 
 
27 Jacqueline Hodgson, ‘The Police , the Prosecutor and the juge d’instruction:Judicial Supervision in 
France ,Theory and Practice’ (2001) 41(2)British Journal of Criminology,342-361 
28Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Victim Oriented Measures at International Criminal 
Institutions :Participation and its Pitfalls  (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review,375-435 
29 Kai Ambos, ‘International Criminal Procedure: adversarial, inquisitorial or mixed?( 3(1) International 
Criminal Law(2003) 
30 Ibid  




Moreover, more attention should be placed on if these rules conform to fundamental 
fair standards. In contrast, Wemmers submit that to understand how courts treat victims; 
we need to look at the criminal procedure in place-‘adversarial’ or ‘inquisitorial’.31 
While Ambos’  proposition tends to relegate the place of criminal procedure in 
international criminal justice, his proposition is flawed. In practice, settings of the ICC 
criminal proceedings reflect otherwise. Victims do not have full procedural rights 
because they are not parties in the proceedings. Their procedural rights are restricted; 
these restrictions reflect the elements of the adversarial system of procedure. 
 
Many a time, the adversarial procedure applies during the trial.32 Nevertheless, It seems 
the PTC is more inquisitorial than the TC, especially concerning the confirmation of 
charges. It is observed that the Pre-Trial Chamber plays an active role in the initial 
proceedings. It is actively involved in truth-seeking-a feature of the inquisitorial system 
of procedure.33 The PTC is responsible for the confirmation of charges hearing.34  It 
also supervises the Prosecutor’s submission of charging document and evidence 
disclosure required at the hearing.35 It appears the process for evidence disclosure aligns 
with the inquisitorial system. A perfect illustration is seen in the Lubanga case, which 
 
31 Jo-Anne Wemmers, Ibid ; John Spencer, ‘Adversarial v.inquisitorial systems: is there still such a 
difference(2016) 20(5) International  Journal of Human Rights,601-616. 
32 Guido Aquaviva, Nancy Combs, Mikaela Heikkila, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vailiev “Trial Process” 
in  Goran Sluiter et al.,International Criminal Procedure:Rules and Principles” (Oxford University Press 
2013)638-645 
33 Rome Statute 1998, Article 61. 
34 Rome Statute, Article 61(3). 
35 Rome Statute , Article 61;ICC RPE Rule 121(1)(2)(3);Article 60(3). 




empowers the PTC to analyse the evidence36-an investigative power. Scheffer notes 
that the disclosure system has transformed the judge into an active one with 
investigative powers control over the parties and evidence as opposed to a passive judge 
and involved parties.37 
 
At this phase, what is required is to provide sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that the suspect committed the crimes.38The adversarial criminal 
procedure is cautious about granting victims extensive role and rights in the 
proceedings.39 In sharp contrast, the inquisitorial criminal procedure, with its roots civil 
law traditions, grants extensive rights and victims roles. However, within the ICC 
context, victims' rights are restricted because the trial process is primarily adversarial. 
The parties have the full rights to participation as well as control over the presentation 
of evidence.40 Although, one may infer that the ICC's criminal procedure is mixed, 
arguably, It appears that the ICC is mainly adversarial than inquisitorial because of the 
 
36 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo,Prosecutor v Thomas Lubang Dyilo, Decision on the 
final system of disclosure and the establishment of a timetable,Pre-Trial Chamber 1,ICC-01/04-01/06-
102. 
37David Scheffer, “A review of the Experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the 
International Criminal Court Regarding the Disclosure of Evidence” (2009) 21Leiden Journal of 
International Law ; Maximo Langer, “Ther Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal 
Law”(2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law ,835. 
38 Situation in Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
Establishment of A Timetable, Pre-Trial Chamber 1,  ICC-01/04-01/06-102,16 May 2006 
39 John Spencer, ‘Adversarial v.inquisitorial systems: is there still such a difference(2016) 20(5) 
International  Journal of Human Rights,601-616. 
40 Carsten Stahn, “International Criminal Justice Procedure” in Carsten Stahn (ed) A Critical Introduction 
to International Criminal Law”(Cambridge University Press 2018)269-380. 




limitations on the exercise of victims’ rights. As was mentioned in the introduction, the 
victims are third parties in the proceedings. 
 
In addition, article 21 of the  Rome Statute provides a human rights approach to 
applying and interpreting the Rome Statute. Article 21 sets international human right 
as a threshold. According to this provision, the applicable law should be consistent with 
the standard of internationally recognised human rights. By implication, Article 21 
supports the applicability of victims rights at the ICC. However, there is a limit to which 
Rule 21 is applicable given that the ICC is not a human rights court; instead, it is a 
criminal court with the mandate to prosecute the perpetrators of gross violation of 
human rights. 
 
Interestingly, in the course of implementing this mandate, it contributes to protecting 
the human rights-a relationship between international human rights and the ICC. 
Victims’ rights are a subset of human rights. Notably, the application of human rights 
within the context of the ICC procedures must be balanced against the court's mandate. 
Thus, it should not sabotage the court's mandate. For instance, in the Lubanga case, 
Lubanga appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision41 to stay or stop the proceedings 
because he was grossly mistreated, which violated his human rights. He concluded that 
 
41 Prosecutor v Lubanga, The decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 1entitled “Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute”  




the pre-trial process was abused.42 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber had to consider the 
doctrine of abuse of process, its ambit and applicability in proceedings before the ICC.43 
Besides, the Appeal Chamber determined if Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute is 
relevant to the Court's assumption of jurisdiction in any given case.44In response to 
these issues, the Appeals Chamber affirmed that the doctrine of abuse of process ‘had 
ab initio a human rights dimension.’45It reasoned that abuse of process breached the 
rights of the litigant. The statute safeguards the accused rights, which are entrenched in 
articles 55 and 67. In the words of the Appeals Chamber: 
     “Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise  
       Of the jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and 
       more importantly, applied in accordance with internationally recognised  
                                                 human rights…”46 
The Appeals decision excerpts acknowledge the interpretation of article 21(3) in ICC 
procedural issues. It should also be noted that the judges referred to English law cases 
in ascertaining the implications of abuse of process in criminal proceedings. Both are 
considered applicable-international human rights and regional human rights. 
 
 
42 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr.Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 
Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 December 2006,para.19. 
43 Ibid,para.19(b). 
44 Ibid, para.19. 
45 Ibid , para.36. 
46 Ibid, para.36;Articles 64(2), 67(1),68(1) and (5) of the Rome Statute. 




Furthermore, in deciding on victim participation, particularly on the definition of 
‘victim’ and ‘harm,’ the Trial Chamber considered the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.47 The chamber interpreted Principles 8, and 9 as the applicable law for 
determining a victim's status under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. In a similar vein, 
the Trial Chamber also alluded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.48While 
the Basic Principles is soft law, the Convention of Rights of the Child 1989 is a binding 
treaty. Judge Blattman, dissenting opined that the Basic Principles was not appropriate 
as internationally recognised human rights because it is not legally binding; rather, its 
authority was only persuasive.49Judge Blattman conceded that the decisions of the 
Chamber must be compatible with internationally recognised human rights. However, 
the learned Judge argued that the Basic Principles were not fit for the consideration 
because the Rome Statute drafters rejected it during the Rome conference's preparatory 
stages. 
 
Om Appeal, the Appeal Chambers ruled that the ICC Chambers may rely on 
international documents which are not legally binding.50 As such, the ICC may refer to 
 
47 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Decision 
on victims’ participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,18 January 2008, Para 35. 
48 Ibid para.36.  
49 The Prosecutor v Lubanga,Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rene Blattman, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1119, Trial Chamber 1, para 4-5. 
50 The Prosecutor v Lubanga, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor  and the Defence against Trial 
Chamber I’ Decision on Victims Participation  of 18 January 2008, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, 
para.33. 




these instruments. Therefore, the chamber could interpret through the use of 
international human rights treaties and national laws.  
  
McGonigle posits that the ICC is unclear as to the extent to which it should apply a 
human rights approach in addressing the interpretation of human rights within the 
context of article 21(3).51In her words: The application of human rights “is largely 
driven by pragmatism rather than principle.”52McGonigle cautions that the court's 
implementation of a human rights approach can subvert the founding principles of a 
fair and legitimate criminal proceeding.53 
 
 It could mean the judges' effort to complement the application of article 21(3) 
overstretch its interpretation, thereby shifting the trial's focus from criminal prosecution 
to a more victim-centred approach. The human rights approach should encompass the 
rights of both accused and victims. It follows that the court ought to strike a balance 
between the application of a human rights approach between the accused and victims. 
If not done, the human rights approach's implementation might overshadow the 
mandate of the criminal court.  
   
 
51 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, “ Pragmatism over Principles:The International Criminal Court and a 
Human Rights-Based Approach  to Judicial Interpretation” (2018)41(3)Fordham International Law 
Journal , 696--736 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 




With the criminological theory's proliferation, victims' extensive role provides another 
approach to victims’ position at the ICC; passive role to a more active role. Doak thinks 
that if victims are given procedural rights, these rights will entrench a sense of 
belonging within the criminal justice system.54 Procedural rights will enhance their 
interests and access to justice; at the same time, procedural fairness could impact their 
experience at the ICC. The availability of these human rights to victims at the ICC 
makes the ICC a victim-oriented court.55 These rights may be procedural-a means to an 
end-therefore, they are to some extent, restricted.  They do not grant victims the right 
to determine the outcome of the proceedings.56  However, they may influence such 
decisions.  
 
In brief, it may be inferred that the ICC aligns itself with the recognition and 
enforcement of victims’ rights. So far, this section has focused on the implications of 
the ICC criminal procedure on victims. It will be necessary to examine procedural 
fairness. 
 
3.3The context of procedural fairness 
In the field of law, the various definition of justice is found. The concept of ‘justice’ is 
a commonly-used notion in law, yet it is a concept difficult to define precisely. 
 
54 Jonathan Doak, ‘Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials  :Prospects for Participation’(2005) 32(2) Journal 
of Law and Society ,1-26. 
55 Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating Justice for victims of at the International Criminal Court:Beyond Rhetoric 
and the Hague (2015) 13(20 Journal of International Criminal Justice , 281-311. 
56 Luke Moffett, ‘Elaborating Justice for victims at the International Criminal Court(2015) 13(2) Journal 
of international Criminal Justice,.281-311. 




Therefore, the definition of justice will depend upon the nature of the dispute or issues 
at hand. Additionally, justice is considered a very relative term for people. 
 
Rawls considers ‘justice as fairness’. A terminology which posits that trustworthy 
principles of justice are reached in an initial situation that is fair. 57 For trustworthy 
principles of justice to emerge, there must be a fair enabling situation or status quo, i.e. 
principles of justice are situated within a fair institution. The initial state of things must 
be honest enough for these principles to thrive and emerge.58 Applying this theory to 
the ICC implies the fairness of such an institution. ICC could be likened to the ‘initial 
situation’(status quo) in Rawls’ analysis. The perception is that the institution must be 
founded on fairness, which underscores the significance of justice in an institution. An 
institution bereft of fairness cannot deliver what it does not have. In a way, this analysis 
emphasises an upright, just or trustworthy institution with integrity and legitimacy.  
 
Having said that, Tyler, in his study, found that citizens base their judgement and 
experience on the fairness of the procedure during the proceedings.59 How people and 
their problems are managed during dispute resolution by the courts has more influence 
on them than the outcome of such disputes.60It is believed that fairness of procedure 
 
57 John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice” (Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard University 1971) 
58 Ibid ; John Thibuat,Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour, Pauline Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness  
(1974)26 Stanford Law Review, 1271-1272.p. 1271. 
59 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy , and the Effective Rule of Law’, (2003) 30(1)Crime and 
Justice ,p283-357. 
60 John Thibaut and Lauren Walker, ‘A Theory of Procedure :Psychological Analysis’ (Hillsdale 1975) 




entrenches legitimacy for the legal authorities.61 Their experience during the 
proceedings is a determinant if they would accept the outcome of such proceedings.62 
Most times, victims prioritise the process than substantive justice. It is stated that 
victims’ positive experience at the court, may shape their perceptions of the court. The 
four criteria for procedural fairness are respect, voice, neutrality and trust.63 It follows 
that procedural justice influences whether people recognise, acknowledge and obey the 
courts' decisions. Therefore, the fairness of procedure becomes a yardstick in 
determining how people are treated in judicial proceedings.  Procedural justice is 
needed to assess the interests of victims as well as their rights. 
 
The next section shall discuss the significance of victims’ voice and respect as essential 
aspects of procedural justice during the trial process. 
 
3.3.1The significance of victims’ voice 
 
Building on from the theory of procedural justice,  this section addresses ‘voice’ as an 
important content of fairness of the procedure. When people are permitted to give an 
 
61 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and Policing: A Rush to Judgment(2017) 13(1)Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science, p.29-53; Tom Tyler, Why Do People obey the Law (Yale University Press 1990) 
62 Ibid 
63 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’ (2007) 44Court Review,p.30 




account of their stories.64 The disclosure of their views and concerns recognises their 
position within the trial   
Voice is a form of participation in the procedure which gives a sense of belonging to 
the victims. Depending on the degree to which their voice is heard, it may influence the 
decision or sentencing. For instance, research suggests that in common law 
jurisdictions, victim impact statement is considered by judges when making decisions 
about the sentencing of the accused.65 One of the desires of parties in conflict resolution 
is the desire to be heard. Their voice could amplify their opinions, concerns and needs 
to the court. The role of the victim impact statements as the voice for victims shall be 
discussed in chapter four.  
Haslam and Dembour posit that victim-witnesses were  ‘effectively silenced’ during the  
Krstic proceedings at the ICTY.66 A consequent of the demands of the legal process on 
 
64 Ibid  
65 Tracy Booth, “Victim Impact Statements, Sentencing and Contemporary Standards of Fairness in the 
Courtroom,In Dean Wilson and Stuart Ross (eds) Crime, Victims and Policy,Palmgrave Studies in 
Victims and Victimology(Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)161-183;Joint Agency Guide to the Victim 
Personal Statement:A guide for all criminal justice practitioners, accessible at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/legal_gidance/joint-agency-guide-victim-
personal-statement_0.pdf last accessed 04 September 2020; Ray Paternoster and Jerome Deise “A Heavy 
Thumb on the Scale :The Effect of Victim Impact Evidence on Capital Decision Making(2011) 49(1) 
Criminology 129;Kerstin Braun, “Giving Victims a Voice : On the Problems of Introducing Victim 
Impact Statementsin German Criminal Procedure(2013) 14(9)German Law Journal ,1889-1908;Luke 
Moffett, Victim Personal Statementsin Managing Victims’ Vocies in Sentencing in Northern 
Ireland:Taking a more Procedural Justice Approach (2017)68(4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 
available at 
https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/137289940/Moffett_NILQ_Final_Special_Edition.pdf
>last accessed 04 September 2020.   
66 Emily Haslam and Marie-Bnendicte Dembour, Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnessses at war Crimes 
Trials (2004) 15(1) European Journal of International Law,151-177. 




the victim-witnesses.67As such, the ICTY  could not meet these victim-witnesses' needs 
because they had to act primarily as witnesses, without giving them the platform to tell 
their stories. The victims’ voices could not be heard during the trial process. The victims 
appeared as witnesses, not in their capacity as victims. 
 
In the ICC, the LRVs are the voice of the victims. These LRVs make opening and 
closing statements, as well as observations. Due to practical constraints,  LRVs make 
submissions and move motions on behalf of victims. In a study conducted by UC 
Berkeley, a majority of victims reported that they had a voice in the ICC during the pre-
trial stage. These victims’ answers were supported by the previous encounter they had 
with Court staff. It demonstrates that they knew the court, especially the awareness that 
the Court renders assistance for victims who have suffered harm.68Some victims opined 
that the submission of individual applications was an indication that their views were 
known at the court.69While this is commendable, it is noteworthy that applications' 
submission is not an automatic qualification for hearing their voices. It is at best 
described as recognition of their suffering, but, this is subject to conditions set out in 
Rule 85. It is important to enlighten the victims about this in order to prevent giving 
them unreasonable expectations. Additionally, the follow- up communications and 




68 Human Rights Center, UCBerkely School of Law, ‘The Victims’ Court? A Study of 622 Victim 
Participants at the International Criminal Court’ (2015)  available at VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf 
(berkeley.edu) 1-86, 32. 
69 Ibid. 




The section below describes ‘respect’ for victims as an important aspect of fairness. A 
discussion on respect for victims will further our understanding of the treatment of 
victims. 
 
3.3.2 The significance of Respect 
“participation” had been defined as “having a say, being listened to, or being treated 
with dignity and respect.”.70 
 
Respect is another important criteria for assessing how victims are being treated. The 
rationale behind respect emphasises that victims are essential and valuable in the 
system. It may also reinforce their inclusion within the rights and protection offered by 
the law.71Respect for the victims is vital at all stages, from the police officers to the 
parties and the judges.72 It involves treating victims with politeness. For example, 
providing victims with updates and feedback about the court activities and their 
protection denotes that they are carried along. It is believed that respect may also 
encompass the dignity a human person; The dignity of a human person is the underlying 
factor of most human rights documents.73 Therefore, as stated in the preamble, victims 
 
70 Ian Edwards,  “An Ambiguous  Participant:The Crime and Criminal Justice Decision –Making (2004) 
44 British Journal of Criminology, 967,973; Jonathan Doak, “Victims’ Rights in Criminal 
Trials :Prospects for Participation (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society,294,295. 
71 Tom Tyler,  ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts (1988) 44 Court Review 24. 
72 Ibid. 
73 The United Nations Charter 1945; Universal Declaration of Human Rights  1948;preamble of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW);Preamble of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse, 1985, Preamble 




should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity.74This may be the 
rationale behind the argument for victims’ rights as entitlements, based on the fact that 
it entitles them to access justice. A generally accepted definition of  Dignity lacks in 
academia and international instruments. The term ‘dignity’ embodies many concepts 
that include the ‘quality of being worthy of honour or respect.’75  Para.2 of the Preamble 
of the United Nations Charter stipulates: “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
the dignity and worth of the human person” The excerpt reiterates the threshold for 
treatment of human. A connection between fundamental human rights and the dignity 
of the human person.  
 
Respect here is classified under dignity as a ‘minimum core’; this emphasises that each 
individual possesses intrinsic worth.76 The ‘use of dignity’ as a tool of judicial 
interpretation highlights the intrinsic value to humans.77 It has commonly been assumed 
that this transcends dignity as a substantive right. The argument finds support from 
human rights' foundational aspirations, amongst others are equality, justice, and peace. 
If victims’ rights are seen as entitlements, then the foundations from which human 
rights emerged from must be incorporated in the application for victims. Dignity is a 
 
74 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles for Victims of Crime and Abuse, 1985, Preamble. 
75 Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia, Merits , Judgement [2016] ECHR 805; Jalloh v Germany, Judgment , 
Merits [2006]ECHR 721The European Convention on Human Rights 1950, Article 3, 
76 Christopher McCrudden , ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 655-724, 657; David Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal 
Value-Part II (2001) 61 Public Law, p.75; John Humphrey, ‘Human Rights and the United Nations: A 
Great Adventure’(1984) 40(3) International Journal 44; C-36/02,March 18,204, [2004] ECR1-09609, 
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fundamental aspect of respect for the victim because it is considered to protect their 
identity and individuality. Therefore, respect should be seen as the source of victims’ 
rights rather than a substantive right on its own. It is seen as a foundation for rights as 
entitlements-value. 
 
Moreover, some victims opine that more communication and support from the 
authorities make them feel truly respected.78 Acknowledgement of their suffering and 
face-to-face meetings are also indicators of respect. Assistance and ‘continuous 
programs’ with multiple visits are considered as treating them with 
respect.’79Infrequent visits’ could mean they are not treated with respect. 
 
From the above, it is clear that dignity and respect are intertwined. Having discussed 
respect as a criterion of procedural justice, the next section shall analyse the ICC's 
criminal system procedure to lay a foundation for the context of the trial process. 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that recent developments within criminological theory 
have also challenged the classical criminal justice system and influenced victims' role 
in criminal proceedings.80 This development in criminological theory proposes a 
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holistic approach to addressing wrong in criminal justice.81The holistic approach 
examines the relationship between the victim, the offender, the society and the criminal 
justice system. This is in contrary to the initial offender centred approach. 
 
In brief, it may be inferred that the ICC aligns itself with the recognition and 
enforcement of victims’ rights. Nonetheless, this does not mean that it is victim-focused 
or gives victims’ rights primacy over the accused's rights. There is a possibility that this 
situation may be improved if the restorative justice values are reconciled with the ICC's 
traditional criminal justice system. 
 
What follows is a description of the rationale behind participation by using the Edwards 
theory of involvement. I will present a detailed account of the argument for this theory. 
 
 
 3.3.3  Edwards’ form of participation  
While some writers have suggested the ‘balance approach’ as a rationale behind 
victims’ participation, the researcher shall review victims’ involvement in the ICC 
criminal trial by using the Edwards framework of dispositive and non-dispositive 
participation. The researcher prefers to use Edwards’ theory because it analyses the 
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relationship between victims and the decision-makers as well as how victims’ 
participation influences the decision and interests of victims. Victims’ interests could 
be considered through procedural and substantive justice for victims.82The procedural 
aspects involve the trial process and the rights afforded to victims. 
 
One of the rationales behind victim participation is empowerment. Victims are 
empowered as primary stakeholders with ‘decision-making clout’ over processes that 
affect them and their communities.83 This empowerment is referred to as full 
empowerment for victims as decision-makers. The scope of participation for victims at 
the ICC is deeply rooted in their interests during the proceedings. Victims’ interests are 
used as metrics for their degree of involvement-a provision enshrined in Article 68(3). 
Procedural rights enhance their role during criminal trials.84 During criminal 
proceedings, victim participation is besieged with challenges of determination of guilt, 
the quest for truth-finding, protection of public interests, and respect for the accused's 
fair trial rights.85 These pre-existing competing ends become complicated for the 
position of victims before sentencing.86 
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Doak divides the impact of victim participation in the criminal trial into two-structural 
barriers and normative barrier.87Given that the ICC is primarily adversarial, the 
incorporation of victim involvement destabilises the equality of arms; an offset of the 
“structured setting between the Prosecutor and the defendant.88Consequently, this may 
lead to a prolonged criminal trial and a clog in the wheel of victim 
participation.89Concerning the normative barrier, Ashworth argued that the criminal 
justice system's mandate is retributive justice for the protection of public interests as 
opposed to individual interests.90Punitive measures are set in place for social control 
and wrongdoing; an approach for preserving the common good. Therefore, it is 
distracting to incorporate individual interests. The court should prioritise public good 
over private interests.91According to Ashworth, to maintain objectivity in criminal 
justice, victims interests will inadvertently be relegated.92 Since Ashworth propounds 
the preservation of objectivity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system over 
victims interests in sentencing, his assertion questions the status and implications of 
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victims' interests in the criminal justice system ensures transparency and checks in the 
system, legitimising the system.93 Victim involvement during trials may contribute to 
the court's legitimacy. Simultaneously, the court should properly manage their 
participation to minimise procedural challenges that might arise due to their 
participation in a predominantly adversarial setting.  
 
 Victims are likened to stakeholders in the proceedings; this entails their interests as 
well as influence in the proceedings. Victims interests as a stakeholder should be 
considered to enhance the value of the ICC. The needs of each stakeholder are valuable. 
It examines the role and influence of victims in criminal trials. Participation may either 
be real empowerment for victims to influence the outcome of decision-making or 
passive involvement.94 Either way, it could be a real power, which affects the decision 
or just a means to an end.95A means to an end connotes victims as a tool in the process, 
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Edwards opines that assessing the effectiveness of participation is best obtained by 
analysing the concept of victim involvement in decision-making rather than creating 
‘balance’ between the rights of the accused and victims’ rights.96 From this, flows 
meaningful participation for victims. From his perspective,  the ‘balance approach’  
may not provide the desired results. This section will critically evaluate the forms of 
participation and the extent to which it influences victims’ rights and interests. Edwards 
proposed four different participatory roles for victims. With this model, each 
participatory form is used to assess its influence on the decision- making process. 
 
A generally accepted definition of participation is lacking. It can be loosely described 
as the act of taking part in an activity. As a result of its unsettled concept, participation 
encompasses A)being in control B)having a say,  C)Being treated with dignity and 
respect. These definitions have been applied to situations within the ambience of victim 
emancipation.97   
 
Edwards points out from his theory that participation should be direct and 
active.98These forms of participation make a distinction between the relationship of the 
victim and the decision-maker. He referred to this as four typologies, with further 
division into a dispositive and non-dispositive category. Under the non-dispositive 
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category, the three forms of participation are consultation, information-provision and 
expression. For this category, the victim is not the decision-maker, but they may 
influence the decision.99 On the other hand, the dispositive category comprises one form 
of participation, known as control. With control, the victim is akin to the decision-
maker. They are in total control of the decision-making process. 
 
Concerning control, Edwards assesses this through the relationship of victims with 
influence and control. Some commenters also corroborate this theory. Thibaut and 
Walker identified two types of authority that parties might have over the procedure used 
in dispute resolution.100These are process control and decision control. They made a 
distinction between these two aspects of control. The significant difference between the 
two is that while the process control involves ‘the control over the opportunity to 
present evidence’, the decision control focuses on the victims' ability to exercise control 
over the final decision.101 Data from the transcripts reveal that victims have, to some 
extent, a degree of control over the process. Participatory rights,102 through LRVs,103 
questioning of witnesses, admissibility and relevancy of evidence,104 sentencing, and 
decisions of the Court.105 Also, victims are allowed, through their LRVs to submit 
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observations(oral and written), representations,106 participating in hearings,107  
attending trials,108The adversarial system, in particular limits the extent of control 
victims can have in the presentation of evidence and decision-making.  
The decision-maker is obligated to identify and use the victims ‘preference’ in decision-
making while the victim must submit his preference to the decision-maker.109Hence the 
victim has control over the process of decision-maker. However, each form of 
participation is either based on a symbolic voice or an influencing voice or control. 
With the ICC, the control of decision –making is entirely left to the Court's discretion. 
 
Regarding the non-dispositive category, consultation centres on identifying and 
considering the views and opinions about guidelines and strategies to be used in the 
formulation of policies or decisions.110Cambridge dictionary defines ‘consultation’ as 
‘the process of discussing something with someone to get their advice or opinion 
about’111 The consultation connotes the process of seeking the opinions and views of 
victims during the criminal proceedings. It also means that the criminal justice system 
or decision-maker is obliged to seek victims views and concerns. However, it is not 
under an obligation to include these views and opinions in the final decision.112 These 
views and concerns need to be balanced with other essential factors. It should be noted 
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that these views and concerns may influence the decisions, but there are other 
competing factors. Hence, consultation may not have an impact on the outcome 
concerning the victims' intentions and expectations. It is considered being a means to 
an end or due diligence. One criticism of this form of participation is that it might create 
false expectations for the victims who feel their contribution will have a considerable 
impact on the decision. 
 
The provision of Article 68(3)113 depicts the implications of consultation. The 
discretion given to the court in determining the appropriate stage of participation 
reinforces the use of consultation as a form of participation; judicial discretion to 
determine the proper stage of involvement, and considering the victims' views and 
concerns. In the same vein, Article 61 appears to demonstrate that victims have an 
interest in participation.114It includes, amongst other things, the avenue to influence the 
content of the charges; consultation, because the victims may make an application for 
amendment of the charges. For instance, the LRV requested the Prosecutor to include 
of inhumane treatment and SGBV to the charges.115 
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This form of non-dispositive participation may create a two-way obligation on the 
authorities and victims regarding information provision. The authority may have to seek 
information from the victims, and the victim has to provide information to the authority. 
The form of participation is less restrictive because victims provide information to the 
decision-maker based on specifications of the decision-maker.This is reflected in 
Article 64(6)(b) (c) ((d).It includes the request for evidence from witnesses or victim-
witnesses, which expresses victims' place as witnesses in most common law 
jurisdictions. Hence, the instrumentalisation of victims in criminal proceedings. The 
practical examples were found in the ICTY and ICTR. Information provision does not 
recognise the interests of victims. Christie and some victim-centric approach have 
criticised this approach because it reduces victims’ visibility in criminal proceedings.116 
The controversies surrounding this came into play during the trial stage in the Lubanga 
case. How appropriate is the participation of victims at this stage? This will be discussed 
in the later section. 
 
Furthermore, the 1985 UN Declaration of principles provides for victims' right to 
receive and give information.117This right falls under access to justice and fair 
treatment.118 This principle states that informing victims of their roles, scope, and 
timing of the case, particularly where they request this information, facilitates the 
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responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the victims' needs.119  
Receiving and giving information may be argued to constitute part of the procedure. 
However, it appears this may be challenging in practice 
 
The final form of non-dispositive participation is expression. As far as expression is 
concerned, it is a very loose form of involvement.120While the authorities are obliged 
to provide an opportunity for expression,  victims are not under any obligation to 
respond. With expression, victims are allowed to tell their story and emote. Most times, 
the expression does not influence decision-making. It is seen as an acknowledgement 
of victims’ presence. The form of participation is similar to Victim-Impact 
Statements(VIS).121It is prevalent in common law traditions which are usually done 
before sentencing. The decision-maker could use this in the determination of sentencing 
for the accused.  
 
This section has focused on the forms of participation as laid down by Edwards. Each 
of the sub-categories defined the level of influence which victims possess. The 
following section shall evaluate the modalities of involvement to set a foundation for 









3.3.3.1 Modalities for participation 
This section shall examine the method of participation. It grants victims procedural 
rights. It might equally be said that modalities of participation determine the means of 
participation.  
 
The statutory provision that victims may present their views and concerns on matters 
which affect their personal interests has been given a different interpretation. A decision 
reached concluded that victims are permitted to question witnesses and introduce 
evidence.122 The Trial Chamber opined that the right to submit evidence during trials 
before the Court is not exclusive to the parties. It stated that the Court has the general 
right to request the presentation of all evidence necessary to determine truth.123 It is 
within the courts' purview to shape the extent of involvement of victims in the 
proceedings. Although victims are third parties to the proceedings, the Court could 
extend their rights(presentation of evidence) to facilitate the determination of truth. 
Therefore, the Rome Statute limits the victims' right to participate in evidence relevant 
to the determination of truth.124 
 
Unsatisfied with the ruling, the ICC Prosecutor sought leave to appeal the 
decision.125The Prosecutor contended that the TC provided extensive participation 
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modalities that exceeded the ‘expression of views and concerns’.126In the Prosecutor’s 
words,  ‘modalities of participation may not infringe upon the parties rights or overlap 
with the exclusive function of the Prosecution”.127The Prosecutor urged the court to 
give a restrictive interpretation to prevent the victims from usurping the parties' 
exclusive rights (to tender evidence). 
 
In its Judgement, the AC stated that the right to lead evidence and challenge evidence's 
admissibility is within the Prosecutor and Defence autonomy.128 However, none of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute ‘prevents victims from participating in these ways. The 
AC notes: 
 
“if victims were generally and under all circumstances precluded from tendering 
evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused from challenging the 
admissibility or relevance of evidence (victims) right to participate in the trial would 
potentially become ineffectual.”129 
 
  
From the above, it can be seen that there are different pathways for victim involvement; 
nonetheless, these modalities for participation are less generalisable. It depends on a 
case by case basis. The Rome Statute leaves the modalities of participation to the 
discretion of the Chamber. This means that there is no value for determining 
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participation. Rather, the Chamber decided that participation based on the presentation 
of evidence at a particular point during the case. In response to an application for 
victims’ participation, the chamber evaluates a connection between victims’ interests 
and the Prosecution’s presentation of evidence. Suppose the victims’ application passes 
the personal interests test at the particular stage of the proceedings. In that case, despite 
the absence of victims’ locus standi, the Chamber is empowered to decide whether the 
mode of participation is appropriate and consistent with the defence's fair rights trial.  
 
Having discussed the modalities and pre-requisites for participation, the following 
section describes victims' procedural rights and its applicability to further victims’ 
interests. 
 
3.4.1Procedural rights of victims. 
Turning now to victims' procedural rights, this section will focus on victims' procedural 
status via the procedural rights applicable to them. The procedural status of victim 
confers victims participatory rights which entitles them to express their views and 
concerns.130It seems that the concept of the procedural status of victims is not settled. 
The following passage espouses the reasoning behind such a statement: 
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“Procedural status of victim” is unknown to law. Such status is fraught with  
confusion and opens the door to victims intruding into the investigation process, 
 the exclusive province of the prosecutor.”131 
 
Although the prosecutor(appellant) remarked this to support his opposition to victims' 
participation in the investigative process, the Appeals Chamber's determination 
supports the prosecutor’s arguments. It states as follows: 
 
“The notion of the procedural status of victims is nowhere defined, and it is difficult to 
attach a specific meaning to it. “Are there other forms of victims status?... Moreover, 
is there a substantive victim status in contrast to a procedural one?”132 
 
In addition, the AC noted that the word ‘procedural’ means something related to the 
procedure. A code which regulates the judicial power known as ‘adjectival law’.It is 
distinguished from substantive law which was described as “definitive of the rights, 
duties and obligations of a person. The word "status" signifies a person's legal 
condition, whether personal or proprietary, Procedure is not of itself determinative of 
the status of any person.”133 
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Procedural status is a precondition for a victim to participate. From the procedural status 
emerges the procedural rights available to victims, contributing to their access to justice. 
It is worthy of mention that the realisation of these rights is not automatic. They have 
left to judicial discretion, i.e. the extent of their application depends on the court's 
decision/rulings. These rights may ensure the realisation of victims’ interests. The UN 
Declaration set out some rights to empower victims of crime and abuse of power. 
Interestingly, this instrument's preamble accedes to the fact that the rights of victims 
have not been fully recognised.134The basic founding themes of victims’ rights, 
according to this declaration is respect and recognition.135The recognition of a person 
is a right embedded in UDHR.136 The right of a person to recognition before the law 
may be construed as a precondition for the realisation of procedural rights for victims; 
hence, the emergence of procedural status. The primary rights listed in this declaration 
are : 
• Right to receive information; 
• Right to receive notification about the progress of the case; 
• Right to express their views and concerns  at the appropriate stages in the 
criminal justice system 
• Right to protection of their physical safety and privacy; 
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• Right to reparation from offender and compensation from State.137 
 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides additional rights like right to confidentiality,138 
access to court documents and information139 right to legal representation,140 and the 
right to appeal reparation orders.141While these rights enlisted in the 1985 Declaration 
could enhance victims' status in the criminal justice system, one major drawback of 
applying these rights is the non-binding nature of the declaration. The signatories to this 
declaration are not under any legal obligation to enforce these rights. It is rather 
persuasive. However, the Rome statute has incorporated some of these rights. This 
highlights the development in the area of victims’ rights. For instance, article 68(3) is 
a replica of principle 6(b) of the UN Declaration which grants victims the right to ‘express 
their views and concerns’. This provision strikes a balance between an adversarial and 
inquisitorial criminal procedure system,142 intending to be subject to judicial scrutiny. One may 
infer that the proliferation of these rights seems to be a  genuine response of human rights to 
the poor treatment of victims of crime in the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, restrictions 
apply to the extent of these rights' effectiveness for victims access to justice, given that the ICC 
is not a human rights court. The applicability of these procedural rights depends on the 
background or framework within which the trial process is situated.  
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In her article, Aldana-Pindell suggests that victims must have access to the criminal 
process to guarantee the effectiveness of criminal prosecutions and hold States 
accountable to victims.143According to the Rome Statute, victims can participate at 
different stages of the proceedings, but this is made subject to the Chambers. Victims' 
procedural rights are not absolute but must be exercised considering the accused's rights 
and fair trial.144 The exercise of these rights are determined on a case-by-case basis. 
The extent of applicability of procedural rights is not settled.  
 
Findlay and Henham observe that procedural frameworks regulate trial in such a way 
that it predetermines the context of such trial. It is vital in setting ‘boundaries’ that 
impels the avenue of ‘influence’ in decision making.145 From this, the role of victims 
and their procedural rights are dictated by the procedural framework. 
 
The traditional forms of criminal justice may sabotage the involvement and extent of 
applicability of victims’ rights in the criminal justice system.146 Ashworth cautions that 
introducing victims into ‘an already balanced system’, -the defence and Prosecutor- 
will result in remarkable consequences.147 Little wonder the applicability of victims’ 
 
143 Racquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for State-
Sponsored Crimes, (2002)Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law ,1399, 1413 
144 Rome Statute,Article 68(3) . 
145Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham, Transforming International Criminal Justice:Retributive and 
Restorative justice (First Published 2005, Wilan Publishing 2005)86. 
146 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure’ Integrating A 
Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice in Adam Crawford and Jo Goody ed(First published 2000, 
Routledge 2016)  
147 Ibid . 




rights is limited. Procedural rights can improve the status of victims at the 
court.148These rights should be seen as the property of the victims rather than elements 
that place them in the same level as the accused(defendant) the goal is not to compete 
with the accused or seek for balance. Instead, these rights are pathways to accessing 
justice, as well as redressing the harm suffered by the victims.149 If extensive procedural 
rights are granted to victims, it may empower them. 
 
However, a severe weakness with this argument is that procedural rights are a means to 
an end, rather than a substantive right. While it may contribute to victims’ access to 
justice, it might not guarantee justice for victims. Some additional factors like accused 
right,  provisions of the Rome Statute, and the ICC RPE, have to be factored in, during 
the criminal proceedings. Hence, victims' procedural rights may influence the decision, 
but, most times, it does not have a considerable impact on the decisions or outcome.   
 
Interestingly, an issue came up in both  Lubanga and Katanga cases that question the 
set of procedural rights that could be attached to anonymous victims' procedural status. 
The Chamber ruled in the Lubanga case that : 
 
“The fundamental principle prohibiting anonymous accusations would be violated,  
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if victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 were permitted to add any point of fact or any 
evidence at all to the Prosecution's case-file presented against Thomas Lubanga  
Dyilo is the notification of charges document and the list of evidence.”150 
 
The single judge asserted that an anonymous victim could participate effectively in the 
proceedings. However, in order to prohibit anonymous accusations, the set of 
procedural rights available to anonymous victims will be restricted. In the Chamber’s 
ruling,  victims granted anonymity are precluded from adding any point of fact or any 
evidence, nor question the witness(in accordance with the procedure set out in rule 
91(3) of the Rules). Notwithstanding, the Chamber held that some procedural rights 
would be compatible with the anonymity of those granted the victim's procedural status 
at the pre-trial stage. These rights are: 
• ‘notification of the public documents contained in the record of the 
relevant case; 
• attendance at  status conferences, or the parts of those status 
conferences, which are to be held in public; 
• making opening and closing statements at the confirmation hearing, in 
which they can, inter alia, address points of law, including the legal 
characterisation of the modes of liability included in the Prosecution 
Charging Document; and 
requesting during the said status conferences and during the public; 
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• sessions of the confirmation hearing, leave to intervene, in which case the 
Chamber would rule on a case by case basis.’’151 
 
 
It is worth noting that the Chamber in Lubanga case held that these procedural rights 
are not exhaustible given that they could be extended “in light of exceptional 
circumstances.”152  
 
A similar question arose in the Katanga case153; victim a/0333/07 prayed the Chamber 
for anonymity during the proceedings leading to and at the confirmation hearing. The 
LRV supported this request with the vulnerability of victim a/03333/07(minor at the 
time of application); the unsettled situation in victim a/0333/07’s location(Ituri 
District); and the fear of the disclosure of the victim’s identity to the defences(Katanga 
and Ngudjolo). The Prosecution did not oppose the request for anonymity of victim 
a/0333/07. He submitted that the same set of procedural rights granted to the 
anonymous victims at the pre-trial stage of Lubangai should be granted to victim 
a/0333/07. In contrast, the Defence for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui argued that anonymous 
victims' participation is not consistent with the rights of the Defence and the principle 
of equality of arms.154He also submitted that anonymous participation should be 
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restricted to the protective measures linked to the anonymous victim.155The Defence 
for Katanga concurred with the observations of the  Prosecution. He submitted that he 
was not in opposition to the anonymity request made by Victim a/0333/07.156 
 
The Chamber granted the anonymity request of victim a/0333/079 (non-disclosure to 
Defence, any other participant, the public and media).157In addition, the Chamber held 
that Victim a/0333/07 should have the set of procedural rights granted to victims in 
VII(They are the same rights granted in the Lubanga case, as shown above).158 
 
Be that as it may, the single Judge observed  that some set of specific procedural rights 
like: 
 
“right to access confidential filing, decisions and transcripts 
contained in the Record of the case, as well as the right to attend 
and participate in closed hearings, can be limited……. if it is shown 
that the relevant limitation is necessary to safeguard another 
competing interest protected by the Statute and the Rules - such as 
national security, the physical or psychological well-being of 
victims and witnesses, or the Prosecution's investigations”159. 
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With participatory victim rights, victims can present their views and concerns on issues 
related to disclosure, questioning of witnesses interim release, jurisdiction, 
investigations, amendments, admissibility of evidence, sentencing and questioning of 
witnesses. It should be noted that they can not automatically exercise their rights in 
these aspects. They must be able to prove that their personal interests are affected. 
Moreover, victims may also be allowed to submit observations, make representations, 
make submissions, attend, participate in hearings and consult the Court’s record. 
 
The victims' participatory rights emerge from the Rome Statute; it is being regulated by 
the Rome Statute and the ICC RPE. Below is Judge Blattman’s excepts on the victims’ 
rights to participate: 
“[t]he important notion that victims’ participation is not a concession of the Bench, 
but rather a right accorded to victims by the Statute.”160 
   
 
“The Chamber should remain mindful that the right to participate when victims’ 
interests are affected is the consequence of a legally protected interest of the 
victim.”.161 
 
The Judge’s statements reinforce the origin/rationale of participation at the ICC. These 
rights are provided to protect the interests of the victims. It is noteworthy that while 
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these rights are stipulated in the Statutes and Rules of the ICC,  their application is not 
automatic. The extent of the application of these rights is subject to judicial discretion, 
bearing in mind the accused's fair trial rights. As suggested by Doak, these rights should 
be seen as entitlements rather than instruments to compete against the offenders,162 
then, victims rights from the concept of human rights framework would preclude the 
opposing dichotomy between victims’ rights and offender’s rights. This dichotomy 
does pitch the victims against the offender with the idea that their interests and position 
are irreconcilable.163 With Edwards’theory, the balance approach is relegated with the 
view of assessing the relationship between the victim and the decision-maker and the 
channel through which they influence the decision. It also places more values on 
victims' contact with the criminal justice system to advance their interests and influence 
the outcome of the proceedings. 
 
The following section shall explore victims’ right to legal representation because 
victims’ LRVs are considered as the link between victims and the court. Victims mainly 
act through them as they cannot participate directly in the court due to the proceedings' 
efficiency and smooth running.  
3.5. Effectiveness of Victims’ right to legal representation 
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“The on-going insecurity in Ituri means that victims cannot always communicate 
easily with their legal representative or each other. Forcing victims to communicate in 
order to liaise with other people whom they do not know could pose a security 
risk.”164 
 
“In the view of the Legal Representatives, several groups of victims would not 
necessarily need to be put together to ensure the efficiency of proceedings, even if the 
number of groups was much higher than at present. It would depend on the 
circumstances.”165 
Legal representation is an important aspect of victims' procedural rights, although 
victims are permitted to participate directly in their own right. However, to expedite the 
trial process, the use of LRVs is indispensable. It follows that a few victims will be 
allowed to participate directly. Thus, most take part in trials through legal 
representatives. The LRV is very relevant for victims’ access to justice, as he is their 
voices.166For victims to participate under Article 68(3), it is not mandatory to 
participate through legal representatives; “[s]uch views and concerns may be 
represented by the legal representatives of victims where the court considers it 
appropriate. “The use of ‘may’ illustrates an open option for victims to participate in 
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trial proceedings directly. In a similar vein, Rule 89 stipulates that victims may 
participate, at the Chamber's discretion, to make opening and closing statements. 167 It 
can be inferred that regardless of if victims have legal representatives, they may make 
opening and closing statements if the Chamber finds it appropriate. However,  Rule 91 
stipulates that victims who decide to participate through legal representatives will have 
more opportunities than victims who choose to participate directly(without legal 
representatives).168This form of participation is referred to as a direct form of 
participation. 
 
Furthermore, Rule 90 set out the regime for choosing legal representatives. Victims are 
free to choose a legal representative.169 This provision gives the victim the free will to 
choose their legal representative. Rule 90(1) grants victims the right to be legally 
represented in the criminal proceedings.170It is one of the rights of victims, which may 
be said to be applicable in principle. Rule 90(2) empowers the Chamber to request the 
victim, with the registry's assistance to appoint a common legal representative(s) for 
victims or a group of victims to ensure trial effectiveness.171 The Rules affirm that 
victims have discretionary right to participate under Rule 91(3)(a).On the Chamber’s 
ruling, the LRV shall represent the victims in criminal trials. The main distinction 
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between Rule 90 and Rule 91 is that, while Rule 90 spells out the need to choose legal 
representatives for victim participation, Rule 91 sets out the modalities in which a legal 
representative may participate in the proceedings. According to Rule 91(2), the LRV 
can attend and participate in the hearing, provided the court has not confined the LRVs 
participation to written observations or submissions. The LRV may also request leave 
from the Chamber to question a witness, expert, or the accused.172In response to the 
request, the Chamber may order the LRV to submit written notice of the intended 
question and then determine the “manner and order of the questions” permitted during 
the proceedings.173 
  
In Donat-Catin’s words, “there is no effective access to justice without skilful and 
responsible representation”.174This statement underscores the importance of  LRVs for 
victims’ access to justice. Mekjian and Varughese point out that the right to legal 
representation is the most ‘procedurally challenging’ aspect in the ICC.175Thus, 
Effective representation goes a long way in enhancing victims’ interests and realising 
full participatory rights. Nonetheless, flawed legal representation may jeopardise the 
realisation of victims’ rights and interests. 
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In practice, it is noticed that victims have less power to choose their legal 
representatives, coupled with the fact that a large group of victims are represented by a 
common legal representative(s). One implication of a common LRV is that there is a 
presumption that these victims have mutual or common interests. At the same time, this 
thesis does not intend to explore if the LRVs neglect victims’ voice because this cannot 
be inferred from the transcripts. 
 
The relationship between victims and their LRVs could be likened to the “crime victim 
agency.”The Chamber chooses many a time, the LRVs as the representatives of the 
victims for the victims. One serious disadvantage of the ICC’s method is that it could 
undermine the crime victim agency. Crime victim agency is defined as the autonomy 
of crime victims to make a fundamental decision about their lives.176This autonomy 
includes their right and power to make important decisions that could have 
consequences on their situations. The concept is divided into two, self-definition and 
self-direction. Self -definition is described as the determination of how one envisions 
himself as an individual or as a member of the community. Self-direction is ‘charting 
of one’s life’177 It is within this context that crime victim agency is situated.  Research 
suggests that crime victim agency can lead to an enhanced quality life and ensure 
victims’ security and protection.178On the other hand, if the crime victims agency is 
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done recklessly, it could lead to re-victimisation for victims, loss of trust/confidence in 
the criminal justice system, as well as  disengagement with the system 179 
 
Most times, victims do not ‘meaningfully choose ‘whether’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ and to 
‘what extent’ to get involved in the process and exercise their rights.180 This is due 
because of the parameters laid down by the Court's existing Statutes, Rules and 
Regulations. These are interpreted and regulated by the judges. Arguably, the LRVs are 
responsible for speaking on behalf of the victims. Given that, most times, victims do 
not choose their LRVs, it remains important that the LRVs enlighten victims about the 
criminal process and possible outcomes of the criminal proceedings. It is also necessary 
that the LRVs inquire about the victims' needs and interests and how these will be 
accomplished. It is believed that some victims might have unreasonable expectations 
of the ICC from information received during the initial campaign and outreach. They 
may come with this pre-conceived idea that the criminal prosecution will solve all their 
problems. In this regard, the LRVs must sensitize the victims about the possible 
outcomes and the court's workings. A viable means to minimise disappointments on the 
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“if some hearings were held in the DRC, this would increase the visibility of justice 
among victims and allow victims who have been authorised to take part in 
proceedings to follow hearings.”181 
In view of the Legal Representatives, insecurity in Ituri is currently too great for a 
trial to be held in Bunia in normal conditions, but hearings could be held in 
Lubumbashi.”182 
 
Clark notes that cultural issues and distance may disengage victims from the court and 
their legal representatives.183 He argued that the ICC becomes distance from the victims 
in an attempt to remain impartial or neutral. This situation played out in the use of 
intermediaries and its implications on testimonies during the trial proceedings.184 
Arguably, the ICC may lack connection with victims because of cultural differences 
between its staff and the victims. However, the language barrier is addressed by the use 
of interpreters. Cultural differences pose a challenge between the ICC's applicable 
substantive and procedural law and the national jurisdiction's operating law. For 
example, the inconsistency between the rules, principles and regulations on rape and 
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other forms of sexual violence applicable in national jurisdiction and other international 
instruments(human rights law, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, International Humanitarian Law) and the 
Rome Statute, including the RPE reveals the difficulties encountered in the 
investigation and prosecution of these crimes.185 These are possibly the issues that 
failed the Prosecutor to investigate SGBV(difficulties in proving sexual violence and 
rape). These challenges reflect the disparity between the victims' expectation and the 
reality of the ICC. One possible solution is for the ICC to recruit staff from the same 
country or situation to represent victims. Understandably, the ICC may be cautious 
about being biased. Presumably, the ICC might have distanced itself from politics; 
inadvertently; the remoteness resulted in a disengagement between the victims and the 
court.  
 
The LRV’s role in victim participation is shown in  Prosecutor v Katanga; the Chamber 
held that victims' right to choose legal representative is not absolute; it is a right made 
subject to paragraph 2 and 3 of Rule 90.186This brings to light the indispensable role of  
LRVs in trials. Regardless, this does not avail the denial of victims right to choose 
LRVs of their choice. As a result of the situation, some victims may not be intellectually 
and psychologically sound to choose a competent lawyer to represent them. It will for 
the Chamber to choose LRVs for victims in such a situation. According to a study by 
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the Human Rights Watch, the Court has factored in cost and efficiency implications, to 
have primacy over victims’ views on their legal representation in determining 
LRVs.187The study implies that victims’ views on legal representation are not relevant 
in their appointment. It is a prerogative of the Court. The Court’s authority to appoint 
lawyers for the victims is justified because of managing unreasonable trial delays.  
 
Nonetheless, it is not an important factor in the selection of LRVs. It goes to say that 
using victims’ views as the main criteria may slow down the legal process and its 
efficiency. Although the wording of Rule 90 enables victims to choose legal 
representatives of their choice without the Court’s interference, it seems the Court does 
eventually choose legal representatives for victims to prevent the delay in the normal 
course of proceedings.188 Subsequently, the Court might have to select a common legal 
representative for a large number of victims. With this, the Court overlooks the fact that 
victims' personal interests may be subsumed under common interests of numerous 
victims, which may not fulfil victims’ needs on an individual basis. On the other hand, 
due to a large number of victims, it is uncertain if the common legal representatives can 
reach out to the victims individually. The implication of these results would be the 
under-representation or partial representation of victims.  
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In 2017,  Killean and Moffett suggested that victims' inclusion in decisions over-
representation may foster victims’ voice and agency.189 They recommended seeking 
victims' opinion on legal representation gives them a degree of control over their 
representatives.190 According to the authors, the use of common legal representatives 
has “collectivised” victims’ voices.191While victims might have suffered harm from the 
same crime, this does not preclude them from having distinct interests and concerns. It 
is noted that victims have two general interests-reparations and justice.192 A 
‘collectivised’ voice cannot herald the victims’ personal interests. The divergent 
interests and concerns of victims can make it challenging for a common legal 
representative to represent “victims’ interests” thoroughly.193Also, Killean and Moffett 
argue that common legal representatives do not strip victims of the political or legal 
agency. From their perspectives, the engagement of legal assistant(local lawyers and 
civil party lawyers) with victims to a large extent reduces victims’ marginalisation at 
the ICC.194 They caution that “there remains a real risk that within the courtroom, victim 
participation is a token effort, rather than a genuine representation of voice and 
agency.”195 Representation of victims as an indispensable aspect of victim participation 
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reinforces the value of voice because victims cannot participate directly in the criminal 
proceedings. Unfortunately, it remains unsettled if the use of legal representation 
heralds victims’ voice. At most, it could be likened to the carrot and stick metaphor. No 
doubt using LRVs as intermediaries between the Court and the victims eases victim 
participation; however, it may filter victims’ voices. In light of this, more attention 
should be given to victims from pre-trial to the trial stage to mitigate any processes that 
could sabotage the underrepresentation of their voices. 
 
The selection of one or two legal representatives to represent many victims 
inadvertently classifies them with common interests. Many a time, this is not the reality. 
Each victim might have concerns which are distinct from the others. This is not within 
the thesis's scope because it is impossible to ascertain the transcript analysis findings.  
We should bear in mind that not every right of victim extends to their LRVs.While 
victims can participate anonymously for protective measures, LRVs are not permitted 
to join under the shield of anonymity. Due to the functions the LRVs perform, 
anonymity or redaction of their identities is not allowed. It came to test in Katanga 
case.196 Based on his safety and security, the LRVs requested the Court to keep his 
identity confidential. The Chamber asserted that a grant of a confidential request to the 
LRVs would mean that all processes and filings made by such LRVs become redacted 
and confidential. This request will affect the expeditiousness of the proceedings, “but 
also create a conflict of interest in which the Legal Representative must choose, for 
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example, between effectively representing the victims in a public hearing and keeping 
his identity confidential.”197 
 
The Chamber concluded that “that a legal representative is entitled to participate in the 
proceedings according to the terms set by the Chamber and considers that anonymity is 
incompatible with the functions to be performed by a legal representative.”198 In its 
ruling, the Chamber decided that the LRVs shall disclose his identity within ten days if 
she wishes to remain the Applicants' legal representatives. The Chamber further stated 
that if the LRVs decides to remain anonymous after the ten days, the OPCV will act as 
a legal representative of all the applicants until another legal representative is chosen.199  
It reiterates that privileges that could be granted to victims do not extend to their LRVs- 
a distinction between victims and their lawyers. 
 
In the Lubanga case, victims were permitted to choose their LRVs.200 The considerable 
low number of participating victims made the process easier.201 The total number of 
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participating victims was approximating around 129(34 female and 95 male victims).202 
The legal teams were divided into two. The first team was appointed for the child 
soldiers while the second team was appointed for the other victims. It follows that most 
victims in the Lubanga case had lawyers of their choice because of the considerable 
low number of participating victims.203The outcome is in contrast to the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo with large victims totalling around 366 participating victims. The Court 
divided 366 victims into two groups and charged ten different common legal 
representatives for victims.204    
 
Regarding if victims needed continuous legal representation, the   OPCV on behalf of 
the victims called the AC's attention to non-represented victims. The LRV of these 
victims, which he termed-‘concerned victims’ withdrew during the proceedings.205 He 
raised an appeal on this ground. The OPCV averred that the TC made a ‘procedural 
error by not appointing a new lawyer for victims immediately after authorising the 
former LRV to terminate his mandate regarding the concerned victims’.206 The OPCV 
asserted that the victims must be represented throughout the proceedings until 
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completing the reparations phase. The OPCV requested that the concerned victims 
should be granted reparations, after having been allowed to present or supplement their 
application for reparations. The AC rejected OPCV’s argument that the representation 
of victims must be continuous. One of the question for determination was if the TC 
abused its discretion by not appointing counsel immediately after the former LRV was 
granted leave to withdraw as counsel while the proceedings were ongoing. The AC 
found that the TC did not abuse its discretion due to failure to appoint counsel to assist 
the concerned victims in completing their applications.207 
 
Besides, the AC noted that, generally, it is not only in the interests of victims but also 
in the interests of the efficient conduct of the proceedings, that victims are legally 
represented during the reparations phase. The AC stated that neither the Rome Statute 
nor the RPE expressly provides that victims be ‘represented by counsel at all times 
before a trial chamber’.208 
 
Suppose victims do not need to choose and be represented by LRV, however, once LRV 
represents them. In that case, it is only reasonable for such representation to continue 
as the LRV is their voice. An absence of legal representation during the proceedings 
leaves a gap for the victims, potentially leading to procedural injustice. In this context, 
victims may become invisible due to the absence of their representative. Besides, 
information may get lost in transit. The right to receive information like every other 
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procedural right aims at improving victims’ experience in the criminal justice system.209 
It also encompasses the right to receive information on the progress of the case. The 
dissemination of relevant information to victims is considered a pre-requisite for 
making an informed decision on whether to participate or not. The transfer of pertinent 
information should span throughout the criminal trial and afterwards.  
 
Apart from the impact of  LRVs representation on victims’ interests, it is noted that 
some victim participants who are not able to access the court due to logistic reasons 
also depend on some external factors.210These external factors included VPRS, staff, 
OPCV, intermediaries.211 The activities of these factors shape how victims experience 
participation at the ICC.  
 
From the above, one could infer that the LRVs are essential in determining the quality 
of victims’ contact and experiences at the ICC. They are the victims' voice; therefore, 
their representation must be adequate and sufficient for victims to obtain maximum 
satisfaction from the proceedings. Besides, the role of NGOs, like Women Initiatives 
for Gender Justice and Human Rights Watch, cannot be overemphasised in promoting 
victims’ interests at the ICC. The Women Initiatives via amicus curiae brought the 
Prosecutor and the Court's attention to the exclusion of the crimes of sexual and gender-
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based violence from the charges.212The Women Initiatives also requested the 
Prosecutor to conduct further investigations into the crimes in the case of Lubanga. 
These activities enhance the ICC's function in ensuring judicial accountability of 
perpetrators of human rights-A watchdog for amplifying victims’ interests. 
 
 Having discussed the effectiveness of legal representation for victims, the next section 
shall examine the dispositive category of participation in order to evaluate the extent of 
degree of control victims have in criminal proceedings. The following section will 
discuss these subdivisions in non-dispositive participation in light of victims' 
involvement during the proceedings. The concept of participation exposes victims to 
the criminal procedure of the court. 
3.5.1Dispositive category 
 
The dispositive category is described as the most direct form of participation. It is also 
known as ‘full empowerment’.213 It ensures that victims are enabled with real decision-
making power. This power is presumed to transcend the commencement of the 
decision-making process to the implementation.214 Here, victims have total control over 
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a particular decision because they participate as decision-makers. This form of 
participation creates a two-way obligation on the victims and decision-makers In 
Edwards words, this form of decision-making power is called ‘control.’215The victims 
are active participants in the decision-making process rather than passive recipients of 
decisions. According to Lundy and McGovern, this is ‘transfer of power’216 with ‘the 
right to participate in decisions which affect one’s life’.217 This category is considered 
the most realistic form of achieving victims’ rights.218 
 
Control is the only type of classification under this category. Control as a type of 
participation creates an obligation on the decision-maker to seek and apply victims’ 
preference.219The victim's corresponding obligation is to provide their preference as the 
victim to the decision-maker. The decision-maker is under a duty to implement the 
decisions. The keyword here is ‘control’- it connotes that the victim wields absolute 
power over the decision-making process, given his interests in such decision. Within 
the context of the ICC, article 68(3) leaves the determination of victims participation, 
significantly considering their views and concerns to the judges' discretion (decision-
maker). The threshold for such participation is the victims’ interests. 
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Consequently,  there are limits to how far this concept of control can go in a criminal 
justice system like the ICC. Besides, given that the ICC is a primarily adversarial 
system-this concept of control is incompatible with the ICC jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, as it is, one could argue that victims' involvement seems to disrupt the 
equality of arms. Giving victims’ control would displace the status quo. The parties-
prosecutor and defence's polarisation would have to accommodate the position of the 
victims as third parties with no full parties rights and privileges. 
 
To corroborate this, one commentator posits that a criminal trial might not be entirely 
workable to strengthen victims rights.220 This argument is evidenced in the mandate of 
the Rome Statute-the focus is criminal prosecution rather than victim-centredness. 
Article 68(3) illustrates the Rome Statute's intention to give ultimate control of the trial 
proceedings to the judges, particularly the judicial discretion. Hence, it is clear that 
victims do not fully control the ICC's decision-making from the provision. Instead, they 
may exercise their procedural rights to influence the decision-making process. Their 
participation is a right granted to victims by the Rome Statute-a means to an end. 
According to Chung: 
 
“Thus, participating victims are not parties to the proceedings; under article  
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           68(3) of the Statute they may only present their ‘views and concerns’,  
                and this only if their personal interests are affected …..”221  
 
From the above, it is evidenced that victims, to some extent, influence the 
proceedings through the presentation of evidence. 
 
On the other hand, evidence from the decision-making like sentencing shows that 
victims do not have control over the decision. Although their observations and 
submissions are taken into consideration via consultation, it does not substantially 
impact the outcome because this is within the judges' exclusive discretion. They might 
influence the decision. However, they do not have absolute control over it because the 
statute and rules have restricted their ability to impact the decisions. The adversarial 
system, in particular, limits the extent of control victims can have in the presentation of 
evidence and decision-making. 
 
This section has analysed the position of control as well as its applicability within the 
context of the ICC. The next section shall assess the non-dispositive theory 
subcategories within criminal trials at the ICC vis-à-vis the Lubanga and Katanga cases. 
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3.5.2Non- dispositive category 
The non-dispositive classification divides the type of participation into 
consultation,information-provision and expression.222 The first two sub-categories of 
consultation and information-provision intend to seek and consider victim preference 
and victim information, respectively. The victim's corresponding obligation is an 
optional supply of preference and non-optional supply of information, respectively.223 
The last subcategory of non-dispositive categorisation is expression. The decision-
maker should authorise victim expression while its corresponding obligation on the 
victim is an optional supply of information and expression of emotion. From the non-
dispositive category, the victim is not the decision-maker. One reasonable consequence 
of this is the victims’ power to influence the decision-making process concerning his 
interests is restrictive. The role play applicable is influence, not control. 
 
The subdivisions shall explore the concept of participation, and its relationships with 
these parties, to broaden our understanding of the application of victims’ rights and 
interests. The following section shall address instances of consultation, information 
provision and expression under the non-dispositive category. From the data, it is worth 
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mentioning that there is no evidence to suggest that victims have control over the 
decision-making. 
 
Concerning victim involvement at the ICC  trials, a plethora of rulings and decisions 
have reiterated that personal interests are a precondition for expressing their views and 
concerns.224  Some scholars(discussed above) have advanced for the rationale behind 
the concept of participation. Surprisingly, an analysis of the transcripts shows that 
asides from the traditional competing interests between the defendant and the 
Prosecution, there are competing interests between the defendant, Prosecutor on the one 
hand, and the victims on the other hand.225Arguably, it often occurs that these two 
parties(defendant and prosecutor) tend to oppose the broad application of victims’ 
rights- conflict of interests. The non-dispositive category empowers victims with a 
reasonable degree of control which could influence the decision-maker.226  
 
For instance, the TC's decision on 18 January reveals a seemingly ambiguous 
interpretation of victim participation regime.227 The TC held that the assessment of 
victim participation in proceedings should be regulated by personal interests test, 
provided in article 68(3). Rule 85 and Article 68(3) are interdependent. Hence, they 
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should be interpreted conjunctively. This decision gives a broad interpretation of 
victims' participation as it does not make restrictions based on the connection between 
the harm suffered by the victims and the crime contained in the charges. In his opinion, 
Judge Blattman dissented from the Majority decision, ‘the over-inclusive and imprecise 
definition of victims’ would threaten or endanger the accused's rights.228This decision 
intended to broaden the provision of rule 85,‘any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
court’229rather than a restrictive provision that restricts crimes in the charges.230 The 
TC also noted that it was imperative to draw a correlation between the victims' interests 
and presentation of evidence in the proceedings.231 
 
Surprisingly this decision was set aside pursuant to the appeal brought by the 
defence.232The AC found that the qualification for victim participation should be 
limited to victims of the situation or a case. The AC confirmed TC's decision to allow 
victim participants to submit evidence and question witnesses.233 Judge Pikis, 
concurring with Judge Kirsch, stated that the Prosecutor and the accused as full parties 
to the case are the only parties with the rights to dispute the charges' content.234In his 
words:  
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“[i]n an adversarial hearing the two sides are cast in the position of 
adversaries, in connection with the determination of the only issue 
raised before the Chamber, the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
The adversary of the accused is the Prosecutor and none other. The 
defendant cannot have more than one accuser. It is not for the 
accused to prove his innocence. He is presumed to be innocent. The 
ultimate question is whether the Prosecution proved its case beyond 
reasonable doubt.”235 
 
Judge Pikis’ opinion draws our attention to the nature of adversarial proceedings and 
its requirements. The emphasis on disrupting the equality of arms if victims were 
permitted to tender evidence in determining truth explains that an extended role for 
victims could prejudice the accused's rights as he is supposedly against two accusers. 
 
The ruling showed progress from a broad definition of victims to a restrictive definition 
of victims and ascertaining whether victims can lead evidence. While the presentation 
of evidence is primarily the role of the parties, in the determination of the truth, the 
Chamber held that victims role might be extended to the provision of information-. It 
shall be explored under the heading of information-provision in the following section 
and consultation and expression. 
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3.5.2.1 Consultation  
 
“[O]ne of our child clients was wounded and remains disabled, but the physical 
wounds that the militias left are not the worse…..These children...were deprived of all 
contact with their families. They saw their friends die. They were forced to kill…One 
of my clients who is now barely 15 years, told us, the psychologist, I am not all right. 
I don’t know what to do. My body s not all right. My head hurts…”236 
These excerpts illustrate victims’ views and concerns through their LRVs to the Court, 
including the judges. This submission is considered a response to the court’s 
consultation. The response of the presiding judge supports this. “We are listening to 
you carefully, because what you have to say is perhaps what is most important, 
especially given the Statute of the ICC.”237 The judge’s remarks show an 
acknowledgement of victims’ voice, which relates to victims being consulted while the 
judges listen. It depends on whether the judge decides to take these views and concerns 
while balancing it against the defence rights and fair trial. 
 
The consultation offers victims powers to influence the process and outcome of the 
decision-making.238However, this is subject to judicial discretion. It is a process that 
seeks to ascertain and consider opinions before or during the decision-making process; 
which encourages the active participation of victims. While victims are not obligated 
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to participate, the decision-makers are under a duty to consult the victims. However, 
the Court(decision-makers) may decide to consider the victim preference. They are not 
obliged to take into account the opinion or wishes of the victims, but the Court would 
seek their opinions. This implies that the outcome may contradict the wishes of the 
victims.239 The ICC seeks victims' opinion as an independent third party with a stake in 
the criminal proceedings. The influence of victims here is considered low as well as 
their power to influence the proceedings. However, their contribution may shape the 
outcome of the decision-making process. The ICC statute and RPE regulate victims 
participation. For instance, Rule 89(1) provides that victims can make opening and 
closing statements at hearings. Rule 93 instructs the Chamber to seek victims' views 
“on any issue” at all stages of the proceedings.240Furthermore, victims are provided 
with procedural rights to enhance their participation. 
 
This consultation is a means to give victims a ‘say’ in the proceedings. One implication 
of this is that it ensures transparency and accessibility to the court.241 Victims are not 
fully enabled with decision-making power, but they are granted the power to influence 
the process and outcome.242This consultation does not necessarily determine the 
outcome, nor will it reflect the wishes of the victims. One main criticism of this non-
dispositive classification category is that it is not best suited for realising victims’ 
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rights.243It could be an ideal approach to victims’ rights—a contrast to control as a 
dispositive classification which gives victims full empowerment to dominate decision- 
making.244 
 
Therefore, consultation as a form of participation applies where the Chamber seeks 
victims' views and concerns because it affects their personal interests. In such a 
situation, the Court deems it fit to seek information from victims because they are 
stakeholders in the proceedings. Whether the Court takes the views and concerns of the 
victims into account is dependent on judicial discretion. There is no consensus on the 
definition of victims’ views and concerns, but different chambers have defined victims’ 
views and concerns with a proposition on ‘personal interests’.According to the 
Chamber; 
“In order to be granted leave to express their “views and concerns” at the trial, the 
Statute requires that victims be able to demonstrate that their personal interests are 
affected. Accordingly, where it is clear that an intervention by a legal representative is 
not related to the personal interests of any of the victims represented by that counsel, 
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While ruling on a DRC situation has described views and concerns to indicate ‘opinions 
or ‘preoccupations’.246 The court is under an obligation to examine these views and 
concerns. It is worth mentioning that victim-witnesses cannot give their views and 
concerns in their capacity as witnesses. According to their dual status, they are only 
permitted to give evidence and answer questions.247Besides, the Chamber stated that 
questioning of witnesses under rule 91(3) is a means by which LRVs may use to present 
their ‘views and concerns’ within the context of article 68 of the Statute.248 
 
At times, the presentation of views and concerns could flow into the role of the parties. 
Some judges have expressed their concerns about potentially abdicating the role of the 
parties to the victims. Victims’ voice may blur the distinction between their roles and 
those of the parties. Judge Pikis calls our attention to this in his dissenting opinion: 
 
“The participation of victims in the proceedings is confined to the expression of their 
views and concerns…participation of victims is confined to the expression of their 
"views and concerns," whereafter I added, "It is a highly qualified 
participation limited to the voicing of their views and concerns. Victims are not made 
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parties to the proceedings nor can they proffer or advance anything other than their 
'views and concerns expression of their "views and concerns," '”249 In relation to what 
can victims express their views and concerns was the next subject I addressed 
……”Not in relation to the proof of the case or the advancement of the defence. The 
burden of proof of the guilt of the accused lies squarely with the Prosecutor; article 
66(2) of the Statute.”250 
 
This dissenting opinion shows the judges dissensus on victims’ expression of views and 
concerns as well as the place of the adversarial system of procedure. For the 
determination of truth, the Court has the right to invite victims to present evidence. 
However, this presentation of evidence and questioning of witnesses seems to violate 
the prosecutor's exclusive right because it bestows on the victims the opportunity to 
prove or disproof the allegations against the accused and how it affects their personal 
interests. The implication centres on a supposed encroachment of the parties ‘ rights, as 
the Court bestows the same right on the victim. 
 
Regarding the personal appearance of victims at trial, while the court acknowledged 
that victims could be invited to give their views and concerns in person, but noted this 
might slow down the trial. The court reiterated that it would be preferable for legal 
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representatives to appear during trial rather than individual victims to achieve a fair and 
expeditious trial. It stressed that for victims to appear in person, “there would have to 
be cogent, indeed powerful, reasons”251 The Chamber notes:  
  
“people without legal training coming to talk about very difficult things that have 
happened to them could have a real capacity for destabilising these court 
proceedings….At the end of the day, this is not a truth and reconciliation 
commission  or a body of that kind[..] we’re not saying no, but we’ are saying 
exceptional and for a good reason.”252 
 
From this excerpt, one could make inferences on the restricted platform the Court is 
willing to give to victims who are interested in presenting their views and concerns in 
person. It simply states that the court's procedural activity is not built like other 
mechanisms(TRC) to entertain victims’ appearances. In exceptional circumstances, the 
court observed that the court permits victims to make appearances based on ‘cogent and 
powerful reasons’.253 Interestingly, the Chamber authorised the request of an LRV for 
three victims to testify at trial.254Their testimonies included presenting their views and 
concerns in person after they had tendered their personal witnesses’  account as 
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evidence.255 The Chamber posited that in this situation, it should ensure that the 
victims’ views and concerns are not a repetition of their witness’s account(evidence).256 
 
Interestingly, In another ruling, Judge Blattman reiterated the statutory nature of victim 
participatory right:  “victims’ participation is not a concession of the Bench, but rather 
a right accorded to victims by the Statute.”257 Furthermore, “The Chamber should be 
mindful that the right to participate when victims’ interests are affected is the 
consequence of a legal protected interest of the victim.”258 Hence, participatory rights 
legalised, there are boundaries to the extent of its applicability to uphold the court's 
mandate. 
 
In summary, the use of consultation may enhance victims visibility during the 
proceedings as it explores their influence on the outcome of the decision. Therefore, the 
court is obligated to consult victims in court proceedings that affect them, but this 
consultation may contribute to the process or outcome. Expressing of views and 
concerns of victims is the main form of consultation. 
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The information provision is another sub-division of non-dispositive category from 
Edwards theory, which ensures a two-way obligation between the decision-maker and 
the victim. The decision-maker seeks or requests information from the victims, while 
the victim must provide information to the decision-maker.259 Here, the victims offer 
information according to rules set by the decision-maker, the Statute and RPE. It is 
noteworthy that the victim has a non-optional supply of information.260The role of the 
victim as a witness is a typical example of this type of participation. One drawback of 
this sub-category is that it utilises victims as instruments for information. In such a 
situation, a victim may be compelled by the decision-maker to provide information. It 
is featured in Truth commissions with subpoena powers.261 Victims are seen as 
witnesses rather than stakeholders who may exercise powers or influence during the 
proceedings. 
 
It addition, the role of victims as information providers, increases the risk of 
‘tokenism’.262Understandably, victims who give testimonies as witnesses are 
underrepresented groups from a large pool of victims. Consequently, the process robs 
the victim of choosing to provide information in their capacities as victims, as they are 
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under oath. The role of victims as a stakeholder whose interests require attention is 
swept under the carpet. At the same time, he acts as an information provider in response 
to the decision maker's needs. The victim is perceived as a source of information; they 
are put on oath to testify as witnesses during the trial. This brings to light the dual status 
of the victims. These phase of testimonies is besieged with examinations in chief and 
cross-examination.  
 
Victims as witnesses do not provide a convenient platform for victims to tell their 
stories or emote. Their primary function is to provide accurate information to the 
parties.263At this stage, the privileges of victim status are suspended. An excellent 
example of this can be found in the arguments of the prosecutor: “such status is fraught 
with confusion and opens the door to victims intruding into the investigation process, 
the exclusive province of the Prosecutor.”264 The Prosecutor’s arguments present a 
perspective which does not grant a warm welcome for victims inclusivity in criminal 
proceedings. His views emphasise victims' initial state as witnesses(information 
provider), in contrast to their emergent status as stakeholders. 
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The victims’ right to present evidence at the trial was examined in the Lubanga case. 
The prosecutor and the Defence sought leave to appeal the Trial Chamber 
decision(referred to as an impugned decision).265On merits,  the AC had to decide 
whether it was possible for victims participating at trial to lead evidence pertaining to 
the accused's guilt or innocence and challenge evidence's admissibility.266 The 
impugned decision found that the right to introduce evidence is not exclusive to the 
parties. The Court has a general right(not dependent on the parties' consent) to request 
the presentation of all evidence necessary for the determination of the truth, pursuant 
to Article 69(3).267 The Prosecutor argued that TC committed a ‘legal error’ for deciding 
that victims may introduce evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused and the 
extent to which it authorised victims can challenge the evidence's admissibility or 
relevance.268The Statute exclusively vests this power in the prosecutor.269 The 
Prosecutor also contended that the presentation of views and concerns under Article 
68(3) of the Statute connotes the right of victims to present ‘their personal perspective 
or opinion on an issue’ rather than the submission of evidence.270 
 
Moreover, the Prosecutor averred that the TC’s powers under Articles 64(6) (d) and 
69(3) do not provide a basis for victims to present evidence about the guilt or innocence 
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of the accused.271 He stated that these provisions regulate the functions and powers of 
the Chambers. As such, the interpretation of Articles 64 and 69 is inconsistent with 
victims’ right to present evidence. In his words; “the erroneous conflation of the 
interests of the victims and the role of the Prosecution”. The Defence argued that the 
right to present evidence relating to the guilt or innocence should be within the parties' 
exclusive. He submitted that the TC erred in allowing victims to lead evidence and to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence.272The Prosecutor supported the Defence 
arguments. In his arguments, the LRVs argued that the accused's guilt or innocence 
affects the victims. Also, the LRV  contended that victims' personal interests might be 
affected by the evidence presented or proposed. Given that presentation of evidence by 
the parties may prejudice their right to reparations.273 
 
The AC stressed that the parties predominantly own the right to lead evidence on the 
accused's guilt or innocence and the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence. It 
noted that the sentence of article 68(3) and Article 64(6) (d) specifically mentioned 
‘parties’ not parties and victims or victims. The Prosecutor's burden of proof supports 
the parties' exclusive right to present evidence and the parties' disclosure obligations. 
The AC, however, this provision does not preclude the victims form tendering and 
presenting evidence. The Chamber confirms the TC's finding on victims' ability to lead 
evidence and challenge the evidence's admissibility.274 
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“The Appellant opposes the participation of the Victims in the 
admissibility proceedings as well as at the hearing of the appeal itself if 
the decision is found to be appealable. The Victims have no conceivable 
interest, as he maintains, in the determination of the admissibility of the 
appeal and none as regards the appeal itself. In his contention, they can 
have no interest in the confirmation of the charges either or any appeal 
arising therefrom. Their interest is confined to trial proceedings that lay 
the ground for the pursuit of reparations….”275 
 
“Equality of arms is another element of a fair trial, which in the context of 
the Statute, putting the burden of proof on the Prosecutor, means that the 
defendant cannot be required to confront more than one accuser. Holding 
the scales even between the parties with the burden of proof cast upon the 
Prosecutor rules out a second accuser. The Prosecutor, the accuser, is 
required to forewarn and inform the person about the case he/she has to 
face at the confirmation hearing or at the trial. The defendant, too is 
required to forewarn and inform the other side, respecting the 
advancement of specified defences. A right to inspect the material in 
possession of either side is also envisaged.”276 
 
“Thus, the Victims assert that their interests lie, first of all, in the 
possibility of seeking reparations. Secondly, the Victims assert their 
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interest in seeing the Appellant being prosecuted; in other words, the 
Victims want that justice is done.”277 
 
The ruling reiterates the ICC's truth-seeking power as part of a criminal justice 
system-one of the rationale behind the establishment of the Court. Truth serves 
a dual function in this instance; truth as an objective of the ICC278 and truth as 
a fundamental right of the victims.279Obtaining an accurate historical record 
propels the arraignment and prosecution of the accused.280 It is worth 
mentioning that the ICC's truth-seeking power may overshadow the criminal 
proceedings' adversarial nature in light of the judges' role as passive umpire. 
If article 69(3) empowers the judges to invite victims for evidence 
presentation, then it may be that the Rome Statute enables the judges to 
perform a truth-finding function. A cursory look at article 54(1)a also 
illustrates that the prosecutor is interested in establishing the truth. However, 
the operation of this article 69(3)  stretches the third-party status of victims-
granting them one of the rights of full party status. Interestingly, Judge 
Wyngaert doubts the contribution of victims to the ICC’s truth-finding 
process. She opines that considering victims’ views “may or may not, be 
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conducive to the truth-finding process.”281False or inaccurate narrative and 
testimonies from victims will affect the outcome of truth-finding. 
Be that as it may, victims also have a right to know the truth.282They have an 
interest in the determination of the facts and the identification of the 
perpetrators of crimes.283 It is believed that victims' right to know the truth 
about what happened may give them closure. It is observed that none of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute expressly provides for victims right to truth. 
However, a criminal prosecution could be a means to obtain the truth. 
The approach of the judges reflects the literal interpretation of Article 69(3). 
It is observed that this ruling offsets the parties' exclusive rights to present 
evidence; an expansion of the rights of victims as third parties. This ruling 
demonstrates that the judges were willing to adjust the presupposed rights of 
the victims for truth-finding. The judges did exceed the scope of the Rome 
statute. The determination of the truth is an essential element of criminal 
prosecution. Both parties are interested in the truth. Victims are also interested 
in the truth. Therefore, their participation in this aspect facilitates in 
uncovering the truth. 
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Furthermore, one other issue which arises is the conflict of interests between the LRV 
and the Prosecutor. This has been seen in the case of  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga; 
the AC had to determine if the TC erred in law by allowing victims to present 
incriminating evidence without corresponding disclosure obligations. In addressing this 
issue, the LRV stated: 
 
“The two Legal Representatives consider that, while it is agreed that the victims 
cannot assume the role of the Prosecutor, with whom the burden of proof solely lies, and that 
their intervention must in no way have the effect of their replacing the latter, they nevertheless 
have – as does the Court – an interest in the determination of the truth. Furthermore, they 
emphasise that the proliferation of victims in the instant case will have no implications for the 




“With respect to the possibility of the Legal Representatives conducting 
investigations, they recall that their sole objective is to gather evidence seeking to 





Besides, the defence objected to the reliability of the testimonies of victim-witnesses.  
The probative value of such testimonies is questionable given the underlying interest of 
such witnesses as victims. In response, the Chamber noted that it is within its 
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prerogative to decide whether it is appropriate to allow a victim to testify in person on 
order to ensure that the dual status of the victim does not sabotage the probative value 
of the testimonies.”286 
 
Furthermore,  the TC brought our attention to the general position of victims with dual 
status,victim-witnesses. And the implications of their testimonies as a source of 
information.287On January 2008, the TC held that victims appearing before the Court 
do not automatically qualify as witnesses.288It depends on whether they are called as 
victims or witnesses. It is necessary to ensure that the participation of victims with dual-
status does not affect the rights of the defence.289 
 
  “ The Chamber indicated that their security should not be compromised, 
it also established that individuals with dual-status do not accrue rights 
above and beyond those of someone who is solely a victim or a 
witness.”290 
 
In a similar vein, the role of victim-witnesses in information provision also came into 
play in Prosecutor v Germain Katanga; the LRV aver that the joint reading of articles 
68(3) and 69(1) of the Statute ascertain that the status of victims and witnesses are not 
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legally incompatible.291 He further argued that if a victim is granted a dual status of 
victim-witnesses, this does not undermine the Chamber’s power to weigh testimony 
and evidence under article 69(4) of the Statute. Rather, it would assist in the 
determination of truth, which is the purpose of the trial. To support his argument, he 
made reference to the AC’s decision of 11 July 2008. This decision granted the victim 
the right to tender evidence at the trial and discuss evidence adduced by the parties. 
 
The Chamber stressed that the recent jurisprudence of the Court recognises and permits 
the dual status of victim-witnesses. Regarding the case law dated 18 January 2008,292 
Besides, according to the context of the situation, it was challenging to find ‘spectators’ 
that are not victims of the Bogoro attack. The Chamber granted witness 166, the 
procedural status of victims at the PTC stage.   
 
The role and influence of evidence in criminal proceedings cannot be overemphasised. 
The preponderance of evidence determines the innocence or guilt of the accused. It is 
the primary responsibility of both parties-defence and prosecution- to present evidence 
and convince the judge or jury to decide in their favour. This begs the question of the 
place of victims in the presentation of evidence. If victims are allowed to present 
evidence, this will disrupt the equality of arms and threaten the accused's fair 
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trial.293This connotes that the accused will be up against two accusers; the prosecution 
and victim. This is not consistent with the adversarial system of procedure. However, 
since the ICC system of procedure is a hybrid of the inquisitorial and adversarial system 
of procedure, victims may tender and examine the evidence with some exceptions. It is 
debatable if victims have the right to present evidence during criminal proceedings. 
 
 Be that as it may, victims' personal interests are not required for them to give evidence 
under oath. The TC  pointed this out. In its ruling, the Chamber has ‘a general right to 
request the presentation of all evidence necessary for the determination of the 
truth…’294  The Chamber also acknowledged that  Rule 91(3) of the Rules permits 
participating victims to examine(question) witnesses with the leave of the Court. 
Therefore, this rule enables participating victims to tender and examine evidence if it 
will assist in the determination of the truth in the Chamber's view. The test for this is 
the “personal interests” test.295The Chamber reasoned that the victims applying to 
participate should be provided with access to the redacted version of the prosecution’s 
‘summary of presentation of evidence’296 This shows that Court allows victims to lead 
evidence provided it is in the determination of the truth and such evidence affects the 
victims’ personal interests: 
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“ [T]he Chamber is satisfied that the victims of crimes are often able to 
give direct evidence about the alleged offences and as a result a general ban on 
their participation in the proceedings if they may be called as witnesses would 
be contrary to the aim and purpose of Article 68(3) of the Statute and the 
Chamber's obligation to establish the truth.”297 
 
The ruling explains the stance of the Court on the dual status of victims. The position 
of a victim does not preclude him from being eligible as a witness. In this situation, a 
victim performs two distinctive roles, participating victims and a witness. Nevertheless, 
this does not affect the role of the victim as a third party to the proceedings. The 
Prosecutor and the Defendant are full parties with obligations and rights in the 
proceedings. One of such obligations is full disclosure obligations.298Both parties are 
under total disclosure obligations if they want to lead evidence, which creates equal 
opportunities for them on equality of arms. None of the provision under Section II (Rule 
76-84) expressly provides for disclosure obligations on victims—same applies to the 
Rome Statute. 
 
The victims lead evidence in their capacity as victims; it is believed that this could 
offset arms' equality and entrench them as assistant prosecutors. This would pitch the 
defendant against two accusers.-the Prosecutor and the victims. The court has noted 
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that victims do not have a corresponding obligation to disclose evidence to the other 
parties before trial because they are not parties to the proceedings. 
 
The scenario is not strange in the jurisdiction of some continental Europe. In Germany, 
Italy and Ukraine, victims have the right to present evidence.299 In Ukraine, the victims’ 
role included ‘scrutinising the evidence at trial’. In addition, one of their rights also 
consists of the right to file a complaint against the prosecutor's actions.300 This ruling 
shows that the proceedings shifted way from a largely adversarial nature towards a 
continental criminal procedure. According to Damaska, continental criminal procedure 
is not founded on ‘bipolar contest’, which marginalises victims' voice. Victims' active 
participation in the continental criminal system is not a clog in the proceedings' 
progress.301 
 
Similarly, the Chamber made a distinction between “giving evidence” and  “expressing 
their views and concerns.”302 The former are testimonies given under oath; the latter 
includes victims story-telling, narratives and grievances. The victims are treated as 
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witnesses. The LRVs, Prosecution and the Defense would ask them questions. It was 
more of questioning than narratives. 
 
Besides, victims can also tender evidence as independent witnesses rather than 
witnesses called by any of the parties. It has been demonstrated in three victims' 
testimonies (two former child soldiers and a school teacher)  in the Lubanga case.303 
 
This section has reviewed the participation of victims during the trial process as 
information providers. It is noted that most times, the chambers permitted victims to 
present evidence, which is an exclusive right of the parties, where the provision of such 
evidence required for the determination of the truth. It follows that the Court has a 
general right per Article 69 to request victims to lead or give evidence. Victims may 




As was pointed out above; expression is an optional supply of information or emotion; 
the permission to emote or tell stories. It is voluntary because it requires the victim to 
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provide information or communicate feelings to the decision-maker.305  The obligation 
on the decision-maker may be to allow victims to emote. Victims don't need to 
undertake this function as it is voluntary. The victims may or may not accept the 
invitation. The impact of expression on the trial is shallow. It has been described as ‘the 
weakest of all participatory forms’.306 This subcategory is very symbolic, as it 
encourages tokenism.307 Their level of influence is considered to be at the lowest when 
compared to other subcategories of non-dispositive participation. According to 
Edwards, Victim Impact Statement(VIS) is similar to expression. 
 
The expression could also come in the form of story-telling at a particular stage of the 
proceedings. Story-telling is not a common process at the ICC, but the narratives may 
contribute towards truth-finding. An instance can be seen in the Lubanga case, The 
Chamber, in response to the request of the LRVs, authorised three victims to give 
evidence.308 It noted that the story of each witness(chid soldier) is peculiar because 
“none of their personal histories is the same.”309Also, the Chamber stressed the account 
of the witnesses should complement the Prosecutor.310 It further distinguished between 
“giving of evidence” and “expressing their views and concerns.” The victims are treated 
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as witnesses. The LRVs, Prosecution and the Defence would ask them questions. It was 
more of questioning than narratives. The witnesses consisted of two former child 
soldiers and a schoolteacher. The victim(a/0270/06, V02-0001), a schoolteacher 
narrated instances of murder, sexual violence and sexual slavery.311 He stated that he 
witnessed the UPC soldiers enlisting four pupils on 5 February 2003.312His testimony 
also revealed he was the guardian of a.0229/06(V02-0003) and a/0225/06(V02-
0002).313 Lubanga was the President of the UPC. He gave an account of the horrible 
experience the child soldiers in his presence and how he struggled to protect the 
children, but he failed to and ended up suffering harm. 
 
The two former child soldiers narrated their ordeal and encounter with the militia. The 
harm they suffered, the state of the camp, the torture and the sexual violence 
encountered by underaged girl soldiers(13-14 years old)314The second victim, a former 
child soldier(a/0229/06, VO2-0003)  averred that the accused was the president of the 
militia group(UPC). Besides, he attested to his abduction315  as well as occurrences of 
SGBV of girls between ages 13 and 14.316 He asserted that the commander tortured 
him, the poor condition of living in the militia camp, and his active participation in 
hostilities.317 
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Although, the victims gave testimonies as independent witnesses. Nonetheless, their 
testimonies reveal narratives of their experiences during the hostilities. While they 
narrated their ordeal, it demonstrated expression. The Chamber rejected some of these 
testimonies on the grounds of falsification of identities and testimonies. The defence’s 
cross-examination of the former child soldiers revealed that the former-child soldiers 
had falsified their identities and one of the child soldiers had tendered false 
information.318 
 
It appears the court is very restrictive with expression via story-telling. Story-telling 
may invoke emotions. The structure of the court is not conditioned to manage emotions 
which comes due to narratives. Narratives are essential for the ascertainment of truth 
and record keeping. Perhaps, a better-suited forum for this is truth commission.319 Truth 
Commission promotes truth, healing, forgiveness and therapeutic benefits.320With TCs, 
there a possibility of reflective engagement and reparative elements between narratives 
and trauma.321 Public testimony in the presence of the perpetrators and the community 
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is restorative.322 Cohen believes the  TC encourages “the symbolic recognition of what 
is already known but was officially denied.”323On the other hand, in criminal 
prosecutions, perpetrators are usually reluctant to acknowledge their crimes and admit 
guilt,324 which precludes healing and reconciliation. Thus, the ICC's normative content 
is not well equipped in accommodating these needs because it is built on punishment 
rather than reconciliation. 
 
Victims should express themselves within this context as right holders rather than 
informants or witnesses. In turn, their stories should contribute to the historical 
context(record keeping) of what happened. As a form of expression, storytelling 
promotes victims’ “healing and rehabilitation” to provide them with closure.325In the 
same vein, victims’ story-telling is likely to contribute to fact-finding and truth-telling 
in the trial process. The truth-finding may promote healing after trauma.326However, 
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As mentioned earlier, VIS exemplifies a medium of expression for victims. It is 
applicable in some domestic criminal justice system. Victims are allowed to emote in 
writing or orally. However, arguably, VIS is mainly symbolic, but it could give victims 
a degree of satisfaction. VIS allows victims an opportunity to inform the Court how 
their victimisation impacted them.327 The VIS is presented to the Court after 
determining the guilt of the accused but before sentencing. The researcher shall 
examine VIS in chapter 4. 
Thus far, this section has explained expression as a function of non-dispositive category 
of participation. The section that follows moves on to consider the findings and 
discussion. 
 
3.6 Discussing findings 
This chapter set out to assess whether the ICC provided sufficient scope to consider 
victims’ rights and interests during the trial process. It is argued that procedural fairness 
fosters victims’ rights and interests in criminal trials. Rawls holds the view that the 
system must be fair to reinforce fairness during proceedings. He likens the system as 
an initial situation.328 In a similar vein, prior studies of Tyler, Thibaut and Walker 
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believe procedural fairness enhances victims’ experiences during trial proceedings.329 
These studies have noted the importance of procedural fairness during trial proceedings. 
It follows that victims tend to prefer how they are treated during the proceedings to the 
outcome of such proceedings. Procedural fairness cannot be entirely separated from 
victim participation in the proceedings. 
 
Similarly, the fairness of the trial process is essential for both victims and accused. But 
this chapter is focused on victims’ rights and interests during the trial process. It is noted 
that respect and voice are essential criteria for victims’ experiences during the trial.330 
Both requirements may give victims a sense of belonging. 
 
 Victims’ procedural rights increase their visibility during the proceedings. Victims' 
visibility is not a determinant of their influence in the proceedings, but rather their 
participation ensures that their interests might be considered provided they are not 
prejudicial to the victims' rights.331 Victims’ voice could be heard through their 
LRVs(opening statements, closing statements, observations and submissions). Victims 
could also voice out through VIS  or storytelling. However, from the transcripts, there 
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is some evidence to suggest that LRVs are the primary voice of victims. The OPCV 
intervenes at times.332 The LRVs are the direct representatives of victims. Victim 
representation may determine the realisation of rights and interests.  
 
A good example is found in the words of the prosecution; “affection of personal 
interests is the “cornerstone” upon which victim participation may be premised.”.333 
Therefore, procedural Status of a victim is not the only factor of involvement; victims' 
personal interests are also essential for victim participation in the trial process. While 
some victims have general personal interests, some victims have individual personal 
interests. This distinction distinguishes between general interests applicable to all 
victims within a collective context and personal interests specific to some victims. 
 
Ambos suggests that the ICC system of procedure is a mixture of an adversarial and 
inquisitorial procedure system.334While he posits that the bifurcation of rules into 
common and civil law procedure is less significant, he argues that what matters is if 
these rules facilitate the courts' effectiveness.335 Do these rules conform to fundamental 
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fair trial standards? As mentioned in the literature review, the criminal procedure in 
place is a significant determinant of how victims are treated during the 
proceedings.336The system of procedure dictates the role of victims and the extent of 
their participation in trials. With this in mind, it is thought that the system of procedure 
in place inevitably affects the realisation of victims’ rights and interests. From the trial 
proceedings, arguably, the trial process is mainly adversarial than inquisitorial. 
Therefore, there are limitations to the extent of application of victims’ rights and 
interests. Suppose the procedural system is mostly adversarial, while victims may be 
given a range of extensive rights. The prosecutor has utilised this argument to oppose 
victims' participation, vis-à-vis the presentation of evidence for the determination of 
truth. He argued that the presentation of evidence is an exclusive function of the parties; 
as such, it is ultra vires the victims' role in presenting evidence during trials. This 
argument finds a basis in common law jurisdictions or adversarial settings. 
 
Nonetheless, the Chambers’ decision to allow victims to present evidence and testify 
for the determination of truth demonstrates the Chamber's role in fact-finding and truth-
finding, a feature of the inquisitorial system of procedure. The court is willing to extend 
the role or rights of victims in order to facilitate the functioning of the court. It is argued 
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that this is beneficial for victims because victims are also interested in truth as they also 
have the right to truth. Nevertheless,  tension still exists, especially concerning the 
recognition and application of victim participatory rights and interests and other 
participants. This tension is seen in the parties' reactions to the chamber’s ruling on 
victims' right to present evidence in determining the truth. Clearly, the ICC has 
improved the respect for rights of victims compared to the previous courts. There still 
exists tension as to the rights of victims and others. 
 
Some of the victims are anonymous; their roles during the trial are restricted to protect 
the accused. It is observed that restrictions are placed on the application of procedural 
rights for victims.337 The Chambers have been cautious in granting extensive procedural 
rights to victims and have noted that procedural rights are not automatic for victims. 
Victims must show that the proceedings affect their personal interests.338The Chamber 
granted some victims extensive procedural rights. It is noted that anonymous victims 
were granted limited procedural rights to protect the accused right to a fair trial339 
because anonymous accusations could prejudice the defendant's right. However, where 
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the victim's identity is known, the court is willing to grant more procedural rights. 
Which connotes that anonymous victims and non-anonymous victims are not entitled 
to the same role or rights. This measure is to guide against anonymous accusations.340 
Victims' interests in a protective measure are guaranteed by compromising the accused 
right. to a fair trial. Therefore, victims’ anonymity if factored in may restrict the 
availability of procedural rights to victims. Consequently, this affects their roles and, 
could potentially affect their interests.  
 
Victims' access to some rights exclusive to the parties indicates the fluidity of victims’ 
procedural rights. An analysis of both Lubanga and Katanga cases in the trial process 
reveals that the ambience tilts towards a largely adversarial procedure which connotes 
a bifurcation of roles between parties with each party persuading the judges through the 
presentation of evidence and use of witnesses. A reasonable implication of this is 
breaking the monopoly of power concerning the parties' presentation of evidence. It is 
worthy of mentioning that victims are not obligated to make disclosure obligations like 
the parties in exercising these rights.341 Victims can testify as of right without being 
witnesses of the Prosecutor. The AC confirmed the TC’s decision on victims’ rights to 
lead evidence. Although it acknowledged that the right to lead evidence pertaining to 
the accused's guilt or innocence lies primarily with the parties, these provisions do not 
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preclude the victims from leading evidence.342However, the AC noted that victims are 
required to submit a ‘discrete application’ in order to be eligible to lead evidence.343  
 
It appears victims are seldom permitted to make personal appearances at the ICC. The 
personal appearance of victims at trial is not guaranteed because of the ICC's normative 
content and mandate. The Court pointed out the implications of victims making 
personal appearances at trial.344Expression within this context is best-suited truth 
commission. Their LRVs mostly represent victims. Therefore, this medium does not 
give them the platform to express themselves directly. They could only be allowed 
personal appearances on rare occasions. 
The chapter also reveals that victims' rights and interests change according to the stage 
of the proceedings. While it appears victims were interested in recognition during the 
investigation stage, during the trial process, victims interests revolve around truth, 
accountability, reparations and justice.  
 
Having discussed the findings, the next section gives a summary of this chapter.  
 
342 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgement on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence 
against Trial Chamber I’ s Decision on Victim Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 
7 July 2008. 
343 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgement on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence 
against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victim’ s Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432, 7 July 2008. Paras 61 and 104. ;Prosecutor v Lubanga , Decision on Victims’ Participation  on 
18January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119. 
344 Status Conference (Open Session), ICC-01/04-01/06-t-101-ENG , 12 January 2009, 
 





The investigation into the ICC proceedings' victim participation and trial process shows 
the extent of applicability of victims’ procedural rights. Procedural rights enhance 
victims’ ability to pursue their interests. The exercise of these rights is not absolute.345It 
assists in making their experience during the proceedings fair and favourable. It is not 
sure if these rights foster a favourable outcome/decision. Nevertheless, the failure of 
the court to consider these rights may incur procedural injustice for victims. 
Due to logistics and administrative reasons, it is noted that victims cannot participate 
directly at the ICC. Hence, the need for LRVs.The role of LRVs includes acting as a 
channel of information to victims,346  the dissemination of information to the victims, 
which increases the quality of interaction between victims and LRVs.Speculations still 
abound as to if LRVs genuinely represent victims' voice, which questions the 
effectiveness of LRVs for channelling victims' interests. 
The most apparent finding depicts the application of victims’ rights tends to lead to 
competing roles against the Prosecutor or at times, the Defence. A notable example is 
the Chamber’s power to request evidence in the determination of truth. In a mainly 
adversarial setting, it is a known fact that it is within the parties' exclusive purview to 
present evidence and question witnesses. While the ICC criminal procedural is 
 
345Situation in the Democratic Republic Of Congo, The Prosecutor V. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-
trial Stage of the Case Pre-trial Chamber 1, p.61 
346 Rachel Killean and Luke Moffett,”Representation, Agency and Voice:Victim Legal Representation 
before the ICC and ECCC” (2017)15(4)Journal  of International Criminal Justice,1-37.  




mixed/hybrid,347 Victims as a third party does not have the right to adduce 
evidence.348Despite that, this function offsets the equality of arms. It also changes the 
role of victims at the criminal proceedings. Therefore, giving victims an edge over 
being a third party. The Chambers' power to call victims to adduce evidence or question 
witnesses confirms Ambos’ proposition, which states it is less significant if a rule is 
‘adversarial’ or ‘inquisitorial’, but opines that what matters is if the rule facilitates the 
tribunals in accomplishing their tasks.349 The Chamber’s ruling that victims can present 
evidence and question witnesses for the determination of truth demonstrate the fluidity 
and characterisation of victims' role and the trajectory of victims' right to truth and the 
ICC's objective in truth-finding. 
 
Some of the judges are cautious not to allow victims rights and interests override the 
court's mandate. They drew boundaries on the court's underlying functions and the role 
of TRCs in story-telling as a therapeutic function.  
 
It is recommended that the staff's composition, specifically the LRVs, should reflect the 
interested victims' background and countries. Generally, there seems to be a gap 
between the court and victims due to cultural, physical and institutional differences.350 
 
347 Kai Ambos, ‘International Criminal Procedure: adversarial, inquisitorial or mixed? (2003) 3(1) 
International Criminal Law Journal, 1-13. 
348 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, Appeal of Mr Katanga against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Phil Clark, Distance Justice:The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African 
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Nevertheless, this disparity is upon the court’s neutrality and impartiality. 
Unfortunately, the distance has led to a disconnect between victims and the LRVs. -
familiarisation between victims and their LRVs could also increase victims satisfaction. 
An enhanced victim engagement by the ICC would ensure enforcement of victims’ 
rights and interests. 













In Roy Lee’s words,  
“ ….This new Court has been transformed …to an international court administering 
restorative justice.[…]and victims will also be able to take part in proceedings  with 
rights to privacy, representation  and security……..”1 
 
Central to the traditional criminal justice system is retributive justice. With the ICC 
establishment, some commentators suggest a shift from a purely retributive justice 
approach to incorporating restorative elements and victim-oriented agenda for the ICC.2 
This restorative element is reflected during criminal proceedings, primarily via victim-
participation and victim trust fund programme.3 The impact of victims on the 
sentencing outcome and the extent to which their interests is considered at the 
sentencing stage remains unclear. However, this chapter does not intend to go into an 
extensive discussion of restorative justice theory. Rather, the debate on restorative 
 
1Roy Lee, “The Rome Conference and its Contribution to International Law” In Roy Lee 
(ed)International Criminal Court:The Making of the Rome Statute –Issues , Negotiations, and Results 
(1st Edition Springer 1999). 
2 Emily Haslam, “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court :A Triumph of Hope Over 
Experience ?,  in Dominic McGoldrick et al  (eds) , The  Permanent International Criminal Court:Legal 
and Policy Issues (Oxford Hart Publishing 2004). 
3 Elisabeth Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of victim participation in the proceedings of the International Criminal 
Court (2008) 90(870) International Review of the Red Cross , 409-440,413.;Emily Haslam, ‘Victim 
participation at the International Criminal Court:a triumph of hope over experience ? in Dominic 
McGoldrick et al. (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court :Legal and Policy issues(Hart 
Publishing  2004) 315,324. 




justice would be limited to how it can be used to assess the role victims’ interests play 
in sentencing. 
It is noteworthy that the Rome Statute does not give comprehensive specifications on 
what principles are applicable at the sentencing stage. Judgment, particularly 
sentencing, is an essential aspect of the criminal justice process, and it is the outcome 
of the criminal proceedings. 
Researchers have not treated the victims' role in sentencing at the ICC in much detail 
in previous studies. Therefore, this chapter seeks to examine the role that victims play 
during sentencing by analysing the case transcripts of the Prosecutor v.Lubanga and 
the Prosecutor v. Katanga. Also, this chapter will critically discuss if victims 
influenced sentencing decisions. It is found, victims are permitted to participate during 
the sentencing hearing, but this is very restrictive and regulated by the court.  
 Arguably, victims' influence on the sentencing outcome can be enhanced by using 
some restorative justice and procedural rights elements. The underlying issues include 
whether the rationale for sentencing mirrors victims’ interests.  
This chapter discusses retributive justice's theoretical dimensions and its justifications: 
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. It will then go on to defining restorative 
justice, as well as the academic debate on it. It is imperative to analyse the theories of 
restorative and retributive justice because it is needed in distilling the elements that 
need to be taken into consideration during sentencing. The following section gives a 
brief overview of the relationship that exists between retributive justice and restorative 




justice. It is also necessary to discuss the retributive and restorative justice to understand 
the two broad theories underlying sentencing at the ICC.  
The remaining part of the chapter is structured into an analysis of the sentencing hearing 
and sentence decision in Lubanga and Katanga cases. Afterwards, this chapter will 
examine the role and influence of victims in the sentence decision/review and discuss 
the findings. The final part concludes the chapter by summarising the sections and 
findings. 
4.1. Retributive Justice 
The international criminal justice system may be described as a social control system 
whose philosophy is based on retributive justice approach. According to a definition 
provided by Smith and Darley, “Retributive justice  is a system by which offenders are 
punished in proportion to the moral magnitude of their intentionally committed 
harms.”4 From this definition, it is apparent that retributive justice places punishment 
of the offender at the forefront. The punishment is awarded according to the principle 
of proportionality, i.e. the offender is punished by the proportion of the harm5. It is no 
gainsaying that retributive justice addresses the wrong, rather than the harm. Thus, the 
offender is the central focus of retributive justice.  
 
4 Kelvin Smith and John Darley, ‘Psychological Aspect of Retributive Justice’, (2008) 40(1)Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology,p.193-236. 
5 Andrew Hirsch, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment” (1992) 16 Crime and Justice, 
p.55,56 




 The concept of retributive justice has been used in a variety of ways, but it is best 
understood as that form of justice committed to the following three principles: 
 
 “(1)that those who commit certain  kinds of wrongful acts, 
paradigmatically serious crimes, morally deserve to suffer a 
proportionate punishment; (2) that it is intrinsically morally good—
good  without reference to any other goods that might arise—if some 
legitimate punisher gives them the punishment  they deserve; and (3) 
that it is morally impermissible intentionally to punish the innocent 
or to inflict disproportionately large punishments on wrongdoers.”6  
 
The idea of retributive justice has played a dominant role in theorising about 
punishment over the past few decades. Still, many features of it—‘especially the notions 
of desert and proportionality, the normative status of suffering, and the ultimate 
justification for retribution—remain contested and problematic.’7 The three 
justifications of retributive justice are deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. 
 
6 Kelvin Smith and John Darley,’Psychological Aspect of Retributive Justice’, (2008) 40Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology193-236. 
7Retributive Justice,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy,(2014) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-
retributive/> last accessed 28 April 2016. 




Some proponents of retributive justice argue that it serves as a deterrent(individual or 
general) while also reducing society's crime rates.8 In the same vein, Schafer supports 
his argument with Pope Clement VI’s words “any punishment that makes the offender 
not commit a crime again is worth administering: and a punishment that does not correct 
should not be given”.9 From the above arguments, it can be inferred that deterrence is 
one reason behind the prosecution of crimes in the international criminal justice system. 
Similarly, most domestic criminal justice systems are rooted in retributive justice 
approach. Bagaric and Morss submit that general deterrence is the primary rationale 
behind punishment in international criminal trials.10 However, little research suggests 
that punitive measures deter future offenders. From McGonigle’s perspective, there is 
no empirical evidence that retributive justice deters crimes.11 Theoretically, retributive 
justice is believed to deter future crimes; nevertheless, pragmatically, it may be difficult 
for retributive justice to deter future crimes based on the fact that the occurrence of 
crimes seems to be on the increase. 
 
8Douglas Husak, ‘Why Punish the Deserving?’ (1992)  26(4)  Nous , 447-464 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216023?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> ; Stephen Schafer, 
Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernised (1965) 50(243)Minnesota Law 
Review 243-254. 
9 Stephen Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernised (1965) 
50(243)Minnesota Law Review 243-254. Available at 
<https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3348&context=mlr>last accessed 23 
January 2019 
10 Mirko Bagaric and Jon Morss, International Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent 
Framework: (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review ,253 
11 Brianne McGonigle, Leyh, “Two for the Price of One :Attempts by the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia to Combine Retributive and Restorative Justice Principles (2009) 22(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 127-149.  




With the punishment theory, one might posit that some people obey the law because of 
punishment. Presumably, if prevention of punishment is the motivation to obey the law 
in society, why has the law not been able to eliminate social vices and severe human 
rights violations? In his study, Tyler concludes that the fear of punishment is the force 
behind obedience to the law; instead, people obey the law because they think the 
authority is legitimate.12Thus, if the legal system’s authority is legitimate and respects 
the people, there will be an increase in obedience to the law. It could also be argued that 
people may also be motivated to obey the law because of their selfish interests-to avoid 
punishment 
On victims’ and sentencing, Ashworth suggests that the traditional forms of criminal 
justice may adversely affect the involvement and the extent of applicability of victims’ 
rights in the criminal justice system.13He cautions that remarkable consequences are 
likely to arise for introducing victim into an already balanced system- accused and the 
defence.14 This argument supposes the traditional criminal justice; notably, the criminal 
trial setting lacks a well-equipped structure to incorporate victims’ interests and rights, 
empowering their involvement. Retribution and deterrence are the driving force of the 
traditional criminal justice system. Retributive justice focuses on the rights of the 
accused in order to prevent convicting an innocent person. Hence, retributive justice is 
offender-centred. In retributive justice systems, punishments given out to the offender 
 
12 Tom Tyler, Why people obey the law?(Princeton University Press 2006) 
13 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victims’ Rights , Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure’ Integrating A 
Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice : International debates  in Adam Crawford and Jo Goody 
(eds),(Routledge 2000)158. 
14 Ibid 




are grounded on evaluating the seriousness of the offender's crime and mental state. 
Which, relegates the needs and expectations of victims in the determination of guilt or 
punishment of the offender.15 The offender’s sentence responds to the wrong instead of 
how it affects the victims’ position. An indication that retributive justice does not align 
with the interests of the victims. In the light of the above argument, how do we reconcile 
retributive justice with victims’ rights within the ICC’s context? Barnett opines that 
retributive justice reacts to the wrong inflicted on a victim rather than the harm suffered 
by the victim. As such, some have submitted that it is less victim-friendly. 
In contrast, it is believed that retributive justice is victim-friendly because the manner 
of punishment depicts society’s cohesion with the victim.16The critical problem with 
this argument is that it trivialises the victim’s interest on an individual basis. The 
punishment only shows the intention to address the wrong done to society, rather than 
the victim's personal harm. Thus, the victim’s satisfaction is sacrificed for society’s. 
The traditional criminal justice system would have been more useful for addressing 
victims’ needs if retributive justice provides a central role for victims and response to 
the harm suffered by the victim. 
Gohan cautions about over-stretching retributive justice, especially within the context 
of victims interests,  because it is likely to result in victimisation of the accused(convict) 
or sabotage its effectiveness.17 Perhaps, the notion of retributive justice within the 
 
15 Randy Barnett,  Restitution :A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice,(1977) 87 Ethics 279,284  
16 Ibid. 
17 Helena Cobban, Amnesty After Atrocity? Healing Nations after Genocide and War Crimes, (Paradigm 
2007)p.209. 




domestic context slightly differs from the idea of retributive justice within the 
international sentencing context. In the international jurisdiction, the ICC deals with 
large scale violations of human rights, which is considered ‘serious’, and with many 
victims that must have suffered harm. Henham opines that victims tend to play 
significant roles within international sentencing as opposed to domestic 
sentencing.18The large scale of crime and collective violence may require victim 
involvement. The similarity within both contexts espouses justice as the accountability 
of the offender to the state or community. With victims’ participation in criminal 
justice, justice should move beyond accountability. 
Besides, the ICC has witnessed a progression from purely retributive norms to 
incorporating restorative justice elements19; despite this, there are still challenges in 
fully accommodating victims' rights and interests in sentencing. Empowering victims 
to participate during criminal proceedings may prejudice the rights of the accused.20 It 
could also shift the trial's focus from the ‘wrong’ to the ‘harm’ suffered by the victim. 
This idea restructures the traditional criminal justice system. 
Article 22 and 23 of the Rome Statute contains the Latin expression nullum crimen sine 
lege, nulla poena sine lege. The principle indicates a mandatory connection between 
punishment(crime) and a fixed, predetermined law-the basis for criminal responsibility, 
a principle of legality which is considered one of the foundations of international 
 
18 Ralph Henham, “International Sentencing in the Context of Collective Violence” (2007)  7(10 
International Criminal Law Review,p.449, 454 
19 Rome Statute 1998, Article 68(3);Article 79 
20 Rome Statute 1998, Article 68(3). 




criminal law.21It is also espoused in customary international law and some international 
treaties such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948. It is noteworthy that Article 22 generated a 
consensus amongst the delegations during the Rome Conference.22Hence, the origin of 
the court's power is to investigate and prosecute an individual most responsible for 
violations of the most severe crimes. The Rome Statute does not prohibit the offence; 
such a person cannot be considered an accused or criminal.23Article 21 mirrors the 
legitimacy and jurisdiction of the ICC. The elements of crime underscore the objectives 
of Article 22, especially about the jurisdiction of the Court.24 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute empowers the Court to impose penalties on individuals 
convicted by the Court of crimes within its jurisdiction. The penalties include 
imprisonment, not more than 30 years, life imprisonment fines or forfeiture. It appears 
the Rome Statute is cautious about the imposition of some severe forms of 
penalties.25This may be the rationale behind the exclusion of the death penalty from the 
Statute. The delisting of the death penalty, corporal punishment, and other forms of 
 
21 Susan Lamb, “Nullum Crimen , Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law”, in Antonio 
Cassese ae al.(eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2002)734-735 ;Per Saland, “International Criminal Law Principles”, in Roy Lee (ed.), 
The International Criminal Court :The Making of the Rome Statute:Issues , Negotiations, Results(Kluwer 
Law International Law 1999)194-195 
22 Ibid 
2323 Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nullum crimen sine lege in Otto Trifferer and Kai Ambos (eds),The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court::A Commentary(Beck Hart Publishing 2008)716 
24 Mark Klamberg, “General Principles of Criminal Law” in Mark Kalmberg (ed)  Commentary on the 
Law of the International Criminal Court( Torkel Opsahl Academic E Publisher 2017)254. 
25 Kai Ambos, “Article 77:Applicable Penalties” in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds),Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court:A Commentary(BECK Hart 3rd Edition, 2016) 
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penalties implies an intention to adhere to the limitations provided by international 
treaties like the UNCPR and the UN minimum rules for prisoners' treatment.26Article 
80 notes that these provisions do not prejudice the applicable laws in the national 
jurisdictions. Although, the ICC does not acknowledge harsher punishment like the 
death penalty and other forms of penalties which could lead to torture or another form 
of degrading treatment. 
Nevertheless, the stipulated provision's implementation does not preclude its 
enforcement in the State party domestic jurisdictions. Additionally, of equal importance 
is the restrictive application of life imprisonment as a form of penalty. The Chambers 
are required to ensure that the imposition of life imprisonment is subject to the 
fulfilment of strict conditions.27 Life imprisonment is justified by the extreme gravity 
of the crime and one or more aggravating circumstances.28This interpretation sums up 
a liberal approach of the ICC to individual rights and rehabilitation of offenders. While 
at the same time, respecting the existing criminal law applicable in national jurisdictions 
of the affected parties. 
That being said, according to Heikkila, procedural rights can improve the status of 
victims at the court.29 Procedural rights may be essential for assessing victims' situation 
 
26 Kai Ambos, “Article 77:Applicable Penalties” in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds),Rome Statute of 
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during criminal proceedings; which has been examined in chapter three. What follows 
is a review of the justifications for retributive justice. It is necessary to assess the 
rationale for retributive justice in order to explore its relevance to the role of victims in 
sentencing. Besides, an assessment may reveal if it resonates with victims’ needs and 
expectations in criminal justice.  
A considerable amount of literature reveals that, in most national jurisdictions, 
retributive justice is at the heart of their criminal justice systems. International criminal 
law being a  distinct area in public international law incorporates some of the theories 
and principles of national jurisdictions with some modification.30It is largely founded 
on retributive justice. 
Having discussed that, the next section shall examine the classic theories of 
justifications of punishments which are deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation.  
4.1.1  Deterrence 
Bentham describes morality as that which promotes ‘the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.’31 From Bentham’s perspective, the state is under the duty ‘to promote 
the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.’32One reasonable explanation 
for this is that punishment is used as a social or crime control, especially for offenders' 
 
30 Antonio Cassesse , International Criminal Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (2nd Edition 
OUP 2006)719.722. 
31Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York Macmillan 
1948) 
32 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York Macmillan 
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action. It could be said that while it controls the actions of offenders, at the same time, 
it increases the happiness of the society and reduces the pain of the community. The 
aim of punishing the offender is to deter people from violating the law in the future.33 
The literature on deterrence asserts that the primary justification for the punishment in 
an international criminal trial is deterrence.34Rothe and Mullins published a paper in 
which they conclude that the notion behind international criminal prosecution is 
deterrence.35From observation, Rothe and Mullin’s viewpoint emerges from 
criminology. In an author’s opinion, international criminal tribunals have integrated 
accountability and ‘instilled long-term inhibitions against international crimes in the 
global community.’36 The inhibitions are measures towards deterrence and 
accountability.  Nevertheless, it is questionable if international criminal law, courts and 
tribunals have been able to pass on a deterrent effect in the international community. 
There are still instances of severe violations of human rights around the world. At best, 
it could be said that the rate of severe abuses of human rights has reduced slightly. 
Arguably, a harsher sentence/punishment may restrict future offenders. The perpetrator 
is sanctioned to serve as examples for future offenders. Thus, deterrence is perceived 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Mirko Bagaric and Jon Morss, International Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent 
Framework: (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review ,253 
35 Dawn Rothe and Christopher Mullins, ‘Beyond the Juristic of International Criminal Justice 
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as a legal threat to crime control.37This sanction could be in the form of the death 
penalty, imprisonment or fine. 
The absence of a general provision for sentencing objectives in the Rome Statute leaves 
a gap for the rationale behind the punishment. Notwithstanding, a cursory look at the 
Preamble shows a deterrent function: “Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”38 
And “Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations.”39 
Preamble 5 and 9 support the deterrent function of the Rome Statute. 
This section has briefly explained deterrence as a justification for retributive justice. 
The next part of this section will discuss retribution as another justification for 
retributive justice. 
4.1.2  Retribution 
Retribution is at the heart of criminal law theory.40 It underscores punishment as a 
reaction to the commission of a crime. The foundation of retribution is deeply rooted in 
respect for the autonomy of the offender. It is a notion that justifies the imposition of 
punishment because it is deserved.41 In Moore’s words, “Punishment is justified if it is 
 
37 Franklin Zimring, Gordon Hawkins and Jams Vorenberg. “Deterrence :The Legal threat in Crime 
Control” accessible at < https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=10857  > last 
accessed at 16 July 2019 
38 Rome Statute 1998, Preamble 5. 
39 Rome Statute 1998, Preamble 9. 
40 Michael Moore, Placing Blame : A General Theory of the Criminal law(Oxford University Press 2010) 
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given to those who deserve it.”42 ‘Desert …is a sufficient condition of just punishment, 
not only a necessary condition’43 It is not yet certain if the offender's punishment can 
be equated to the harm and suffering inflicted on the victims. Therefore, the fact that 
the offender is deserving of punishment does not mean that such punishment is 
quantifiable to the victim's plight, given that they occur within two different contexts. 
As such,  punishment is motivated by ‘just deserts’ and proportionality. Punishment is 
mainly imposed because the offender has committed a crime. This offender is 
sanctioned by punishment or reward because he deserves it; this is the philosophy 
behind just desert. The sanction is a reaction to the breaking of rules by the offender. 
Theoretically,  the offender’s punishment is proportionate to the offence committed. 
How to measure the proportionality of the punishment remains unsettled. Different 
courts adopt different approaches. Proportionality principle is significant in the 
determination of retribution. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain if the sentencing 
matches the crime committed.44 
The principle of proportionality determines the sentencing that is appropriate for the 
gravity of the crime. The gravity of the crime must be commensurate with the severity 
of the crime. The principle of proportionality is a commonly –used notion in sentencing, 
and yet it is a concept difficult to define precisely. Goh asserts that proportionality 




44 Ralph Henham, International Sentencing in the Context of Collective Violence, (2007) 7(1) 
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objectives of criminal punishment proscribed by sentencing guidelines.45 There is an 
inconsistency with this argument; proportionality is a determining factor for sentencing; 
it is similar to the deciding factor. Hence, it is not an objective of criminal punishment. 
Goh’s argument fails to consider that proportionality is not an objective of criminal 
punishment but rather, a determinant. Therefore, there is no competition between 
proportionality and other goals of punishment. Punishment is a reaction to crime. It is 
argued that proportionality is a principle in determining the punishment, while 
retribution is an objective of criminal punishment. The principle of proportionality is a 
determinant of sentencing, and it is a means to an end, which is sentencing. It measures 
the gravity of the crime in determining the severity of the punishment. It is believed 
that sentence which matches the gravity of offences are deemed fairer than punishment 
that does not.46It is worthy of mention that proportionality as a concept is nebulous. We 
should be careful not to confuse the justification for punishment with the determinant 
for sentencing. While the former focuses on retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, 
the latter aims to determine the reasoning or logic why a particular 
quantity(measurement/amount) of a sentence is given in response to the gravity of the 
crime.  
To broaden our understanding of proportionality, the following paragraph shall briefly 
explore the different types of proportionality. The five types of proportionality are 
 
45 Joel Goh, “Proportionality-An Unattainable Ideal in the Criminal Justice system (2013) 
2(41)Manchester Student Law Review 41- available at 
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retributive proportionality, constitutional proportionality, ordinal proportionality, 
cardinal proportionality, and utilitarian proportionality. 
Retributive proportionality is backwards looking. It addresses the past of the offender 
by depriving him of his rights. It is considered that the offender deserves this 
deprivation of rights. It ensures the extent of punishment of the offender by using the 
concept of blameworthiness.47 
Ristroph draws our attention to constitutional proportionality. He argues that within the 
criminal context, constitutional proportionality sets a limit on the state penal 
powers.48This means that there is a maximum sentence which caps the totality of 
sentence an offender may serve. This type of proportionality is prevalent in most 
national jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have a maximum number of imprisonment 
which the offender can serve. For instance, the ICC’s states that imprisonment should 
not exceed 30 years or a sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with article 
77.49The Rome Statute set a maximum, which ensures that sentencing is not only the 
purpose of punishment. However, there are other purposes for punishment which could 
be rehabilitation. However, it is debatable if the different purposes of sentencing are 
combined while using constitutional proportionality. Arguably, if constitutional 
proportionality is applied, it could co-exist with other purposes of punishment. 
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Constitutional proportionality is not the purpose of punishment. It puts a cap to the 
quantum of punishment; it regulates and prevents abuse of the process. 
Furthermore, ordinal proportionality proposes that more serious crimes require severe 
punishment. Thus, the gravity of the crime determines the severity of the sentence—
crimes of a lesser degree attracts less severe punishment. 
According to cardinal proportionality, absolute measures are set for punishment that is 
proportional to a given crime.50This proportionality lay emphasis on commensuration 
between the sentence and the crime. There are doubts regarding the applicability and 
attainment of cardinal proportionality as the crime and harm suffered by the victim 
happen within an entirely different context. At the same time, the punishment occurs in 
another context with various factors to be taken into consideration in determining the 
quantum.51 
Retribution as a concept with particular reference to proportionality and just deserts 
depends on moral relativism and public opinion.52The moral values of society dictate 
if a crime should get a harsher punishment.53The crime and punishment are paired 
together on two scales to determine equality. 
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Some of the Rome Conference delegates proposed proportionality between the gravity 
of the crimes and severe penalties; they suggested death penalty and life imprisonment 
reflect the magnitude of the offence.54This bid was counteracted by a few delegations 
who pointed to the compliance of human rights treatise. The opposing delegations 
suggested humane means of punishment which would gradually reform and rehabilitate 
the offenders.55 
According to the Orthodox school, the law is criminal when the individual who 
contravenes it is punished.56The judicial punishment invokes sanction on the offender 
as a response to a violation of the law. Husak argues that a sanction does not qualify as 
a punishment in the absence of ‘punitive intention’.57It is believed that there must be a 
functional idea behind the imposition of sanction on the offender. What does the 
sanction intend to achieve by imposing punishment? It could possibly be the correction 
of the wrong or to address the harm. Most times, the intention behind the punitive 
measure is to reinforce social control. 
Concerning the ICC, after rigorous debate on the issue of mode of punishment, all the 
delegates at the Diplomatic Conference unanimously agreed to include imprisonment 
as the main punishment.58While some delegations advocated for a maximum sentence, 
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the counterpart preferred judicial discretion to determine sentence rather than a specific 
cap.59 It is observed that the delegations reached no consensus on the rationale behind 
punishment. Although, there were “widely differing” opinions on the objectives of 
penalties because of the large disparity between the moral values, norms, principles and 
practices are operating in their different jurisdictions.60Unfortunately, no conclusion 
was reached on the issue. However, the Rome Statute Preamble gives us guidance on 
the purpose of penalty: “Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution…”61 
The phrase “must not go unpunished” emphasised on the inclination for retribution as 
an objective of sentencing. 
Having examined what is meant by retribution, it is necessary to explain rehabilitation 
as an aspect of retributive justice. 
4.1.3. Rehabilitation  
Concerning rehabilitation, Andrews and Bonita argue that more attention should be 
given to offenders' rehabilitation rather than increasing punitive measures.62 In their 
opinion, punitive measures have not been able to curtail criminal recidivism; rather, 
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there is an increase in the proliferation of correctional facilities-affecting government 
budgets.63 Possibly, punitive measures do not deter crimes to the expectation of society. 
For more clarification, it is imperative to define rehabilitation. According to Hudson, 
Rehabilitation is : 
“taking away the desire to offend, is the aim of reformist or rehabilitation punishment. 
The objective of reform or rehabilitation is to reintegrate the offender into society 
after a period of punishment, and to design the content of the punishment so as to 
achieve this.”64 
Unfortunately, Hudson’s definition does not provide a certain perspective on 
rehabilitation. While the definition aims to be comprehensive, it also gives an unsettled 
perception of rehabilitation. This definition raises some questions about rehabilitation's 
objective, the relationship it has with punishment, the act or process of rehabilitation, 
and the aftermath of rehabilitation. However, from this definition, it is believed that 
rehabilitation intends to reform the offender after he has served the punishment. 
Rehabilitation takes place during and after punishment. Presumably, the courts' 
contribution to offenders' rehabilitation after the sentence term can result in re-
integration into society. One viable approach is for the court to address the 
consequences of a conviction for the convict/sentenced person.65Court’s involvement 
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in rehabilitation would demonstrate their interest in deterrence and retribution. 
However, it would also show their interests in the offender's life post-conviction and 
reintegration into society. Re-integration is a pillar of restorative justice, an indication 
that retributive justice is not totally punitive, rehabilitation entails a restorative element. 
Triffterer notes that the most effective means to ‘fight’ criminality is to prevent the 
commission of crimes.66He recommends an early evaluation of the different ways to 
challenge impunity.67Prevention, deterrence and repression are sustainable means of 
fighting impunity.68 
Rehabilitation has been described as a humane alternative to retribution and deterrence; 
some times, the punishment is lenient to dissuade recidivism.69 Article 110(4) and Rule 
223 states the Conditions and factors for Sentence review at the ICC.70These provisions 
that may ensure the convicts' early release could conflict with the deterrent and 
retribution function because it focuses on reformation and resocialisation of the 
offender, which may outweigh or preclude the deterrent's objectives retribution. 
Possibly, rehabilitation of the offender could be the reason why the maximum term of 
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imprisonment is 30 years. How these conditions and factors reflect the rationale of 
penalty is left to the discretion of the panel. 
Arguably, the ICC  could use a combination of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation 
for sentencing, since they are not mutually exclusive. While it is easy for the ICC to 
enforce deterrence and retribution, it could become challenging for the ICC to 
implement and supervise offenders' rehabilitation. While article 110 of the Rome 
Statute and Rule 223 of the ICC RPE provides for the reduction of sentencing and 
expressly list reintegration and re-socialisation, respectively, these provisions do not 
stipulate a medium of compliance with these conditions during the convict’s 
incarceration and after the release. It seems rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment 
would be more effective in the domestic context.  
 That being said, this study does not intend to discuss rehabilitation extensively, and 
criminologists have written a lot on rehabilitation.71 So far, this section has focused on 
retributive justice; the following part  addresses the theory and principles  of restorative 
justice  
4.2   Restorative Justice 
Having considered the implications of retributive justice, and its elements, within the 
ambience of sentencing in criminal courts, this segment will discuss restorative justice 
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and its impact on sentencing. It is necessary here to clarify what is meant by restorative 
justice. Zehr is one of the first authors to define restorative justice. He is referred to as 
the father of restorative justice. According to Zehr:  
“Restorative justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, 
those who have a stake in a specific offence and to collectively 
identify and address harms, needs and obligations, in order to heal 
and put things right as possible.”72 
Similarly, Zehr’s definition shares the same content as Marshall’s. Marshall defines it 
‘as a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how 
to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’.73  Be that 
as it may, Doolin is critical of  Marshall’s definition. From her perspective, Marshall’s 
description contains lacunae because it does not include some crucial restorative justice 
elements.74 Some of the questions raised include; who should be involved in collective 
resolution? how do those involved arrive at the collective resolution? what is meant by 
dealing with the aftermath of an offence and its implications for the future? Moreover, 
what are the best ways to resolve such issues in terms of the spirit of restorative justice? 
This debate opens a range of broad questions with the process of restorative justice. 
Doolin gives a comprehensive perspective on restorative justice. 
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Moreover, Doolin also proposes that the definition of restorative justice should not be 
restricted to the ‘process’ involved, but, the outcome should also be considered. She 
pointed out that Marshall’s definition is ambiguous; hence his interpretation did not 
refer to the result to be achieved.75 Doolin’s assertion prioritises the voluntariness and 
informal settings of the process. For instance,  where one of the stakeholders is absent, 
he/she could be coerced for appearance. One severe weakness with the proposition of 
Doolin is the use of coercion. Coercion goes against the voluntary and consent needed 
for the process. A possible implication of this is that the process might lead to a  ‘non-
restorative ends’ thereby compromising the intention of restorative justice.76 As such, 
compulsion may lead to victimisation of the offender or re-victimisation of the victim. 
Thus, the use of coercion flaws the proposition of Doolin. 
Besides, Zehr’s principles of restorative justice comprise of the relationship between 
parties in conflict resolution. These values include: 
• deals with victims’ harms and consequent needs, as well as offenders’ and 
communities’; 
• Addresses obligations that arise from these harms; 
• Uses inclusive, collaborative processes; 
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• involves victims, offenders, families, community members and society because 
they have a legitimate stake in the situation; 
• aims to put right the wrong.77 
One of the aims of restorative justice is to reposition victims as ‘active agents’ rather 
‘passive objects’ of the justice process.78 It puts the needs of both parties at the 
forefront. One benefit of restorative justice is that it profers inclusive approach for all 
stakeholders. 
 Moreover, Ness and  Strong divide restorative justice into there categories. The three 
categories are referred to as three key pillars of restorative justice;  ‘encounter’, 
‘amends’ and ‘reintegration.’79 These commentators argue that victims have a central 
participatory role in the three pillars of restorative justice processes. Realistically, 
victims ought to be involved in direct participation in this process. The three key pillars 
of restorative justice shall be discussed in the following section: 
 
4.2.1 Encounter 
According to Van Ness and Heetderks, Encounter is the first pillar of RJ.  The encounter 
between victims and the offender is an essential element of the RJ process. This 
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encounter may be referred to as a meeting. It is vital that this meeting must involve the 
voluntary participation of victims. No participant should be coerced to attend or 
participate in the conference. The conference provides a platform for communication 
for both the victims and offenders where they can narrate their experiences, the harm 
caused they suffered, and the impact on their lives.80 
Interestingly, one unique aspect at the encounter stage is that the victims can tell their 
stories in their own words, instead of speaking in legal language. Besides, they can also 
emote and use emotional language. In a way, it becomes easier for understanding the 
relationship between the parties and the implications of their actions.  
In the meeting, all participants bring their unresolved, undiscovered, and 
unacknowledged issues with their emotional consequences from the wrongdoing to the 
meeting.81Hence, allowing them to express these emotions can promote healing for 
both parties.82  
 It is argued that if the victim is allowed to give a narrative of the crime and the events 
that led to the crime, he will probably make a subjective account rather than the factual, 
objective account. Subsequently, the storytelling and its consequences lead to a 
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discussion between the victims and offenders. McCold and Wachtel maintain that 
restorative justice's dialogue stage helps in the ‘collaborative problem-solving 
approach’, which is the central focus of restorative justice practice.83 It follows that the 
meeting between the participants aims to highlight the problems/issues. Afterwards, the 
participants profer solution to these issues collaboratively. It is also noteworthy that the 
discussion grants them the freedom to make their choices/decision. The result of the 
encounter is  to reach an ‘outcome agreement.’84 Encounter emphasises on the practice 
of restorative justice or best put, the process of restorative justice. 
4.2.2  Amends 
As mentioned earlier, amend is the second pillar of the restorative justice-A role of the 
offender.85 Given that  ‘encounter’ means the practice of restorative justice, then 
‘amends’ means the outcome’86 Thus, the outcome of restorative justice is to heal 
individuals, communities and nations after harm caused by wrongdoing.87 An essential 
determinant of repair is the input/involvement from those who were mainly affected by 
the crime. This ability to repair connotes taking on responsibility for the crime he(the 
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offender) has committed. Furthermore, finding ways to repair the harm or loss, the 
victim has suffered. 
Moreover, making amends could be in tangible ways.88Also, amends could be made 
through an acknowledgement of the crime or sincere apologies. It has been submitted 
that in most conferences of restorative justice,  the crux of discussion ‘always presents  
a moment when it is natural for an apology to be offered in recognition of emotional 
restoration needed by the victim.’89  
Research suggests that in the criminal justice system, victims are affected by their 
experiences.90Victimologists have described this as ‘secondary victimisation’ or re-
traumatisation.91 They may be characterised as anti-therapeutic experiences which 
victims of crimes go through as a result of their involvement or contact with the actors 
of the criminal justice system  
Presumably, victims may be affected by these actors' indifferent reactions, leading to 
secondary victimisation.  While Courts are not therapeutic centres, they are not 
expected to carry out therapeutic functions; their primary function is to prosecute 
criminal and administer justice.  Naturally, the settings of the court are not victim-
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centred or focused. On the other hand, restorative justice parameters are more relaxed 
and could foster genuine communication between the offender and the victims.  
We should bear in mind that the dialogue for restorative justice does not operate within 
the context of adversarial settings. It involves victims, offenders and other affected 
individuals or participants.92The amends here could include individual or collective 
measures. The individual measures may be in the form of victim-offender mediation, 
here, the offender tender apologies to the victims. The victims ask the offenders 
questions and also narrate the real impact of the crime against them.93On the other hand, 
RJ's collective measures are truth commission and other forms of justice aimed at 
disclosing the truth regarding the commission of the crime and acknowledging the 
wrongdoing to the victims.94 
This part has analysed amends within the context of restorative justice. It is now 
necessary to explain re-integration as the last pillar of restorative justice. 
4.2.3 Re-integration 
Christie writes that conflicts are valuable commodities which have been taken away 
from their rightful owners(victims, offenders and communities) and given to 
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professional thieves-lawyers, prosecutors and the criminal justice system.95He submits 
that, ‘the bigger loser is us-to the extent that society is us. The loss is first and foremost, 
a loss in opportunities for norm-clarification.’96If properly managed, conflict, he 
believes, could give rise to a crucial opportunity for community development. The 
question that arises is, ‘is re-integration also a property.’ It is noteworthy that both the 
victims and offenders need re-integration within the context of the community. 
Van Ness and Strong define reintegration as the re-entry into community life as a whole, 
contributing, productive person.97  For offenders, re-integration includes rehabilitation 
into the community. Stigmatisation is an indispensable occurrence for the aftermath of 
crime. Consequently, it may cause the ostracisation or exclusion of the offender from 
the community or family relationship. Through reintegration, restorative justice intends 
to ‘build or rebuild relationships between offenders and their communities.’98 This 
includes but not limited to reinforcing the offender’s ties with adults and peers and 
changing the offenders’ view of law-abiding citizens and community.’99 Therefore, the 
channels of socialisation need to be involved in the policies and strategies for re-
integration. 
Set against this background, it is almost sure that some restorative justice elements 
could enhance victims' involvement in the sentencing stage. Such could include 
 
95 Nils Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977)  17(1)British Journal of Criminology,1-15. 
96 Ibid (n 8). 
97 Van Ness and Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice(Anderson Publishing 1997) 116. 
98 Gordon Bazemore, ‘Restorative  Justice and earned  redemption: communities, victims  and offender 
reintegration.(1998) 41(6) American Behavioural Scientist, 768-813, 789 
99 Ibid (n 787). 




consultation with victims on how the crime has affected them; this may be in the form 
of VIS. It could also be an encounter between the victim and the offender,  remorse, 
public apology, acknowledging the crime, admission of guilt, and efforts to address the 
harm done. Since sentencing is also a process, some of the restorative justice elements 
could be incorporated to enhance the process and outcome for the victims.  
Before examining the Lubanga and Katanga cases' sentencing, the following section 
shall discuss if there is a relationship between retributive justice and restorative justice. 
4.3.0 Retributive justice and restorative justice: Two sides of a coin? 
The previous sections have focused on the theories of retributive and restorative justice. 
It is now necessary to explain if there is any relationship between these theories. This 
part would make a comparison between the two approaches to assess their compatibility 
within the context of sentencing. In  Zehr’s observation, retributive justice is not the 
opposite of restorative justice.100 They are not irreconcilable. Instead, their approaches 
address the imbalance caused by the wrongdoing.  
Similarly, Zehr also submits that restorative justice is not a replacement for legal system 
nor an alternative to prison.101It is believed that restorative justice runs parallel to 
retributive justice. It seems the elements of these theories are opposites. However, these 
theories can be applied to complement each other because it recognises the harm 
suffered by the victims. In contrast, retributive justice recognises the wrong committed. 
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The focus of retributive justice is criminal punishment.102  Most advocates of restorative 
justice agree that crime has both a public dimension and private dimension.103 Zehr 
opines that crime has a societal dimension, as well as a more local and personal aspect. 
He argues that the legal system focuses on the public dimension vis-à-vis society’s 
interests and obligations as represented by the State. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the 
collective dimension relegates the personal and interpersonal aspects of 
crime.104Sentencing as an integral part of the criminal justice system is situated within 
the common facet of addressing crime. 
Also, it is thought that restorative justice method is more holistic when compared to 
retributive justice.105 It is argued that both theories do not have to be alternatives in 
criminal trials. Findlay and Henham argue that both paradigms of justice share common 
qualities despite ‘distinct differences.’106 As such, both paradigms can be used within 
the context of criminal trials, without relegating the status of restorative justice to an 
option or using it for symbolic function.107  
Christodoulidis is sceptical about the ability of trials and punishment to obtain 
restorative functions in conflict resolution.108  Retributive expectations from trials are 
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mainly just deserts and punitive outcomes.109 Shapland et al. also argue that it is almost 
not certain if restorative justice can co-exist with retributive justice in the criminal 
justice system.110 These authors believe that restorative justice cannot have a 
predominant role within the criminal justice system. They submit that it may operate  
‘in the shadow of criminal justice’111 Nevertheless, restorative justice may perform 
background function.112From their studies, it appears that restorative justice cannot 
have a direct impact on criminal justice. However, there is a possibility that some 
elements of restorative justice would be useful in criminal justice.  
This section has evaluated the relationship between the theories of retributive and 
restorative justice. Let us now consider the role of victims in sentencing. This 
assessment shall be made based on the decided cases approach; an analysis of Lubanga 
and Katanga cases' transcripts. This approach is required to evaluate the impact of 
victims on sentencing. 
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4.4.0 Victims in sentencing-The Prosecutor v. Lubanga  
4.4.1.Overview of the Lubanga judgment  
This section intends to investigate victims' role during the sentencing hearings to 
Lubanga's sentencing analysis.  
On 14 March 2012, the chamber ruled that Thomas Lubanga was guilty as a co-
perpetrator of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into an 
armed group(UPC/FLPC) and using them to participate actively in hostilities in Ituri 
region of the DRC.113 Subsequently, the sentencing hearing commenced.  
In the determination of the judgment, the chamber resorted to documentary video 
evidence and evidence a former UPC soldier who was over 15 years when he joined the 
UPC, testimonies of P-38 and P-10.114 This chapter aims not to address the judgment 
of Lubanga; some scholars have discussed the fairness of the decision.115 Nevertheless, 
one could infer that victims' role in the trial, mainly concerning victim-witnesses was 
not fully realised because of witness tampering and unsupervised intermediaries' 
activities.  
That being said, it is evident from the ICC transcripts that victims participated through 
their LRVs during the sentencing hearing via written observations/submissions in 
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sentence hearings.116However, what is not yet clear is if these written 
observations/submissions have a significant role or influence in the ICC's sentencing 
decision. With this background,  the following section will assess victims’ observations 
in the Lubanga case. 
4.4.2.0The Sentencing Hearing 
The Trial Chamber is responsible for the determination of the appropriate sentence on 
the accused person’s conviction.117 A hearing will hold to hear additional evidence or 
submissions relevant to the sentence.118  
4.4.2.1 Victims’ Observations 
In determining the sentence, the Chamber considered five relevant factors. These 
factors were : 
(1) The gravity of the crime, 
(2) The large and widespread nature of the crimes committed,  
(3) The degree of participation and intent of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
(4) The aggravating circumstances  and, 
(5) The mitigating circumstances. 
In determining the gravity of the crime, the Chamber referred to the evidence of  Ms 
Radhika Coomaraswamy the United Nations Special Representatives of the Secretary-
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General on Children and Armed Conflict and the opinion of expert witness Ms 
Schauer.119 
On the 24 April 2012, the Trial Chamber ordered the victims' legal representatives to 
submit their views on all evidence discussed during the trial.120 In response to the Trial 
Chamber 1’s order, the LRVs provided evidence examined during the proceedings to 
establish aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the convicted person. In the 
determination of sentencing, the legal representatives were allowed to make oral and 
written submissions in the event of sentence hearing. In their written observations, the 
LRV submitted three aggravating evidence, with no mitigating evidence. 
At this stage, it is necessary to examine the meaning of aggravating circumstances. 
4.4.2.2The Prosecutor’s request; aggravating circumstances  
The Prosecution listed the aggravating circumstances as ‘harsh conditions in the camps’ 
and ‘the brutal treatment of children.’121 The Prosecution had requested the Chamber 
to consider sexual violence as an aggravating factor.122 However, the Chamber rejected 
the evidence; it found the evidence insufficient because it was inadequate to establish a 
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the punishment of children under the age of 
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15 years of age occurred in the ordinary course of the crime for which the chamber 
convicted the accused.123 The prosecutor’s arguments were insufficient to hold 
Lubanga responsible for cruel treatment.  
Furthermore, the prosecution requested the imposition of a 30-year sentence on 
Lubanga.124 Thirty years is the maximum term of imprisonment under the Rome 
Statute. He arrived at this request by drawing on a mathematical formula.125The 
Prosecutor supported his claim by referring to the Special Court's precedents for Sierra 
Leone, where sentences for similar offences fell within seven to fifty years.126 Initially, 
the Prosecution requested a ‘severe sentence’ of 30 years… ‘in the name of each child 
recruited, in the name of Ituri region’127Subsequently, the Prosecution submitted that 
it would reduce the sentence from 30 years to 20 years, provided that Lubanga offers ‘a 
genuine apology’ to victims of the crimes.128 It is believed that this sincere apology is 
a demonstration of acknowledgement of the offence and remorse from the perpetrator. 
4.4.2.3 Victims’ Aggravating Circumstances 
In their written observations, the  LRVs urged the Chamber to consider the aggravating 
factors such as the abuse of the official functions by Lubanga, the particular 
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vulnerability of the victims and the motive for the discriminatory aspect.129They argued 
that Lubanga as the president of the UPC and commander –in –chief of the FLPC, 
abused his role and position to recruit children under the age of 15 and use them to 
participate actively in hostilities.130They presented evidence of experts opinion which 
corroborated their proof. Also, their observations revealed how the soldiers threatened 
and raped women and girls.131The LRVs supported the statements with the testimonies 
and evidence of witnesses and victims.132The observations also contained a list of 
commanders and soldiers supervising the child soldiers(victims). The victims submitted 
that the convict has a discriminatory motive that instigated him to commit crimes which 
led to soldiers' sexually abuse female child soldiers.133 
The following shall describe the mitigation circumstances and the court’s ruling on it. 
4.4.2.4.Mitigating Circumstances 
 
“All these factors can only be considered on the basis of the submissions and evidence 
presented primarily by the Office of the Prosecutor, but  also on the basis of the 
Registry report specifically on the personal circumstances of the convicted  person 
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and the victims’ submissions, especially with regard  to the scope and extent of the 
harm they and their family members suffered.”134 
Mitigating circumstances are factors that could reduce the convicted person’s term of 
imprisonment. It is more beneficial to the convict because these are facts or situations 
that do not relate to the defendant’s guilt, but these circumstances support the leniency 
of the sentence.135 For instance, the defendant’s cooperation with the ICC is perceived 
as a mitigating factor because it expedites the ICC's work.136Glickman cautions that the 
mitigation for surrender may undermine the court's role in fostering general deterrence, 
but rather, entrench special deterrence. His submission confirms that the court's 
objective is to deter future offenders from committing similar crimes, instead of special 
deterrence for a convict.137 It appears the ICC is not under any obligation to consider 
local practices in the determination of sentences. 
The convict’s expression of remorse, acknowledgement of the offence, and the effect 
of guilt admission are the crucial factors to be considered.138 Arguably, the convict’s 
expression of remorse, recognition of the crime, admission of guilt and apology can 
promote restorative process, provided the victims acknowledged the apologies and 
articulation of remorse which may accelerate the healing process of the victims and 
repair the relationship between the victims and the offender/convict. An apology by the 
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offender/convict demonstrates the expression of responsibility and acknowledgement 
of the harm done. 
Mitigating factors is very significant because if considered, it may decrease the term of 
sentence. Perhaps, the most severe disadvantage of the rule on mitigating circumstances 
is that it requires proof- a balance of probabilities- as opposed to the aggravating factors. 
Balance of probabilities is also known as preponderance of the evidence. It does not 
require a piece of overwhelming evidence—a reflection of what is applicable in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY.139 Hence, the threshold is lower for the balance of 
probabilities. For instance, in the Lubanga case, the implication of mitigating factors is 
that it resulted in a lenient sentence of 12 years imprisonment for the convict. As a result 
of the lower threshold for mitigating circumstances, one may deduce that from the 
ICC’s Statute and RPE, the ICC rules' intention makes it easier for mitigating 
circumstances to lessen a sentence. In comparison, the aggravating circumstances 
require a higher threshold to get an increased sentence. 
The LRVs submitted that there was no circumstance on the convicted person who could 
exonerate him from his criminal responsibility.140 These taken together, the LRVs 
prayed the Chamber to retain the aggravating circumstances in the convicted person's 
case. 
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The prosecution and the legal representatives (V01 and V02) noted no mitigating 
circumstances in the case.141 On the other hand, the defence tendered several 
extenuating circumstances.142The factors included necessity, peaceful motives and 
demobilisation orders, cooperation with the Court.143   
In addressing the mitigating circumstances, the defence requested the Chamber to 
deduct the period of Mr Lubanga’s domestic detention from his total sentence because 
his initial incarceration by the DRC authorities between 2003 and 2006 resulted from 
the same crimes.144 
4.4.2.5.The Chamber’s response to the aggravating circumstances 
In determining the gravity of the crime, the Chamber examined the evidence of  Ms 
Radhika Coomaraswamy the United Nations Special Representatives of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict and expert opinion witness Ms Schauer.145 
Furthermore, the Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s submissions that sexual violence 
and rape should be considered an aggravating factor because there was no relevant 
evidence to link Mr Lubanga to sexual violence in the ordinary recruitment course. The 
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Prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this factor did not 
reflect his culpability for the sentence.146 
Besides, the Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s request on life sentence; the Chamber 
opined that life imprisonment would be inappropriate because  it is “justified by the 
extreme  gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, 
as evidenced by the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances.”147 The 
Chamber submitted that it would be ‘inappropriate’ to sentence the convicted person-
Mr Lubanga- to life imprisonment because it has not found any aggravating factors in 
this case.148In his observations, the Chamber noted that it would consider other 
evidence necessary to determine an ‘appropriate’ sentence. This ‘appropriate’ sentence 
should be proportionate to the offence. The proportionality is determined by balancing 
all the relevant factors.149  
The Chamber did not accede to the aggravating factors presented by the Prosecutor and 
the LRV; it ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that child soldiers under the age of 15 years were subject to punishments such as 
‘whippings and canings’ in the ordinary course’ of the conflict.150 The Chamber 
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reiterated that the convict had not ‘ordered or encouraged’ the infliction of these 
punishments. 
The Chamber pointed out the prosecutor's failure include sexual violence in the charges, 
and his inability to introduce new evidence of gender-based violence during the 
sentencing phase.151 In the same vein, the Chamber rejected the children's vulnerability 
and discriminatory motives as aggravating factors. While the former was denied based 
on the facts that it qualifies as a  double count, the Chamber rejected the latter because 
there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Lubanga ‘deliberately discriminated 
against women, given that his commanders sexually abused female 
soldiers.’152Therefore, the Chamber found no aggravating factors. 
4.4.2.6.The Chamber’s response to mitigating circumstances  
The Chamber considered the convicted person's cooperation with the Court during the 
proceedings as a mitigating factor. The Chamber factored in  Lubanga’s ‘notable 
cooperation’ and commented on the prosecution’s refusal to disclose evidence with its 
consequent delays.153 By inference, the reasoning behind this decision shows an 
offender-centred approach.  
4.4 2.7.The Sentence                                                               
In determining the declared sentence, it is revealed that the majority of the Chambers 
took into account: the widespread use of child soldiers during the time frame of the 
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charges,  the influential position of Mr Lubanga within the UPC/FLPC and his capacity 
by virtue of his position of authority to supervise the foot soldiers. Besides, the majority 
of the Chamber dismissed the aggravating circumstances(as presented by the LRVs). 
The Chamber’s reasoning, the aggravating factors were insufficient to warrant an 
influence on the sentence, as they submitted that they found no aggravating 
circumstances in the LRVs submissions. 
 
The  chamber outline the declared sentence is as follows: 
“In considering these factors, the majority chamber meted a separate sentence for 
each of the three crimes for which Lubanga had been convicted. The following is 
the crime and the corresponding sentence: 
(1) Conscription of children under 15 years old-13 years imprisonment; 
(2) Enlistment of children under 15 years old-12 years imprisonment; and  
(3) The use of children under 15 years to participate actively in hostilities-14 years 
imprisonment. 
Furthermore, the Chamber pronounced a joint sentence of a total period of 
imprisonment as 14 years.154 
However, in her dissenting opinion, Judge Odio suggested that ‘punishment and ‘sexual 
violence’ should have been considered aggravating factors in the determination of 
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sentence because they resulted in severe and often irreparable harm to the victims and 
their families.155 The learned judge noted that it would have considered evidence of 
sexual violence, had it been introduced during the sentencing stage. Therefore, the 
Chamber found no aggravating factors.156 
On the same point, Judge Odio buttressed the gravity of the suffering of child soldiers 
with the expert opinion of Ms Schauer and evidence of Ms Radhika Coomarasway. 
They both testified to the negative impact on their(child soldiers) education 
psychological development and the girl child soldiers subjected to sexual violence.157 
The witness reported that the children narrated an account of systematic sexual violence 
in the camps—the incidences of pregnancies and abortions, and the subsequent 
expulsion of the pregnant girls. The learned judge opined that the Majority disregarded 
the damage caused to the victims and their families. However, she reasoned that 
‘punishment and ‘sexual violence’ should have been considered as aggravating factors. 
Because they resulted in severe and often irreparable harm to the victims and their 
families; which puts them at risk of severe physical and emotional harm’ and death.’158. 
She stressed the Majority's indifference to victims' loss due to harsh punishments and 
sexual violence.159 She argued that the Majority of Chamber considered; a)the large and 
widespread nature of the crimes committed;b) the degree of participation and intent of 
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the convicted person; and c) the convicted person's individual circumstances as the 
‘fundamental factors.’160Initially, the Chamber acknowledged ‘the harm caused to 
victims and their families as a factor of gravity pursuant to Rule 145(1) © of the 
Rules.161Subsequently, it disregarded this item as a factor of gravity. She emphasised 
that the Chamber received sufficient evidence to establish the punishments, harsh 
conditions and sexual violence suffered by the victims due to their recruitment in the 
camps. Therefore, these items should have been factored in when determining the 
sentence against the convicted person as is it precipitates ‘serious’ and  ‘irreparable 
harm’ to the victims and their families.162  
Regarding the term of imprisonment, judge Odio criticised the majority’s decision to 
impose a lower sentence to the crime of enlistment, 12 years, a higher sentence to the 
crime of conscription, 13 years and an even severer punishment to the crime of the use 
of children to participate in the hostilities, 14 years. She asserted that the distinction in 
term of imprisonment gives a wrong impression about each crime's consequences. 
Although the crimes are ‘distinct and separate crimes’, they are the outcome of a 
common plan implemented by Mr Lubanga.163 The learned judge opined that Mr 
Lubanga should be sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for each of the crime of 
enlistment, conscription and the use of children under the age of 15 years to participate 
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actively in hostilities.164Thus, the joint years of imprisonment should have been 15 
years of imprisonment.165 
Arguably, the court could have considered the item for recruiting under 15 children in 
the armed conflict. The exclusion would suggest that the children’ suffering was not 
severe for the gravity of the crime. Also, the Chamber rejected the effects of sexual 
violence. One possible explanation for this might be related to inadequate evidence on 
these alleged crimes. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the fact that the offender might 
have been responsible for the commission of the alleged crimes. It connotes that the 
evidence was not sufficient enough to warrant charges and subsequent conviction as 
well as the sentence. The declared sentence shows that the criminal proceedings' 
outcome is a product of persuasive or convincing evidence from the parties, rather than 
the stated sentence being victim-focused. Hence, this corroborates the fact that the 
outcome relies heavily on the preponderance of the evidence. 
Following the sentencing, and the appeal after that, Mr Lubanga, filed an action on the 
possibility of Review of his sentence. It is necessary to examine the role of victims in 
Mr Lubanga’s sentence review. The next part of this chapter shall outline the 
reduction/sentence review. 
 
164 Ibid 143,p.51 p.26, lines 2-8. 
165 Ibid 143, p.52, para 27, lines 1-2. 




4.5.0 The first sentence review 
Having discussed the involvement of victims in the sentencing decision for Lubanga, 
this part shall assess victims' participation in the sentence reduction and if they 
influenced the review of the sentence. This section follows on from the previous part, 
which examined the sentencing hearing and the declared sentence. 
4.5.1 Overview of sentence Reduction and its provisions.  
Pursuant to Article 110 of the Statute, the Court is empowered to review a convict's 
sentence when he has served two-thirds of the sentence or 25 years 
imprisonment.166The presiding judge's scheduling Order invited the participating 
victims to express in written submissions their views and concerns regarding any 
reduction in the convicted person’s sentence.167Furthermore,  Article 110(4) lists the 
conditions that the Court must be satisfied with to reduce the offender’s sentence. These 
conditions include the offender's willingness to cooperate with the ICC at the initial 
stage and subsequently; the offender must have rendered voluntary assistance to the 
court to enable ease enforcement of the judgments; a clear and significant change in 
circumstances that warrant a reduction of sentence.168 
Furthermore, Rule 223 states other factors that will be considered in sentence review. 
These factors are: 
 
166 Rome Statute 1998, Article 110(3). 
167 The Prosecutor v Lubanga, Observations of the V01 group of victims on the possible review of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ sentence, ICC-01/04-01/06-3149-tENG, 10 July 2015,p3,para3,lines 1-3 
168 Ibid. 




• The conduct of the sentenced person while in detention, which shows a genuine 
dissociation from his or her crime: 
• The prospect of the resocialisation and successful resettlement of the sentenced 
person; 
• Whether the early release of the sentenced person would give rise to significant 
social instability; 
• Any significant action taken by the sentenced person for the benefit of the 
victims as well as any impact on the victims and their families  as a result of the 
early release; 
• Individual circumstances of the sentenced person, including a worsening state 
of physical or mental health or advanced age. 
It has commonly been assumed that a sentence reduction may be a  remedy for alleged 
violations of the human rights of the convict, to serve his sentence without risk of 
physical harm.169 Moreover, we should bear in mind that reducing a sentence as a 
remedy based on alleged violations of human rights is not provided for in article 110(4) 
of the Statute or rule 223 of the Rules. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that some 
common law jurisdictions do grant review of sentence reduction, not as a remedy to 
human rights violations, but as the basis of the convict’s cooperation with the legal 
authorities, or if a particular part of the sentence has been served.170 Reduction of a 
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sentence is not an automatic right; it is subject to some conditions. In addition, it seems 
the reduction of sentence and review is not new to the criminal justice system; it is 
prevalent in most national jurisdictions. 
Hole notes that sentence reduction tries to strike a balance between the interests of 
offenders, victims, and the community. From his perspective, the sentence review 
checks ‘an arbitrary’ discretion’ to the Court.171Sentence reduction will probably 
address unresolved issues between the sentenced person and victims which have not 
been corrected by the original sentence. The notion is applicable where a sentence is 
meant to promote rehabilitation of the offender. It follows that the sentence review 
embraces a holistic approach towards repairing the relationship between the 
stakeholders-victims, offenders, and society.   
Arguably,  the sentence review gives victims a more participatory role. Similarly, one 
could argue that it permits a deeper interaction between the victims and the sentenced 
person. The conditions listed in Rule 223 appears to stress an integrative or holistic 
approach to addressing sentence review. These conditions expressly inform an 
expectation of the offender’s reformation, particularly concerning building a 
relationship with the victims. The conditions imply that the offender’s early release is 
made conditional on ‘significant actions’ to address the harm caused to the victims. In 
a similar vein, the rules also highlight the implications of the offender’s release on the 
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community. Therefore, this explores the interrelationship between the offender, victims 
and the community-a subtle approach to restorative justice. 
 21 August 2015 marked the commencement of the hearing on Lubanga’ first sentence 
review. The Court listened to arguments from both parties and, the victims. The Court's 
primary function was to evaluate the convicted person on the criteria set out by Article 
110(4). Inadvertently, the parties presented these criteria in two contrasting arguments; 
argument favouring early release and arguments against early release. The Chamber 
invited written representations from the participating victims on their views and 
concerns regarding a possible reduction of sentence.172 Also, the Registrar and the DRC 
filed observations. 
In this sentence review, The Prosecutor, the OPCV and the LRVs, V01 and V02  
concluded on the absence of the factors in Article 110(4)(a) and (b), Rule 223. The 
LRVs 01 submitted written observations. In the words of the Court: 
“[[t]he Appeals Chamber invited the participating victims to express in written 
submissions their views and concerns in relation to any reduction in the sentenced 
person’s sentence, having regard to the criteria set out in article 110(4) of the Statute 
and rule 223 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”.173 
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In response to the court’s order, the victims submitted their observations. The victims 
concluded that the legal criteria for a reduction of the sentence were not present.174In 
the LRVs 01’ observations, the victims averred that criteria (a) to (d)  of rule 223 
affected the victims' interests directly. These criteria are duplicated in article 110(4). 
In the victims’ assertions, Mr Lubanga Dyilo ‘consistently denied his responsibility’,  
that he committed the crimes he was convicted. Additionally, the victims observed that 
his conduct and behaviour did not reflect that he has ‘dissociated’ from those crimes.175 
They recommended that an apology and expression of regret by the sentenced person 
would suffice as a step towards reparations. They also pointed out that his unrepentant 
ways were likely to escalate the continuing tension in Ituri while an apology and 
expression of regret could ease the existing tension in Ituri.176These victims’ 
observations highlighted their expectations and the thorough follow-up of the offender's 
activities (Lubanga). In addition, the victims also expressed their concerns about the 
consequences that might arise if Mr Lubanga was released to return to the Ituri region. 
They expressed fears that his release “might hamper implementation of the Trust Fund 
for Victims’ reparations programme, as a result of Lubanga’s influence on public 
opinion.” They averred that Lubanga’s return would negatively influence the collective 
reparations process and the symbolic reparations.177  
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Regarding reintegration back into society, the victims averred that Mr Lubanga would 
face challenges, which could hinder or impact negatively on his ability to resettle in the 
community with peace and reconciliation. They reported the lack of motivation on Mr 
Lubanga’ part reflected his attitude towards victims.  
 
On the risk of social instability, the victims felt the offender’s release. Returning to the 
region could aggravate the communities' tension, provided Lubanga does not change 
his attitude.178 They also contended that Lubanga‘s return might escalate reprisal 
attacks as well as the beginning of new war crimes. 
 
Turning now to the positive action favouring victims, the victims' arguments show that 
Mr Lubanga has declined to undertake a proposal of positive actions during his 
detention term. This criterion required him to engage victims by reassuring them of his 
support publicly, a public acknowledgement that children under the age of 15 years 
were indeed enlisted into UPC, as well as an expression of regret in the absence of an 
apology.179  
Furthermore, the LRVs( victims V01) also claimed that Mr Lubanga has not 
participated in any conduct that shows that he has taken ‘significant action’ to benefit 
the victims. Mr Lubanga failed to make public apologies, which could have formed part 
of the reparations; he refused to cooperate throughout the reparations proceedings.180He 
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objected to the inclusion of child soldiers in the reparations programmes. He blatantly 
refused to recognise the fact that he was responsible for the former child soldier’s 
recruitment. The Registry corroborated this assertion. The LRVs of Victims V02  argue 
that Lubanga was required to prove his good faith and wish to cooperate with the 
reconciliation process in Ituri.181 The LRV concluded that none of the sentenced 
person's conduct could be considered ‘change’ to qualify for the legal criteria for a 
sentence reduction. The LRV’s submitted that the statutory criteria for sentence 
reduction were not, at this juncture, present. They deferred for six months, the review 
for a possible sentence reduction.182  
In response to this, the Defence contested the LRV’s assertion and claimed that 
Lubanga offered apology letter. They reiterated that Lubanga’s apologies were genuine. 
The Defence argued that the conduct antecedent to sentence review supported 
Lubanga’s application for a sentence reduction.  
Nonetheless, the Panel considered the LRV’s submissions. It dismissed Lubanga's 
application to reduce the sentence because he failed to comply with the rules, including 
his lack of remorse and insincere apology. Given the information received from the 
LRVs, the Panel concluded that Mr Lubanga had not genuinely dissociated from his 
crimes.183 However, the Panel acknowledged the prospect for the resocialisation and 
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successful resettlement of Mr Lubanga in the DRC.184 Hence, the reduction of his 
sentence could not be justified in the present circumstances. Based on the above factors' 
assessment and the absence of evidence to establish Mr Lubanga’s dissociation from 
the crimes, the judges found no elements favouring Lubanga’s release.185 Furthermore, 
the judges held that Lubanga had not satisfied the court that there was any indication 
which supported the fact that he has taken  ‘significant action’ for the benefit of the 
victims of his crimes. 
Interestingly, the first sentence review manifests the significance of remorse, and 
sincere apology in sentencing, especially in assessing the relationship between victims 
and offender and victims’ perspectives on this. Perhaps victims may find closure from 
the offender’s apologies. On the other hand, remorse and public apology could serve as 
a mitigating factor for the defendant at sentencing. Since apology may perform a 
restorative function towards mending the broken relationship between the victims and 
sentenced person, victims tend to expect this from the perpetrator. In this particular 
case, from their perspectives, the victim believed the apology was not genuine. Remorse 
and sincere apology could fit in as a medium to teach offenders lessons, vindicate 
victims and expedite reintegration into the society.186  
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In summary, the Panel found no factors in favour of Lubanga’s release. The panel 
reached this decision based on the absence of evidence that he had genuinely 
dissociated himself from the crimes and failure to establish any indication that 
supported the fact that he had taken ‘significant action’ to benefit the victims of his 
crimes. 
From the above assessment, It is observed that the Panel considered the victims’ 
submissions in the determination of the sentence review. After a while,  the sentenced 
person, Lubanga, applied for a second review for a sentence reduction. The following 
part shall explore the second review by commencing with the preliminary issue. 
4.5.2 Preliminary issue: request to postpone the second review.  
The LRV V01 and V02 requested the Chamber to defer the sentence review for six 
months.187 The LRV V01 stated that Mr Lubanga had not met the conditions set for his 
early release. Therefore, the requirements from his initial review have not changed. 
However, according to the letter dated 7 September 2017 titled ‘merits considerations’, 
which contained a ‘new information’ on Mr Lubanga's intentions. This letter expressed 
Mr Lubanga's desire to participate in the reparation process and become its ‘committed 
partner.’188 
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Additionally, they observed Mr Lubanga's intentions via his proposal, to organise 
public apologies, which could be held while still in detention. Lubanga also proposed 
that he would continue detention if it increased the chances of social harmony and well-
being of the communities who suffered from his crimes.189  
In addressing this, the LRV VO1 contended that if these new proposals were sincere, it 
may expedite public apologies, which in turn could provide some measure of 
satisfaction to victims and successful reparations.190They submitted that the 
justification for a postponement of six months was to prepare for a meeting between 
Mr Lubanga and a delegation of victims, intending to reach an agreement on the 
possible forms of public apologies and implementation of such agreement.191The LRV 
V01 posited that if the process's initiation was successful, it could relieve the victims’ 
fears and promote reconciliation between communities and Mr Lubanga’s community. 
This process could also lessen the hindrances to implementing reparations and, ensure 
his release was carried out in favourable conditions.192 
The LRV VO2 in their submissions concluded that if the panel agreed to postpone its 
decision, it would positively impact the implementation of the reparations process and 
the involvement of all parties and trust fund.193 
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The Prosecutor’s submission was quite different. The Prosecutor persuaded the Panel 
that it should decide on the information currently available, rather than postponing its 
decision.194 He argued that the letter dated 7 September 2017 was a repetition of Mr 
Lubanga’s earlier statements, which had already been considered in the First Sentence 
Review.195 
On the other hand, the OPCV ‘s submissions expressed his opposition to Mr Lubanga’s 
early release and the postponement of the panel's decision. The OPCV  urged the Panel 
to make an urgent decision to reassure the victims who will potentially have access to 
the reparation programme.196  
The sentenced person, Mr Lubanga, recognised the request for the postponement of 
reviewing his sentence. He emphasised his intention to meet with the victims of his 
crimes to fulfil his wishes for reconciliation.197 
The Panel noted that the Defence’ Second Observations reflected Mr Lubanga’s 
intentions and actions to be taken in the future.198This statement from Mr Lubanga was 
considered more aspirational than pragmatic.  
The Panel held that there are ‘too much’ uncertainties in Lubanga’s proposals. The 
Panel relayed his doubts on the realisations of these proposals, especially, the time 
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constraints.  The Panel ruled that the parties and participants' arguments do not warrant 
the postponement of its decision.199 The Panel was mindful that some of the parties and 
participants raised the same arguments presented in the first sentence review.200 
4.5.3 The second review for reduction of sentence. 
Rule 224(3) of the Rules provides for the review of sentence reduction every three 
years. Following the decline of Lubanga’s initial sentence review in 2015, Mr Lubanga 
applied for the second review after two years.201The Panel requested Defence, the 
Prosecutor, the LRV V01, the LRV V02, the OPCV, the DRC and the Registrar to 
submit written representations for the sentence review concerning Mr Lubanga 
Dyilo.202 The review's scope was restricted to questions on any significant change in 
circumstances since the initial sentence review.203This review included a piece of new 
information available that demonstrated any changes since the first sentence review 
decision was issued. 
As claimed by LRVs V01: 
“In view of the Legal Representatives of Victims V01, a traditional ceremony to be 
attended by the victims could be problematic for those who fear retaliation and would 
 
199 Second Decision on the Review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Thomas Lubanga  Dyilo P.9 
Para.20. 
200 Ibid, para.32. 
201The Prosecutor v.Thomas Lubanga  Dyilo, Situation in the Democratic Republic Of Congo, 
Scheduling Order for  the second review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo ,ICC-01/04-01/06-3346 07-08-2017,.P3. 
202 Ibid, p.4 para 1; regulation 33(1)(d) 
203 Ibid, para 2. 




have to make known their participation in the proceedings. In their submission, the 
Letter of 7 September 2017, which refers extensively to the 2015 Sentence Review 
Hearing which was already considered by the Panel in its First Sentence Review 
Decision, does not reflect a genuine change of attitude.”204 
 
The LRV VO1 argued the sentenced person, Mr Lubanga refused to cooperate in the 
reparations proceedings. They also averred that Mr Lubanga failed to accept that he was 
responsible for recruiting the former child soldiers, as he was reluctant to accept their 
reparations.205 The LRV V01 asserted that since Mr Lubanga’s first sentence review 
decision, his conduct had not shown his dissociation from the crimes from which he 
was sentenced.”206 They referred to the negative implications of Mr Lubanga’s release 
on implementing the Trust Fund for Victims’ reparation programme and the leaders' 
strong ties with the political group headed by Lubanga. The opposition on their part to 
the reparation programme may deter any participation in them.207 
In a similar vein, the LRV V02 submitted that Mr Lubanga was required to establish 
good faith and wish to cooperate with the reconciliation process in Ituri. Although, the 
LRV acknowledged Mr Lubanga’s good faith and intention to collaborate with the 
reconciliation process in Ituri, however, this intention was not sufficient.208Besides, the 
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LRV V02 pointed out the adverse reaction to Mr Lubanga’s release, which included, 
the risk of social instability, the potential for stigmatisation of victims during the 
implementation of the reparations.”209In their submission, they recommended that Mr 
Lubanga should “adopt a more cooperative approach towards victims.” 210 
Additionally, the Panel rejected Lubanga’s statement concerning serving his full 
sentence to promote the victims' wellbeing. The Panel ruled that this did not constitute 
a significant change in circumstances because none of this indicated a significant action 
taken by Mr Lubanga for the victims' benefit.211 
In reaching the decision, the Panel evaluated the significance of any actions taken by 
the sentenced person, Mr Lubanga, for the victims' benefit (as stipulated in rule 223(d) 
of the Rules). The Panel acknowledged Lubanga’s proposal of a public ceremony to 
meet with victims and offer his apologies. Although this constituted a change in 
circumstance, the Panel did not consider it significantly sufficient to modify Lubanga’s 
sentence. It reasoned that the proposal was more intentional than feasible. 
These taken together,  the Panel determined that there had been no significant change 
in circumstances since the first sentence review decision would merit a reduction of Mr 
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Lubanga’s sentence. 212A summary of the main findings, together with the discussion, 
is provided in the following section. 
4.6.0 Discussing findings. 
Henham’s study results reveal that international criminal law is founded on a measure 
of consensus for punishment and morality; however, there is little agreement on what 
approach to re-enforce this morality/punishment.213To date, there is no consensus on 
the path to take. One implication of this is the disparity between different national 
jurisdictions with varying approaches to sanctions and punishments. While the Rome 
Statute outlines the applicable penalties, presumably, the victims, in this case, are 
familiar with the penalties applicable in their local jurisdictions. It seems some victims 
do not comprehend the ICC’s approach to punishment nor the justification for such 
sentences.  
In Beresford words, “the passing of a sentence on an offender is, after all, probably the 
most public face of the international criminal justice system…”214Beresford’s statement 
draws our attention to the function of this phase of proceedings–sentencing-in 
international criminal justice. A climax which every stakeholder of the criminal justice 
system expects. Seemingly, transparency is expected in sentencing. Sentencing within 
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the global context is described as a response to collective violence.215 A response to 
this end indicates a more significant number of victims. Victims and the international 
community look forward to international sentencing. As opposed to national 
jurisdictions, sentencing operates within a broader context of gross violations of human 
rights. Since the ICC is not a ‘self-contained’ institution, it derives some of its 
applicable law from internationally recognised human rights, treaties, and the legal 
system's national law.216 This derivation is evidenced in the compromise reached at the 
Rome Conference. It is settled that the Rome Statute provisions do not prejudice the 
existing national laws of the State parties. 
The application of these rules differs within the ICC jurisprudence. ICC’s approach 
may seem liberal, given that it excludes some harsh penalties like a death sentence and 
corporal punishment. The delegations of the Rome negotiations agreed to humane 
punishments. 
As mentioned in the introduction, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation are the 
main justifications for sentencing. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the judges 
did not expressly mention the rationale behind sentencing. There are divergent opinions 
by penal lawyers on the purpose of sentencing. Schabas proposes that human rights 
principles are more suitable to achieve rehabilitative goals over retributive goals217. 
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According to Schabas, more attention should be given to rehabilitating offenders rather 
than promoting punitive purposes. Human rights principles are used as guidelines, 
explaining the leniency of penalties at the ICC; an attempt at rehabilitation. 
In contrast, Danner believes that the driving force of international criminal sentencing 
is retributive justice. 218 While rehabilitation is a subset of retributive justice, retribution 
takes the forefront in sentencing. Perhaps, striking a balance between retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation would enhance the role of retributive justice. If the court 
contributes towards rehabilitation and liaises with the national jurisdiction involved, 
combining these parts would create a more holistic approach to sentencing.  
Although it is observed that the Rome Statute and RPE do not expressly stipulate any 
justification for punishments, nonetheless, a cursory look at the preamble of the Rome 
Statute implies retribution and deterrence as justifications for punishment.219 Regarding 
deterrence, it is not yet clear if individual deterrence is included. This stresses ICC's 
primary goal to mete out punishment to the masterminds/perpetrators of serious human 
rights violations. This punishment could be a reflection of just desert and 
proportionality. The last emphasis reflects the deterrent effect, to serve as deterrence 
for future offenders. Therefore, one may infer that the conviction and sentencing of 
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Lubanga underscore the objectives of classical criminal law theory-deterrence, 
retribution and rehabilitation. 
That being said,  victims expected the vulnerability of children under the age of 15 to 
aggravate the sentence; they also expected sexual and gender-based violence(against 
women and girls) and discriminatory motives against female child soldiers to provoke 
the punishment.220 Given that crimes of sexual and gender-based violence were 
excluded from the charges, and subsequently not prosecuted. The victims anticipated 
these items to exacerbate the sentence. However, the Chamber found no aggravating 
factors in these observations. It is observed that victims contribution via aggravating 
circumstances to increase the convicted person’s sentence play little role in the outcome 
of the sentence because the Chambers found no aggravating factors. 
Judge Odio’s dissenting opinion highlighted the discrepancy between the declared 
sentence and the seriousness of the crime. However, the learned judge's opinion on the 
sentence is unsatisfactory because of the observed difference between the declared 
sentence and the recommended sentence suggested by Judge Odio is negligible; she 
stated that 15 years of imprisonment would have been preferable to 14 years. In the 
learned judge’s opinion, one could see that the difference between the majority’s term 
in prison and her preferred term of imprisonment was one year. Although the learned 
judge shed light on the deficiency in proportionality, her suggested sentence is of little 
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or no help to the proportionality between the seriousness of the crime. Judge Odio’s 
opinion might have been more persuasive if she had suggested a higher sentence. 
Nonetheless, her observations on the majority’s decision reveal her disappointment in 
the length of the sentence. On proportionality of the gravity of the crime and the 
deserving punishment, it is not yet settled if there is a threshold for measuring 
punishment. There is no universal principle; preferably, the cardinal proportional 
principle is applied; this principle of proportionality is not universal; it is determined 
based on moral relativism.221 Thus, it is open to inconsistencies and different 
interpretations. From the Lubanga case data, it is apparent that the declared term of 
imprisonment 14 years expresses acts of retributive justice. Nonetheless, one could 
argue that these stated terms of imprisonment are perceived as an expression of general 
deterrence. 
One implication of this sentence is the possibility that the accused/offender/convicted 
person still takes the forefront at the sentencing stage. Non-lengthy sentence and 
sentence review ensure rehabilitation of the perpetrator. The threshold is sufficiently 
humanitarian that one may infer the promotion of offender reformation as well as the 
transformative approach of the court towards the punishment of the offender. 
Interestingly, the Lubanga sentencing demonstrates that victims were permitted to 
submit observations and participate through their LRVs during sentencing. This form 
 
221Joel Goh, ‘Proportionality-An Unattainable Ideal in the Criminal Justice System(2013) available at  < 
http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/law/main/research/MSLR_Vol2_4(Goh).pdf>last accessed 
19 January 2020. 




of participation connotes a regulated and restricted medium of participation. Therefore, 
it can be assumed that the sentencing phase enhances victim engagement, subject to 
judicial discretion. Also, one may argue that protecting the sentenced person's rights 
from a human rights perspective is the basis for this restricted participation. Cretney 
and Davis opine that based on moral reasons, victims should be given roles to play in 
the delivery of punishment because it can reassure them that they have ‘public 
recognition and support.’222 From these commentators’ submission, victims’ role in the 
delivery of punishment should emanate from a moral standpoint.223 This submission 
resonates with Christie’s analysis of ‘stolen property’s within most common law 
jurisdictions' adversarial system.224From a moral perspective, the victims should be 
allowed to participate. Nevertheless, the effects of their participation on the sentence 
are regulated by judicial discretion/power. This finding agrees with Henham’s ideas, 
suggesting that the extent of victims’ involvement in sentencing is curtailed by judicial 
discretion.225 
It is also interesting to note that the declared sentence does not conform to the 
prosecution's request for a severer punishment. It demonstrates that the judges have full 
discretion to determine the term of imprisonment, provided it conforms with the statute 
and RPE provisions. The prosecutor's request on a higher sentence seems to 
demonstrate his viewpoint on retributive justice, especially the doctrine of retribution, 
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just desert and deterrence. As mentioned in the literature review, there is no empirical 
evidence that criminal trials deter crimes.226Prior studies also note that deterrent as an 
arm of retributive justice serves a more rhetoric function then a pragmatic one.227The 
deterrent function could be an individual function for the sentenced person or general 
deterrence for future offenders. The Judge dismissed the OTP’s request for a threshold 
sentence of 20-30 years. This sentence seems to reflect that the war crime of using 
children under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities is not considered 
severe to warrant the highest sentence of 30 years imprisonment or life imprisonment. 
This sentence supports Schabas assertion that genocide and crimes against humanity 
rank higher in the hierarchy than war crimes.228 We should bear in mind that the Rome 
Statute does not expressly provide for the hierarchy of crimes. Perhaps, the Chamber 
did not consider the war crime of recruiting child soldiers as severe to warrant a higher 
sentence. Possibly the declared sentence implies a liberal approach to water down 
vengeance request from the victims. 
Another emerging issue is the possibility that active victim participation during 
sentencing may likely override the process's objectivity. It is crucial to bear in mind the 
possible bias that might arise if victims are given extensive rights to participate. 
Unregulated victim engagement during sentencing may lead to an emotional 
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rollercoaster.  It is believed that most of the victims are speaking from a place of hurt, 
as a result of their sufferings, most times, their submissions may be very subjective and 
vengeful. On the other hand, the rights of the convicted person need to be considered 
and protected. Therefore, the convict’s circumstances is a major factor in the 
determination of sentencing. Arguably, this helps us understand that the sentencing 
stage is dominated by retributive justice principles with lesser principles of restorative 
justice. 
Moreover, the Lubanga case also emphasised the importance of apology(genuine) for 
victims in sentencing. The Prosecutor attempted to negotiate with the convict by 
requesting the latter to make a ‘genuine apology’ to victims because of his 
culpability.229 The Prosecutor asserted that he would be willing to reduce the request 
for a sentence from proposed 30 years to 20 years provided the convicted person made 
a ‘genuine apology’ to the victims. The Chamber eventually dismissed this request. 
However, this request shed light on the significance of sincere apologies for victims. It 
also shows that apology from the convict may be perceived as an essential aspect of 
sentencing and review. Surprisingly, from the perspective of the defence, it seems 
apology are mitigating circumstances. Here it performs a dual function, as a mitigating 
circumstance for the defence and, also as a restorative function. As mitigating 
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circumstances, they may be used as metrics for punishment or as an approach to teach 
offenders lessons, vindicate and expedite reintegration into the society.230   
Moving on now to consider sentence review, Hole notes that sentence reduction tries to 
strike a balance between the interests of the offender, victims and the community.  From 
his perspective, the sentence review checks ‘an arbitrary’ discretion’ to the 
Court.231Arguably, the sentence review gives victims a more participatory role- within 
two polarised parties.  Similarly, one could argue that it permits a deeper interaction 
between the victims and the sentenced person. The conditions listed in Rule 223 appears 
to stress an integrative or holistic approach to addressing sentence review. These 
conditions expressly inform an expectation of the offender’s reformation, particularly 
concerning the victims' relationship. By implication, the offender’s early release is 
conditioned on ‘significant actions’ to address the harm caused to the victims. The same 
rules also emphasise the implications of the offender’s release on the community. 
Therefore, this explores the interrelationship between the offender, victims and the 
community. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the victims expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
review of the sentence by adducing reasons why the convicted person should not be 
released earlier than envisaged.232 They argued that the convicted person has 
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consistently denied his responsibility; he had failed to show remorse or expressed 
regret, and has refused to acknowledge his crimes. From these victims perspectives, 
one could argue that justice includes the factors they listed(which the convicted person 
refused to do). The sentence of 14 years might not have meant sufficient justice.233The 
penalty of 14 years cannot replace sincere apology, acknowledgement, and expression 
of remorse from the convicted person.  In addition, one may deduce that the victims 
were not in agreement with the sentence review; that is why they submitted 
observations to object to the sentence review. They asserted that Mr Lubanga failed to 
acknowledge that he recruited child soldiers, while he made efforts to frustrate the 
reparations programme.234 These points reveal that victims need more than the 
imposition of sentencing. They also expect restorative functions. Fortunately, the 
Chamber acceded to the victims' observations, and the sentenced person, Mr Lubanga’s 
sentence reduction was declined. 
In a similar vein, the current study found that victims prioritised apology and expression 
of regret from the sentenced. They believed it would suffice as a step towards 
reparations.235 One could infer that apology and expression of regret here perform a 
restorative function for the victims. The fact that Mr Lubanga ‘consistently denied’ his 
responsibility connotes that he did not acknowledge the crimes he committed.  Neither 
did he recognise his contribution to the recruitment of child soldiers. In this regard, he 
cannot be coerced to perform these roles. It is dependent on him. The victims contested 
 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid 235. 
235 Ibid. 




the sincerity of the defence’s apologies. It is observed that the offender's failure, Mr 
Lubanga, to offer sincere apologies and implement significant actions for the benefit of 
the victims negatively impacted the offender's access to a reduction of sentence. The 
same issue came up in the second review. The offender was denied sentence reduction. 
A comparison of Mr Lubanga’s two-sentence reviews reveals that the Panel did not find 
any significant change in the circumstances that should be taken into consideration 
within the meaning of Rule 223(e) the Rules and the factors under Article 110(4) of the 
Statute for the determination of the reduction of sentencing.236 Moreover, the panel also 
observed that Mr Lubanga’s sentence expires on 15 March 2020. Hence, there was no 
reasonable ground to schedule a further review of his sentence.237Nonetheless, the 
Panel acknowledged Mr Lubanga’s rights under rule 224(3) of the Rules to apply for a 
new review of his sentence provided there was a significant change in circumstances.238 
 
The decision on the review of sentence reduction has shown that victims’ observations 
of LRV’s V01 and V02 were considered to determine whether Mr Lubanga qualified 
for a sentence reduction. All the parties and the LRVs(V01 and VO2), were ordered to 
submit observation. It is not surprising that the factors considered are pursuant to Rule 
223 of the RPE and Article 110(4). Arguably, the sentenced person’s denial to accept 
his responsibility for child soldier’s recruitment and his reluctance to include them in 
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the reparations programmes tacitly demonstrates the limit of sentencing; retribution's 
objective to ensure he took responsibility for his actions. 
It is observed that the sentenced person’ stance can impede rehabilitation or the process 
restorative justice. The convicted person, Lubanga, refusal to acknowledge his crimes; 
his lack of remorse and sincere apology reveals the implications on victims.  A 
reference to Doolin’s proposal supports the idea of using coercion to ensure a 
stakeholder’s(offender) presence in the restorative justice process.239 This argument is 
flawed because coercion may sabotage both process and outcome. We should bear in 
mind that at this point,  apology from the convict should be voluntary. Coercion is not 
an effective strategy to receive an apology from the convict. Nothing could have been 
done to persuade the offender; Lubanga; even imprisonment could not induce him to 
apologise to the victims. Voluntariness/willingness on his part was required.  
Be that as it may, it is noted that the Rome Statute provisions overlook the consequences 
that follow the release of the offender as a result of sentence reduction or regular 
discharge after imprisonment. It is not sure if there is any provision to support the 
offender regarding reintegration after his release. This gap needs to be filled by the 
domestic criminal justice system to promote offenders' rehabilitation and reintegration.  
In general, therefore, it seems that the ICC restricts victims' ability to influence 
sentencing, particularly the term of imprisonments for the convicted person. The 
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finding observed in this study seem to be consistent with the research of Perez-Leon –
Acevado. Perez-Leon points out that the ICC impose limits on the involvement of 
victims at the sentencing stage.240 
Having discussed the Lubanga sentencing findings, the next section of the chapter 
addresses victims' role in sentencing and presents the results. 
4.7.0Victims’role in sentencing: The Prosecutor v.Katanga.  
The following is an examination of the role of victims in Prosecutor v Katanga. The 
section below shall address victims' position during sentence hearings and if victim 
participation affects the sentencing decision. 
4.7.1.Overview. 
On 20 March 2014, the majority found Katanga guilty on one count(murder) of war 
crime and four counts(pillaging, killing, an attack against civilian population and 
destruction of property) of crimes against humanity.241 Sadly, The Chamber acquitted 
Katanga of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity.  One 
implication of this is the effect on substantive justice. Judge Bruno Cotte summarised 
the implication of Katanga’s acquittal on the alleged crimes of sexual violence and the 
use of child soldiers. 
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In  Judge Bruno Cotte’s words: 
“If an allegation has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, this does not 
necessarily mean that the alleged act did not occur. Declaring a person not guilty does 
not mean the Chamber is convinced of the person’s innocence; just that they are not 
convinced of the person’s guilt as charged.”242 
Perhaps, one of the challenges, in this case, was the failure of the Prosecutor to obtain 
and present convincing evidence at the court. Consequently, the victims within this 
category might not have been able to know the truth concerning the crime or find 
closure. 
The Chamber sentenced Katanga to 12 years imprisonment.243 However, since the 
convict has been in ICC detention since 18 September 2007, he will serve six years 
imprisonment.244 In response to this, the Prosecution made an application for appeal 
because the sentencing decision was erroneous and not proportionate to the crimes 
committed. The Prosecution requested for the sentence to be revised to 22 years 
imprisonment. Furthermore, the Prosecutor pleaded the Court to reverse or amend Trial 
Chamber II's judgment to organise a new or partial trial before a different trial chamber. 
Katanga’s defence notified the Chamber of discontinuation of appeal and submitted 
Katanga’s apology statement to the victims. An appeal could have given the victims 
some thread of hope. However, with the discontinuation order by the defence, the 
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chamber dismissed the appeal. Some victims relayed their disappointment in the 
sentencing order of 12 years imprisonment, which they felt was not proportionate to the 
crime committed. They opined that if the local courts had tried him, he could have 
incurred a more substantial punishment. Katanga’s apology also calls into question the 
role of apology in retributive and restorative justice for victims. While the LRVs 
contested Katanga’s apology's authenticity, they averred that Katanga’s apology was a 
ploy to avoid the appeal and subsequent increment of a harsher sentence.   
The dissenting opinion of Judge Christine Wygnaert questioned the impartiality of the 
majority in the Katanga case. She acknowledged that while judges may exercise their 
truth-seeking roles, it is reasonable that they do not overstretch their boundaries by 
recklessly shaping the case.245She challenged the modification of Katanga’s liability 
vis-à-vis Regulation 55. In her opinion, the change in Katanga’s liability mode was a 
deliberate effort to ensure his conviction, which violated the fair trial principle. This 
argument is further exemplified by McGonigle, who notes that the Katanga’s 
judgement illustrates the ‘impartiality deficit’ of the criminal institution. McGonigle 
contends that the conviction of Katanga was in a bid to suppress the rights of the 
accused in order to ‘fulfil its mandate of ending impunity and providing justice for 
victims.’ 246  
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The majority decision and the dissenting opinion of Judge Wyngaernt suggest that there 
is division amongst the judges in addressing justice for victims and closing the 
accountability gap. While some judges are pro-victims’ rights and, access to justice for 
victims, some judges are pro-defendants’ rights. Bearing this in mind, it is submitted 
that the ICC as a criminal court founded on criminal law principles and norms, however, 
recognise victims’ rights, it still struggles with incorporating victims’ rights as a subset 
of human rights law within it jurisprudence. Given that Article 21 provides that its 
interpretation should conform to the human rights standard, the ICC is not a human 
rights court.  
The following sections shall summarise the arguments of the parties in the sentencing 
hearing under the headings of gravity of the crimes committed, aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating circumstances. 
4.7.2 Gravity of the crimes committed  
This section will discuss the interaction of the victims through the LRVs and the other 
parties. The response of the court shall also be assessed. 
The Chamber examined the cruelty of the crimes against the inhabitants of Bogoro, 
including the defenceless children, the discriminatory intent behind the attack and the 
accused’s abuse of victims in an official capacity.247 The Chamber specified that the 
sentence's determination depended on factors like the gravity of the crimes committed, 
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individual circumstances of the convicted person, mitigating circumstances and 
aggravating circumstances.  
The gravity of the acts committed by the convicted person is necessary for the 
determination of sentencing. The gravity is a determinant of the severity of punishment. 
As such, the accused person must be aware that the crime he was convicted of is the 
most severe crime of concern to the international community.248 It is noteworthy that 
these crimes are not of similar gravity. The particular circumstances and the degree of 
participation of the convicted person in the crime commission must be taken into 
account.249 
The Chamber noted that not all crimes are equally severe. It differentiated between 
crimes against people and crimes against property.250The Chamber observed that the 
crimes committed during the attack in Bogoro on the 24th February 2003 were of 
questionable magnitude.251It pointed out that the attack reflected explicit discrimination 
against a particular tribe and intended to wipe out the Hema population. The Chamber 
stated that Katanga was convicted of contribution ‘in any other way.’252 The Chamber 
highlighted the implications of the attack on Bogoro community and the victims. 
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Finally, the Chamber submitted that the degree of participation of Katanga must not be 
underestimated and must be included in the gravity of the crimes committed. 
4.7.3 Aggravating circumstances 
The Chamber recalled that the OTP submitted four aggravating circumstances. These 
aggravating circumstances were:(i) the vulnerability of the victims(defenceless 
victims). Especially the children;(ii)cruelty of the commission of the 
crimes;(iii)discriminatory intent; and,(iv) the accused’s abuse of official 
power/capacity.253 
The LRV concurred with the contention of the OTP’s first three aggravating 
circumstances.254The Defence averred that the Prosecution misconstrued the accused's 
official capacity, he submitted that the accused never abused his power. In the 
Chamber’s opinion, in order to establish the abuse of power as an aggravating 
circumstance, it must be shown that the convicted person exercised power and abused 
power.255 The Chamber recognised that the accused exercised his authority to make 
decisions regarding the distribution of weapons. However, he did not exceed the 
authority nor abuse it. The Chamber noted that it was not convinced that Katanga 
abused his power position or used his power to “promote the commission of crimes.”256 
Therefore, the Chamber found no aggravating factor in this. 
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4.7.4 Mitigating circumstances  
Regarding mitigating circumstances, the Chamber referred to the Prosecution and the 
LRVs submissions, which advanced that Germain Katanga must not benefit from the 
application of mitigating factors to his sentence.257 However, the Chamber considered 
the factors presented by the Defence to determine the mitigating circumstances. The 
Chamber considered age, family and character(good moral standing as mitigating 
factors. 
The mitigating circumstances are relevant for reducing the sentence and not the gravity 
of the crime.258Mitigating factors is very significant because if considered, it may 
decrease the term of sentence. Perhaps, the most severe disadvantage of the rule on 
mitigating circumstances is that it requires proof- a balance of probabilities- instead of 
the aggravating factors. Balance of probabilities is also known as preponderance of the 
evidence. It does not require a piece of overwhelming evidence—a reflection of what 
is applicable in the jurisprudence of the ICTY.259 Hence, the threshold is lower for the 
balance of probabilities. From the Katanga case, one implication of this is that it resulted 
in a lenient sentence of 12 years imprisonment for the convict.  
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Moreover, the Chamber also considered peace and reconciliation efforts, and remorse 
by the accused towards the victims, the accused's conduct during proceedings. 
However, the Chamber did not find the violation of Mr Katanga’s rights as a mitigating 
factor because there was no violation of his rights while he was in Court’s authorised 
detention. 
The following sections shall assess the role of victims in the sentencing hearing, the 
parties' observations, and the Court's decision. 
4.7.5. Katanga case: Victims role in sentencing  
The sentencing decision of the Katanga case shares some similarities with the Lubanga 
case. The Prosecution requested a sentence of 22-25 years, after which the parties and 
participants presented their final submissions. 
In addressing the court, the LRVs reported: 
“They had lost everything during the attack. Many people were injured and were the 
victims of cruel attacks. Some still bear the scars of bullets or matches. Mr 
Byaruhanga also explained to us that the suffering is continuing for some victims. 
They still have not been able to obtain adequate care…..”260 
“The victims are having a very difficult time going back to their older way of life 
because, you see, they lost everything………..On 24 February, the attackers wiped 
Bogoro off the map…we are not talking about minor looting or one or two buildings 
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destroyed here and there. In this case, an entire village was struck..It cannot be denied 
that Germain Katanga played a key role in the commission of the crimes.”261 
To emphasise the seriousness of the crimes, the victims persuaded the Court to consider 
three aggravating circumstances. These are; ‘the particular vulnerability of the victims. 
It is noted that some vulnerable individuals(especially civilians) like many women, 
children, older adults and newborns became targets during the attack.262 They were 
either killed or injured despite their vulnerability. The LRV argued that the second 
aggravating circumstance is the cruelty of the crimes. In her submissions, the 
combatants stripped some victims of their clothing. Some corpses were dismembered, 
and some victims were treated without dignity.263They begged to be spared. The third 
aggravating circumstance was the attackers' discriminatory acts against a particular 
ethnic group, the Hema. It was reported that every person deemed to be Hema was 
initially detained and killed.264 The LRV found no mitigating circumstances and 
discountenanced any potential mitigating circumstances.265 
Furthermore, the LRV stressed the culpability of Katanga, notably how he contributed 
to the wiping out of an entire village. She posited that Katanga’s moves during the trial 
had been a ‘strategic choice’ to defend himself and that he(Katanga ) never for once 
expressed any remorse or regret for the victims. He was also elusive about 
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acknowledging that civilians were targeted and killed. The victims reiterated that there 
were no extenuating circumstances that could affect the sentencing of the accused. The 
LRV states: 
“We are not here to represent the international community…….we are here to 
ensure that the victims’ voices are heard...the seriousness of these crimes 
cannot be reduced to just a number of casualties. We must take into account 
the long-term effects on the victims. The harm that has been done has hit an 
entire community. People will be victimised for generations.266 
Furthermore, the LRV expressed the victims’ quest for justice. 
“I have met with people who are thirsty, who have a thirst for justice. They 
only wish for justice, taking into account the key role played by Germain 
Katanga in the commission of the crimes of the attack on Bogoro on 24 
February 2003.”267 
In the Defence’s observations, he listed Katanga’s personal history and his low degree 
of participation, his passive role in the hostilities, which was limited to weapons 
distribution.268He also observed that Mr Katanga lacked the intent, but he was aware of 
the crimes' commission.269 He reminded the court about the rule against double 
counting, i.e. no factor taken as an aspect of gravity of the crime might be considered 
as a separate aggravating circumstance.270 
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In the same vein, the Defence listed factors that could be considered as mitigating 
factors. This factors included the role of Katanga in demobilisation process, the time he 
had spent in detention in the DRC and the need for the amount of time spent to be taken 
into consideration, Katanga’ moral standing and Katanga’s behaviour within his 
community.271 
In its closing statement, the Defence stressed the statement made by the accused before 
the Court and pointed out that Mr Katanga acknowledged the victims' suffering and the 
killing of civilians.272The Defence’s statement was in contrary to the assertion of the 
Prosecution. Additionally, the Defence restated its sympathy and compassion for the 
victims on behalf of the convicted person.273He emphasised that Katanga had always 
been remorse throughout the proceedings.274The Chamber did note that a statement of 
remorse could be considered as a mitigating circumstance. However, for a declaration 
of remorse to qualify as a mitigating circumstance, it must be genuine/sincere.275 
However, the Chamber distinguished between a statement of remorse and the 
expression of sympathy or genuine compassion for the victims. The Chamber stated 
that the expression of sympathy and genuine compassion might be considered in 
determining the sentence; nonetheless, it cannot be compared to a statement of remorse 
because a statement of guilt carries a higher value than an expression of sympathy 
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compassion for victims. Hence, an expression of sympathy and compassion for victims 
had lesser weight.276 
Moreover, the Chamber recalled the legal representatives' observations for victims and 
the prosecutor's closing statement that none of Mr Katanga’s statements could be 
interpreted as an expression of deep and genuine remorse. The Chamber acknowledged 
that Mr Katanga made some statements that could qualify as an expression of deep and 
genuine remorse. Nonetheless, the Chamber observed that Mr Katanga made some 
statements “attesting to his compassion for the victims and his desire for justice.”277 In 
the Chamber’s observation, it was noted that at the end of the hearing for the 
determination of the sentence, Mr Katanga’s statement per article 67(1)(h) expressed 
his compassion in general for victims of “that war.”The term “that war’ referred to the 
ongoing war in Ituri, and victims from his community.278 
In their second submission, the defence stated that “mitigation seeks to diminish the 
sentence, not the crime”.279 It is noteworthy that this assertion is flawed. The 
punishment(just desert) and proportionality are the theories applicable here. It is argued 
that sentencing is punishment. The sentenced is reduced; it may indirectly send a 
message that the crime's severity or gravity has been lowered. 
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The defence argued that Katanga expressed his genuine sympathies for the victims, 
which should not be dismissed. The defence submission was contrary to the LRVs 
submission that Katanga never made a genuine sympathy to the victims. He also 
reiterated that Katanga never denied the civilians' suffering, nor failed to acknowledge 
these civilians' death. He cited Katanga’s words: 
“Today, my thoughts go out to all victims of the conflicts in Ituri in general 
and particularly the conflict in Bogoro. My thoughts go out to all those who 
have lost loved ones, who have lost their prosperity and their wealth, for all 
those whose pride and dignity have suffered. I extend to them my compassion 
in regard to all the suffering that they have suffered because of the foolishness 
and wickedness of human nature.”280 
The Chamber opined that Mr Katanga’s statements were not an acknowledgement of 
the crimes he committed.281 Instead, the statements were considered as a ‘mere 
convention.’282 In support, the Registry submitted that it had ‘no reliable information’ 
on any measure that Mr Katanga must have taken to ensure the victims' 
compensation.283In the Registry’s report, the village chief revealed that he was unaware 
of any action/measure put in place by the convicted person in the victim's 
interest.284Based on the above reasons, the Chamber rejected Katanga’s statements 
because it did not qualify as an expression of compassion or genuine remorse for the 
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victims of Bogoro. It also concluded that it was not sufficient to be considered as a 
mitigating circumstance.285 
The Chamber sentenced the convicted person, Katanga to 12 years 
imprisonment.286After a few years, the convicted person, Katanga applied for sentence 
review. The sentence review shall be discussed below. 
4.7.6.Review on sentence reduction-Katanga case 
4.6.1 Overview 
As mentioned earlier, sentence review is not an automatic right. It is regulated by the 
Rome Statute and the ICC Rules. It is subject to the condition that a sentence may be 
reviewed when two-thirds of that sentence has been served.287According to Article 
110(4) of the Statute, a decision on whether to reduce a sentence is discretionary. It is 
evident in the use of the phrase ‘may reduce.’The presence of one factor is sufficient to 
decrease a sentence. We should bear in mind that the presence of one factor does not 
guarantee a reduction. Furthermore, the presence of a factor against modification of a 
sentence does not hinder the exercise of this discretion. The factors against modification 
of a sentence must be weighed against factors in favour of review in order to determine 
whether a reduction of punishment is justified.288 
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Mr Germain Katanga withdrew his appeal against the conviction  decision  and 
submitted his ‘expression of sincere regret.’289The prosecutor also withdrew her appeal 
against the conviction decision. Katanga filed a video recording and transcripts of 
filmed apology, where he publicly apologised to the victims of the crimes for which he 
was convicted.290The legal representatives noted that victims are ‘entitled’ to express 
their ‘concerns’ on the basis that  Judge Van Den Wyngeart has been requested to rule 
on a reduced sentence of Germain Katanga.291It was observed that once a decision of 
sentence reduction is made, it is final and irreversible.292 
Schabas suggests that early release's primary justification is to decide if the prisoner is 
suitable for social rehabilitation after the sentence.293The Defence cited this point. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that early release is likely to sabotage the deterrent and 
retributive function of sentencing. Perhaps, early release or sentence reduction may 
affect victims’ perspective of justice or how victims perceive the ICC. Where the 
rationale behind sentencing is classical theories of retributive justice, early release or 
reduction of sentencing may sabotage the purpose of such punishment. 
The excerpts from victims’ submissions are in the quote below: 
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“Furthermore, having regard to the gravity of the crimes of which he was 
found guilty and the extent of the harm suffered by the victims, we deplore 
the 12-year sentence imposed on Germain Katanga by the International 
Criminal Court …[…..]The victims of the February 2003 attack on Bogoro 
consider  that this sentence is not proportionate to the crimes committed and 
that any reduction would merely exacerbate the feeling of injustice shared by 
all victims.”294 
 
  “ With respect to the victims’ submissions and the observations of 
the DRC authorities regarding the victims’ continuing negatives 
feelings regarding the length of Mr Katanga’s original sentence, the 
panel concurs…..”295     
It is necessary to state here that the above excerpts demonstrate the disappointment of 
victims in the declared sentence and sentence review. It seems the victims expected a 
higher sentence because of the gravity of the convict's crime. Both the victims and the 
DRC authorities expressed that they were not satisfied with the Court's declared 
sentence. The dissatisfaction is not unconnected to the applicable laws and the 
jurisprudence in DRC. They believed the convict would have received a harsher 
sentence in Congo. 
Similarly, the DRC authorities expressed their reservations regarding the declared 
sentence for Lubanga. They reported that Katanga’s sentence of 12 years came as a 
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rude shock to the affected population of Ituri, “who, the DRC authorities submit, 
expected a higher sentence, given the nature of the crimes committed.”296 
The panel considered the presence of five factors listed in Lubanga sentencing. In as 
much as the panel finds information that supports one of the factors in rule 223, or 
article 110, it is left to the discretion of the Court to make a sentence reduction. 
According to the panel, the reduction is mainly dependent on the information taken into 
account to establish the presence of the factors in rule 223(a)-(e) 
On the early release of Mr Katanga, the Panel found that the early release of Mr Katanga 
would not give rise to “significant” social instability. However, it had found that his 
early release would give rise to a degree of social unrest.  
In addressing this point, Mr Katanga submitted he took actions for the benefits of the 
victims. These actions include; withdrawal of his appeal, expression of regret, actions 
towards bringing the two communities together, supporting victims in their applications 
for individual reparations, expressing public apologies.297 
According to the Prosecutor, the sentenced person has not taken any significant action 
to benefit victims because the victims rejected Mr Katanga’s apology. In addition, the 
Prosecutor recalled that in the victims’ submissions, they averred that Mr Katanga’s 
early release to Ituri would trigger their trauma. She also noted that it was too early to 
decide if any of the potential actions that Mr Katanga promised to take during 
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reparations would benefit the victims.298Mr Katanga argued that his withdrawal of 
appeal against the conviction decision constituted ‘a significant action’ that would 
benefit the victims. 
Turning now to the final three actions identified by Katanga: that he has offered support 
for the Victims’ individual reparations,299 that he has released an apology video and; 
that he offered to apologise personally to the victims, the Panel noted that the victims’ 
opposition was based on the fact that the reparations proceedings were ongoing. Thus, 
there was a  time constraint between completing the criminal proceedings against Mr  
Katanga and the sentence review proceedings(two years and a half months).300 The 
victims rejected Mr Katanga’s offer to apologise. They averred that accepting his 
apology is inconsistent with a fundamental principle in Hema culture, articulating that 
an offender must make amends before they tender an apology.301The principle of this 
culture believes that reparations precede an apology. The Panel acknowledged the 
Prosecutor’s argument that it was too early in the reparations proceedings to deduce if 
any of Mr Katanga’s actions benefitted the victims.302The Panel reasoned that it should 
analyse this factor on a ‘case by case basis.303 
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The Panel noticed that the filmed apology was not aimed at the ‘broader community’. 
However, it was directed to specific victims of the Bogoro attack, who held Mr Katanga 
liable, this led Mr Katanga to extend the filmed apology to more victims.304 However, 
Mr Katanga did not show the video to the victims because it would cause further 
upset.305 Therefore the benefit of the filmed apology to the victims was ‘indirect’ and 
‘minimal.’ 
Mr Katanga showed the filmed apology to members of the broader community. The 
Panel also referred to the observations of the HRC/TJI: “[t]hus far. It appears that Mr 
Katanga’s apology has been found inadequate for victims.”306 Consequently, this 
triggered ‘negative reaction’ from the actual victims to the video. As such, the Panel 
found the victims’ rejection of the filmed apology as reasonable. The Panel conceded 
that the filmed apology was beneficial to the broader community affected in the DRC. 
Despite that, the benefit to the victim was ‘indirect’ and ‘minimal’. Within this context, 
for that reason, it does not qualify as a significant action’ taken by Mr Katanga for the 
benefit of the Victims. 
Concerning Mr Katanga’s offer to meet personally with victims to apologise(last 
identified action), the Panel reasoned that a more personal form of apologies such as a 
face to face meeting between the sentenced person and victims might constitute 
‘significant action’ that would benefit victims. The  Panel observed that in this instance, 
 
304 Mr Katanga ‘s Reparations Response. 
305 Mr Katanga’s Submission, pars 82.84. 
306 HRC/TJI Observations on Reparations, para 86. 




it remained uncertain if the victim wishes to have a face to face encounter with Mr 
Katanga or whether this action might also cause further upset.  The Panel recognised 
that while Mr Katanga’s offer to meet with victims to apologise was an action that could 
potentially benefit the victims. However, it was not sufficient as a  significant action 
because it was probable whether such action would be beneficial to the victims. 
Besides, the Panel mentioned that the second clause to the factor, “any impact on the 
victims and their families as a result of the early release” recognised the trauma it could 
cause the victims and their families to be relevant on evaluating this factor. 
Based on the information received, the Panel concluded that from the actions taken by 
Mr Katanga, there was a ‘limited benefit’ to the victims. Hence, all the actions 
undertaken by Mr Katanga did not constitute a ‘significant action’ for victims' benefit 
within the meaning of rule 223(d) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Panel 
also found that the early release of Mr Katanga could negatively affect victims and their 
families. Flowing from this, the  Panel submitted that the factor under Rule 223(d) of 
the RPE was not present to determine whether it would be appropriate to reduce Mr 
Katanga’s sentence. 
The Panel took into account Mr Katanga's cooperation with the court in its 
investigations; a genuine dissociation from his crimes, the prospect of resocialisation 
and change in Mr Katanga’s circumstances. The Court admitted Katanga’s expression 
of regret. It should be noted that although victims were allowed by the Panel to submit 
observations about the benefit, they had derived from Katanga’s ‘significant action.’ 
This factor was considered but, had limited influence on the outcome of the sentence 




review. In conclusion, three judges considered it appropriate to reduce Mr Katanga’s 
sentence by three years and eight months.307 




This section summarises and discusses the main findings of the Katanga sentencing 
decision and sentence review. The results represent purely data obtained from 
transcripts of the decided case. Not in-person observations. 
By carefully examining the data, it is found that victims were allowed to participate 
during the sentencing hearing and sentence review. From the data obtained on sentence 
review reduction, as well as evidential provisions of article 110(4)(b) of the Statute and 
Rule  223(d) of the RPE, it is shown that victims participated through written and oral 
observations/submissions. The judges and panel had to balance between defendants, 
prosecutor, and LRVs’ observations and verbal and written submissions. Perhaps, the 
rationale behind this is to give victims a platform to influence the sentencing decision 
and the sentence review. Nonetheless, their participation seems to illustrate a restriction 
on their ability to influence sentencing. Even though the chamber weighed LRVs’ 
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submissions against other parties involved, the sentencing decision and review were not 
made based on strictly victims’ requests. The outcome implies that victims could not 
determine the term of imprisonment against the convicted person, Katanga. The control 
resides within the decision-makers, the judges. Therefore, regardless of the extent of 
victims' participation, primarily through aggravating circumstances and mitigating 
circumstances, the sentencing decision is mostly dependent on judicial discretion. This 
finding is consistent with Henham's study, which suggests that judicial discretion 
suppresses victims' ability to effectively influence the sentencing decision.308 This 
reasoning underlines the role of judicial discretion in sentencing. One could say that the 
sentencing decision filters the views and observations of the victims. 
This finding seems to be consistent with the research of Perez-Leon-Avecado.309Perez-
Leon Avecado points out that the ICC imposes limits on the involvement of victims at 
the sentencing stage.310 Surprisingly, from this data, their submissions did not play a 
massive role in the determination of sentencing or sentence review, which reiterates 
that the Court is vested with the judicial discretionary power to decide sentence and 
sentence reduction. The impact of victims' participation on the sentencing outcome 
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could be described as symbolic—an impact made by representation through a few 
victims a means to an end. 
The outcome of both the sentencing decision and sentence review suggests that judges 
were very cautious not to lose their objectivity based on the victims' emotional stories. 
Some instances show Mr Katanga's inadequacy in addressing the victims' concerns; 
most of these concerns came from victims’ hurtful emotions. The judges exercised 
caution in making a decision. Victims' submissions are most times subjective. Perhaps, 
such emotions from victims could affect how the judicial role is performed by triggering 
judges' sentiments. In making a fair sentencing decision or sentence review, the judges’ 
reasoning should be objective to a large extent rather than the victims' reaction.311In 
Gibson’s words: judicial role theory is  “a means of moving beyond an exclusive focus 
on individuals to consider the influence of institutional constraints on decision-making. 
Contexts are always associated with the expectations emanating from others who share 
the context.”312Judicial restraint takes precedent over sentiments, as sentiments could 
derail the purpose of sentencing. 
On the other hand, victims' emotions could perform therapeutic functions for both 
victims and the offender., which is best achieved in an informal context. Notably, 
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victims’ communicated they envisage a more severe punishment for the convicted 
person. However, contrary to their expectations, this study did not find that victims’ 
observations and submissions influenced sentencing. The impact of victims' 
participation on the sentencing outcome could be described as partly symbolic. Some 
commentators have argued that most victims’ representations are beclouded with 
emotions rather than objectivity.313 Thus, it may be difficult for the Chamber to 
consider their observations in the determination of sentencing.314 According to the 
classical theories of punishment, Sentencing is mostly devoid of emotions,315 which 
could ensure that sentiments and feelings do not compromise the court's integrity. 
Nevertheless, in the realm of restorative justice, emotions from victims and remorse 
from the offender could impact the sentence and repair relationships.316  
It is worthy of mention that international sentencing at the ICC is influenced by the 
western liberal rules and human rights. The conclusion on penalties during the Rome 
negotiations highlights a more humane approach to punishments. It also reflects a shift 
 
313 Neal Feigenson’Emotional Influences on judgments of legal blame.How they happen , whether they 
should, and what to do about it’.In  Brian Bornstein & Richard Weiner (Eds), Emotion and the 
law:Pyschological perspectives(New York Springer 2010) 45-96;Neal Feigenson, “Jurors Emotions and 
Judgments of Legal Responsibility and Blame :What Does the Experimental; Research Tell Us?(2015) 
8Emotional Review26-31. 
314Jeffrie Murphy,Remorse,Apology and Mercy in Punishment and the Moral Emotions(Oxford 
University Press 2012)129-180; Samuel Pillsbury , “Emotion and Criminal Punishment :In Principle and 
in Practice” available at <https://emotionresearcher.com/emotion-and-criminal-punishment-in-principle-
and-in-practice/>last accessed 13 January 2020;Jonathan Doak and Louise Taylor, 2Hearing the voices 
of victims and offenders:the role of emotions in criminal sentencing”(2013) 64(1)Northern  Ireland Legal 
Quarterly.22-46. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Samuel Pillsbury , “Emotion and Criminal Punishment :In Principle and in Practice” available at 
<https://emotionresearcher.com/emotion-and-criminal-punishment-in-principle-and-in-practice/>last 
accessed 13 January 2020. 




from a purely vengeful notion of ‘an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth’  to a more 
liberal approach to punishment. It could be inferred that the ICC does not adhere to the 
principle of ordinal proportionality. A contrast to the application of retributive justice’s 
principle of ordinal proportionality in some national jurisdictions.317 
Given this, most victims of international crimes participated in the proceedings with 
higher expectations of sentencing. Still, they felt disappointed or not satisfied when the 
Chambers sentenced the convict to 12 years imprisonment- which was considered a 
lesser punishment- as opposed to what is applicable in their respective national 
jurisdictions. The DRC authorities and victims’ submissions318 demonstrated they 
expected severe punishment. Hence, they lamented on the supposed disproportionality 
between Katanga’s declared sentence and the crime's gravity. They reasoned that a term 
of 12 years, excluding the six years Katanga had spent in the ICC’s custody was not 
proportionate to the crime's gravity. The Rome Statute and RPE are silent on the 
determinant of proportionality. These victims felt that their national court would have 
met a harsher punishment than what the ICC gave Katanga. Moreover, the finding on 
sentencing outcome reinforces the general belief that cultural differences exist between 
sentencing in some domestic jurisdictions and the ICC's jurisprudence. 
In comparison, this difference flows from the objectives of sentencing within these 
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, it appears that the objective of sentencing at the ICC is 
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entirely different from what victims expected. For instance, the declared term of 
imprisonment for the convicted person,12 years is considered low, compared to if the 
offender was prosecuted in the national court.  Therefore, this finding underscores the 
differences between punishment approaches at the ICC and the concerned domestic 
jurisdiction(DRC). The Chamber declared 12 years for the convicted 
person(Katanga)based on a few mitigating factors. While this 12 years imprisonment 
serves as a general deterrent function because it was interpreted as a stern warning for 
future offenders that the Court frowns at impunity. The Chamber stated that Katanga’s 
sentence must reflect both punishment and deterrence.319 From the transcripts(quoted 
under Rule 223(c) the declared sentence does not seem to resonate with the victims' 
expectations. They expected a higher penalty. Their expectation could be due to the 
corresponding punishment in Congo’s laws. One reasonable explanation for this is not 
unconnected to the fact that the convict, Katanga was acquitted of some crimes such as 
the use of child soldiers to participate actively in hostilities and the charges of sexual 
violence. One of the victims’ submissions also expressed their disappointments about 
the request for Katanga’s sentence reduction. From their perspectives, it is inferred that 
the early release potentially lessens the penalty, which may, in turn, decrease the gravity 
of the crime. The victims’ complaint about reducing the sentence reinforces their 
conception of sentencing as mainly retributive justice.  
Given that in their domestic jurisdiction, the options of sentencing spans from the death 
penalty, terms of imprisonment to life imprisonment. The DRC maintains the death 
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penalty in its legislation.320 In DRC, the death penalty is regarded as the highest form 
of punishment, as well as capital punishment for grave and heinous crimes. The nearest 
to this capital punishment is life imprisonment. It is possible that that the victims 
expected  ‘capital punishment’ of the death penalty or at least life imprisonment.  Thus, 
for this particular case point, it could be argued that the ICC was unable to fulfil or 
manage the victims' expectations. The Rome Statute‘s provision on sentencing states a 
three-step process to determine what law is applicable. These are the provision of the 
Statute, elements of the crime and the RPE.321 Where this is not applicable, then the 
court shall refer to relevant treaties and the principles and rules of international law. 
Where this does not suffice, the court should resort to general principles of law derived 
from national jurisdictions.322 
The victims did not accede to have benefited from any significant actions taken by Mr 
Katanga. They acknowledged the reception of Mr Katanga’s filmed apology. 
Nonetheless, the apology should be taken with caution because the ‘affected victims’ 
have not seen Mr Katanga’s filmed apology. The victims averred that apologies at this 
stage were incompatible with a “fundamental principle in Hema culture, according to 
which a person who has done someone wrong must make amends before he or she 
 
320 Oliver Lungwe Fataki, World Coalition  Against Death Penalty , Africa Towards the Abolition of the 
death Penalty in DRC: Advances to be confirmed , published on 13 December , 2016. Accessible at 
www.worldcoalition.org/Towards-the-abolition-of -the -death-penaalty-in-DRC-advances-to-be-
confirmed.html >Last accessed 12 November 2019. 
321 Rome Statute Article 21. 
322 Robert Cryer, ‘Royalism  and the King Article  21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of Sources 
(2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review ,390,391; David Hunt, The International  Criminal Court :High 
Hopes , Creative Ambiguity “ and the Unfortunate Mistrust in international Judges; (2004) 2Journal of 
Criminal Justice ,56. 




makes an apology.”323This development highlights the intersection between law and 
culture. The clash between the Hema cultural precedent and the dictates of the law 
reminds us of the connection between law and culture. At this stage, the affected 
jurisdiction context cannot be entirely detached from prosecution, sentencing and 
review. 
Therefore, the ICC’s failure to meet victims’ expectations is attributed to the ICC's 
restrictive/liberal approach to sentencing. Basset and Drumbl opine that international 
sentencing is primarily influenced by objective universalism.324 From the universalist 
approach, consistent rules that preclude subjectivism and moral relativism are the 
appropriate methods for determining the sentence.325  The observed difference between 
the imposed sentence and the victims' projections in this study reveals a transformative 
ICC approach towards sentencing. One could infer that the ICC was lenient about this 
sentencing. It strengthens the place of rehabilitation of convicts within a purely 
retributive goal. While the ICC aims to work towards rehabilitative justifications for 
sentencing, the victims expected a strictly punitive sentencing approach. This finding 
accords with Schabas argument that international sentencing should be guided by 
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human rights principles which enhances rehabilitation objectives rather than purely 
retribution goals.326  
Suppose the ICC’s justification for sentencing is rehabilitation. The approach connotes 
that it accords priority to the offender's needs over the victims or balances the difference 
between offender and victims.327With this, the support of the communities is usually 
required. The sentence does not preclude general deterrence and the ‘expressive notions 
of punishment’. Sloane, in his study, posits that international punishment should have 
the value of expressing punishment.328Sloane’s argument does not reference 
proportionality, but there must be a value of expressing a sentence, which could be 
incapacitation or other objectives.329 Perhaps, because the international crimes 
committed within this context is on a large scale, and regarded as a mass atrocity, the 
victims had expected a ‘severe’ penalty for Katanga. It is suggested that the court strike 
a balance between considering the victims' concerns and interests and the integrity of 
the sentencing process.  
Having discussed the findings in Katanga, the next section shall explore how to address 
sentencing with restorative justice and procedural justice. 
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4.7.8 Procedural and Restorative justice: A viable way to enhance victims' impact 
on the sentencing outcome? 
Sentencing is the pinnacle of the criminal process.330It unravels the punishment and its 
justifications; the most public face of the criminal trial.331 Plausibly, procedural justice 
and restorative justice are pathways to enhance victims’ experiences during the 
sentencing process. Suppose the court effectively utilises Victim Impact 
Statement(VIS) vis-à-vis procedural justice and restorative justice elements. In that 
case, combining these two will positively impact the sentencing outcome and victims’ 
satisfaction with the sentencing decision. 
Findings reveal that victims participate through verbal and written submissions; the 
impact of this medium of participation on the sentencing decision is minimal. One 
implication of this observation is that the balance of different views on victims' rights 
and interests results in extra weight and values of submission of victims in sentencing, 
which is subject to judicial discretion. 
VIS332 is a written or verbal statement by the victims presented to the court at the 
defendant's sentencing.333  Thus, as a medium, VIS expresses victims’ emotions and 
concerns about the implications of the crime on them. It is worthy of mentioning that 
there are pros and cons to VIS. VIS proponents contend that it is a medium for victims 
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to emote and express themselves about how the crime affected them.334 With VIS, 
victims are allowed to tell the court the effect of the crime on them. The input of victims 
is likely to contribute towards the restoration of their dignity.335 As good as it sounds, 
we should be careful not to allow victims’ emotion to override the sentencing decision.  
VIS critics have cautioned that the stage of intervention-sentencing is rather too late to 
address victims’ suffering.336  They also argue that VIS may tilt the balance of justice 
because it is a victim's subjective expression.337Some have contended that VIS is not 
suitable for an adversarial system that focuses on the Prosecutor and the defendant. It 
may disrupt the notion that crime is committed against the state, not an individual.338 
They also argue that it may blur the objectivity of the decision-maker.339This argument 
overlooks the role of victims’ harm in aggravating the sentence. While also questioning 
the proportionality between the gravity of the crime to the seriousness of the 
punishment. Probably, VIS might be situated within the context of retributive justice, 
as an aggravating factor. However, we have to be careful not to raise the expectations 
of victims with VIS inadvertently.  
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 Manikis contends that the use of VIS is not clearly articulated; as such, there are 
inconsistencies as to its effectiveness during criminal proceedings.340 She categorised 
VIS into instrumental and expressive.341From her perspective, VIS is instrumental 
because it is regarded as a procedural right that empowers victims with an active role 
to influence the decision-making process.342Thus, it intends to accomplish victim 
satisfaction, belonging and visibility in the sentencing phase. 
Through the expressive function of VIS, the victims’ voice may be heard and probably 
acknowledged during the sentencing process.343 The reminiscent part is considered 
empowering for victims. Studies show that VIS could have a therapeutic benefit for 
victims.344Such therapeutic function could be healing or closure.345The VIS performs 
an expressive function which might influence the outcome of the sentencing. However, 
there are still controversies as to the primary role of VIS in sentencing. 
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The expressive function of VIS also includes ‘emoting’. This role relays a message to 
the court, the offender or the public about the harm suffered.346 As mentioned earlier, 
the expressive function of VIS can be therapeutic.347 It is noteworthy that the 
therapeutic benefits of VIS may not be one size fit all; it may not work for every victim. 
While VIS may aggravate sentencing, at the same time, and reassure them that the court 
validates their emotions. Presumably, it becomes empowering for victims because they 
have a degree of control on the sentencing hearing. There is, therefore, a definite need 
for VIS because it engages the emotions of victims. VIS explores the reactions and 
impact of harm on victims. Arguably, VIS is an approach which could effectively 
combine elements of retributive justice and restorative justice at the sentencing hearing.  
As mentioned earlier, the expressive function of VIS aims to grant victims a voice in 
criminal proceedings with implied therapeutic benefits.348A channel which establishes 
an interaction between the judge and victim, victim and offender.349 While it evokes 
emotions, the interaction between the victim and the offender might reinforce the 
crime's consequences on both participants. It is interesting to note that the victims and 
offender have an encounter in the court at this phase. Conceivably, the extent of the 
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meeting is curtailed because it is best situated within an informal setting.350 The 
sentencing hearing may not be entirely appropriate in effecting the role of restorative 
justice via VIS.  In a way, the sentencing process as a part of criminal prosecution is 
considered a mechanism of transitional justice. Criminal prosecution is one of the 
mechanisms of transitional justice.351 It is sketchy if the Rome Statute or Rules 
provisions refer to VIS because it is not applicable at the ICC. One explanation of this 
could be that the large number of victims involved will become impracticable for 
individual victims to read out their VIS during sentence hearing. Nevertheless, VIS 
offers direct participation for victims during sentencing. Unfortunately, it is not 
applicable at the ICC. 
It is noteworthy that Story-telling does not perform the same function as VIS. 
Storytelling is distinct and shares some similarities with VIS like establishing the 
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truth,352healing353 and giving victims a voice.354 At the ICC, an aspect of victim 
participation permits story-telling during the trial process, not at the sentencing hearing. 
Victims’ narrative contributes to truth-finding and historical records.355The sentencing 
hearing precludes story-telling.  
We should be careful not to raise victims’ expectations as their expression may be 
symbolic with no substantial effect on the decisions. We should note that it is one thing 
for victims to voice out, while it is another for their voices to be heard and influence 
the outcome. Moffett draws our attention to the distinction between giving victims a 
platform to ‘voice their views’ and ‘considering their interests’ in sentencing.356He 
believes that Victim Personal Statement(VPS) is a channel the criminal justice system 
may use to acknowledge “victims experience, rather than engendering harsher 
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sentence”.357 The VPS may impact the sentence; a means to an end. Nevertheless, 
procedural justice enhances their potential to go through this process in fairness.  
Furthermore, some restorative justice elements are portrayed in the sentencing hearing, 
and sentence review of both cases.  The crucial factors are the process, the parties, the 
stake, the crime, the agreement, the aftermath and the consequences of the violation. 
The sentencing hearing is the process; the victims and the offender (convicted person) 
as “stakeholders” are the ‘directly affected’participants.358However, both parties 
indirectly participate in the sentencing process through their legal representatives; a 
restriction is absent within informal settings of restorative practices. In this instance, 
the scenario reinforces the analogy of Christie-property has been stolen from the 
original owner and taken over by the prosecutor and legal representatives of the directly 
affected.359 Arguably, asides from the formal settings, presumably, victims' indirect 
participation through their LRVs may sabotage restorative practices during the 
sentencing hearing.  
Be that as it may, for a successful process and outcome of restorative justice, both 
parties must exhibit willingness and voluntariness to participate actively in the 
process.360 One of the parties does not participate voluntarily or hesitates to carry out 
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any activity necessary for the procedure's progress, which would impact the outcome 
and victims’ satisfaction. Van Camp and Wemmers’ study explains that victims 
satisfaction with restorative justice exceeds the procedural justice model.361  While 
procedural justice is partly responsible for victims’ satisfaction with restorative 
practices, they found that flexibility, care, central dialogue and pro-social 
motives(helping, sharing and comforting) partly contribute towards victims satisfaction 
with restorative justice.362Unfortunately, it appears these factors are absent at the 
sentencing hearing of the ICC. As mentioned earlier, the ICC setting is strictly 
conventional. It is challenging for these elements to be factored in-a limitation to the 
practicability and outcome of applying the restorative justice approach. Therefore, the 
Rome Statute compromises some indispensable retributive features and legitimate 
restorative practices, making the process predominantly retributive. 
Truth commissions and reparations schemes are mechanisms which advance restorative 
interests because of the absence of prosecutions. Truth-telling, narratives, and symbolic 
reparations like public apologies and monuments represent victims' formal 
acknowledgement of victims' ordeal and offender responsibility.363It is noteworthy that 
criminal prosecution may sabotage the accomplishment of a restorative approach 
because most times, the defendant/accused denies the charges by entering a non-guilty 
plea. Subsequently,  both parties contest the non-admission of guilt in the proceedings. 
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Even post-conviction, convicts like Lubanga denied the crimes he committed. These 
elements of prosecution are impediments to successful incorporation of restorative 
justice in criminal trials.  
The following section shall discuss the three pillars of restorative justice within the ICC 
context and the cases mentioned above. 
4.7.8.1. Encounter  
This phase involves a face-to-face meeting between the offender and the victims.364A 
critical aspect of the encounter is that the participation of all stakeholders must be 
voluntary.365 The accused is referred to as an offender. Encounter ensures 
communication between both participants to narrate their experiences, emote and 
express the consequences of the harm they suffered. The dialogue at this phase assists 
in “collaborative problem-solving approach”.366Some of these elements of encounter 
are illustrated in both sentence hearing and review. The use of narratives via victims’ 
observations and submissions is restricted in the criminal trial but mostly 
accommodated in TRCs. 
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From the victims’ statements, it appears they were vindictive rather than problem 
resolution.367 The use of legal language also increases the tension and robs the hearing 
of basic restorative elements. One could not have expected a less conservative 
environment given the context of the ICC. An encounter modelled after the first pillar 
of restorative justice by Van Ness and Heetderks Strong is unworkable during the ICC 
sentencing hearing. Perhaps, the use of the VIS as the voice of victims and fulfilment 
of procedural justice could become practicable during the sentencing hearing. 
Nonetheless, the encounter procedure requires the absence of a process to determine 
punishment, which is not feasible in a traditional retributive arena. 
The sentence review considers every participant’s interests by addressing points raised 
in the sentence, reviewing any improvement by facilitating interaction between the 
participants. For instance, in the second review, the convicted person, Mr Lubanga 
proposed a public ceremony to meet with the victims and offer his 
apologies.368Similarly, the sentenced person, Mr Katanga suggested he would meet 
personally with victims to apologise to fulfil the condition of ‘significant action’ as 
stipulated in the Statute and rules. The panel recommended a face-to-face between Mr 
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Katanga and the victims, provided the latter were willing to be involved.369The 
convicted persons' proposed encounter and the panel's sanction simulates an ideal 
encounter for restorative practices. 
The presence of judges, LRVs and evidence examination may also hinder the outcome 
agreement as it is best achieved within a relaxed social context. The encounter set the 
stage for amends and re-integration.  
In the following part, the researcher briefly discusses amends and draws comparison 
from the context of ICC sentencing hearing. 
4.7.8.2 Amends 
Amends is the role of the offender to address and repair the harm suffered by the victim. 
The outcome is usually to heal the individuals from the consequences of the harm and 
wrongdoing.370 The offender’s acknowledgement of the offence, as well as an apology, 
is a step towards taking responsibility for the crime he has committed. At this phase, 
the main issue is the offender's willingness to acknowledge the crimes they committed, 
feel remorseful and tender sincere apologies.371 These questions arose in the Lubanga 
case; the victims disputed the sincerity of his apology and remorsefulness.372 
 
369 Transcripts of Sentence Review Hearing; Mr Katanga’s Submission, paras 82.84; HRC/TJI 
Observations on Reparations,para.86. 
370 Katherine Van Wormer and Lorenn Walker, In Van Warmer and Lorenn Walker (eds) ,Restorative 
justice today:Practical applications ( 2013) Journal of Restorative Justice, 255 
371 Ibid. 
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In Lubanga and Katanga, victims lamented about the lack of remorse and insincere 
apologies from the sentenced persons, Lubanga and Katanga, respectively.373 The 
reluctance of both convicts to show remorse and offer genuine apologies demonstrates 
the limitations of the court's role in the process of restorative justice. Their 
unwillingness may impede rehabilitation. The convicted person, Lubanga, refused to 
acknowledge his crimes; his lack of remorse and sincere apology reveals an unrepentant 
offender's implications on the restorative justice process. A reference to Doolin’s 
proposal supports the idea of using coercion to ensure a stakeholder’s(offender) 
presence in the restorative justice process.374 Coercion may be unworkable in practice 
as it may sabotage both process and outcome. We should bear in mind that at this point,  
apology from the convict should be voluntary. Coercion is not an effective strategy to 
receive an apology from the convict. Nothing could have been done to persuade the 
offender; Lubanga; even imprisonment could not induce him to apologise to the 
victims. Voluntariness/willingness on his part was required.  
The convicted person’s remorse and sincere apology are factors that the judges assess 
at sentencing and sentence review. Metrics for character assessment and improvement. 
 
373 Second Decision on the Review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Thomas Lubanga  Dyilo P.9 
Para.20; para 39; Observations of Legal Representatives of Victims V01,para.12; Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-
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374 Katherine Doolin, “But what Does it mean? Seeking  definitional clarity in restorative justice, 
(2007)71(5)Journal of Criminal Law 427-440. 




The convict’s remorse and sincere apologies have contributed towards the mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances as well as sentence reduction. However, assessing 
contrition and sincere apology has undoubtedly led to controversy between victims and 
convicts because of differing conforming standards. 
Victims’ reactions to the convicted person's apathetic attitude indicate they value 
remorse and sincere apology from the perpetrators. It is hard for an offender who had 
persistently denied the charges to accept responsibility and tender apology. Lubanga 
and Katanga were reluctant in accepting the responsibility of the crime committed. It is 
interesting to note that the Chamber and the panel(sentence reduction)  established their 
obligations in this respect. Of utmost importance are the Chamber’s assessment of 
whether the offenders’ apologies were genuine and the victims' remorsefulness.375 This 
is inferred from the conditions set out in Rule 145. 
Victims may obtain closure from apologies because it validates the offender’s 
acknowledgement of the crimes committed. Apology increases solidarity between the 
stakeholders and reasserts the identities of the parties involved.376One could classify an 
apology as making amends-a component of restorative justice. It is commendable that 
the Chamber considered the absence of admission from the sentenced person and the 
ingenuity of the convicted person’s apology to reduce the sentence. It reveals that the 
remorse and sincere apology are significant in mending a broken relationship between 
 
375 Rule 145(2) of the RPE 
376 Lawrance Sherman, Heather Strang , Caroline Angel, Daniel Woods, Geoffrey Branes, Sarah Bennet 
and Nova Inkpen, ‘Effects of face-to-face restorative justice on victims of crime in four randomised, 
controlled trial’ (2005)Journal of Experimental Criminology,367-395,368. 




the victims and the sentenced persons(perpetrators). An acknowledgement of the 
convicted person's crimes indicates accountability by the perpetrator and validates the 
victims' harm. Acknowledgement which usually comes before an apology contributes 
largely to making amends. The Perpetrators’ reluctance to take responsibility for the 
crimes is typically connected to the guilty plea. One of the conditions for a successful 
restorative justice process is that the offender accepts responsibility and makes a guilty 
plea at any point of the proceedings.377In criminal trials, the accused(now convicted 
person) mostly contest their guilt. The acceptance of responsibility contributes towards 
the establishment of truth. Therefore, the absence of a guilty plea could potentially 
affect a successful restoration. The hesitation of the sentenced persons to tender, sincere 
apologies to the victims supposes lack of willingness to rectify the damage. 
Unfortunately, the Court cannot coerce the perpetrators to make amends. All parties 
must participate voluntarily. However, it can facilitate an encounter between the victims 
and convicts to facilitate reconciliation. Perhaps, suppose the ICC can arrange a pre or 
post-sentence restorative justice process for victims.  
In that case, it is commendable that the ICC provided victims to participate directly and 
indirectly during the criminal justice process, which gives an accent of the restorative 
justice activity. However, this is fettered with use of LRVs and the restraints of criminal 
justice procedures. The few victims who participate directly may not represent the 
 
377Ministry of Justice, ‘Pre-Sentence restorative justice’ 
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interests of the larger percentage of victims. One implication of this is the promotion of 
tokenism for victims participation. 
While restorative justice is not a substitute or the opposite of retributive justice,378 the 
court can simultaneously use both to address the wrong and harm. Inevitably, in a 




As the third pillar of restorative justice, the goal is to reinstate the victim and the 
offender into the community.379 After the commission of the crime, both victims and 
offenders often face stigmatisation from family, friends and the community.380 
Sometimes, victim-shaming and victim-blaming may lead to ostracization of some 
victims while the offenders may become vilified. In such a situation, victims and 
offender require a support system to promote their re-entry into community life.381 
Reintegration also includes rehabilitation of the offender and rebuilding the offender’s 
relationship with their communities.382It is noteworthy that rehabilitation is the third 
arm of retributive justice, supposedly, restoration of the offender commences in the 
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correctional facilities. Rehabilitation can occur during sentence execution and after the 
offender has been released. After the release, reintegration of the offender begins.  The 
state can continue rehabilitation. Braithwaite notes that asides from offenders and 
victims, communities also need to be restored. 383 The community is defined as 
members of  ‘micro-community’ and ‘macro-community.’384 The micro-community 
has been described as a victim’s or offender’s relatives, friends and neighbours. Macro-
community indicates ‘ethnic group’ and volunteer community participants representing  
‘community interests.’385 Both are necessary for re-integration.  
The role of the community in re-integration is indispensable; it is necessary as a third 
party.386 Rule 233(a)-(c) are requirements of resocialisation and re-integration which 
are mandatory to support sentence reduction.387 For the practical outcome, the 
community must have a working knowledge of the criminal justice system as well as 
the rationale behind sentencing. It follows that the ICC could contribute towards re-
integration through the implementation of positive complementarity. The ICC’s 
collaborating with the community by disseminating information and enlightening the 
participants on the criminal justice system's purposes would suffice. In this instance, 
the ICC might give recourse to the principles, rules, laws, norms and values of the 
domestic jurisdiction affected rather than its(ICC) laws. It is also worthy of mentioning 
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that the ICC rules on the reintegration of the offender and victims are limited. The Rome 
Conference negotiations show the Rome Statute's intention to implement more humane 
values and less lengthy sentences in compliance with limitations obtained from human 
rights standards.388One could argue that the leniency of punishment does not preclude 
retribution or deterrent function; rather, the rationale behind this liberal approach is to 
encourage offenders' rehabilitation. 
Doubts remain as to the extent of ICC’s role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
convicts. Rehabilitation is preventive-reduces recidivism-at the same time ensures the 
reintegration of the offender into the society.389In a similar vein, offender rehabilitation 
is a form of punishment and a condition for early release. It is an offender-centred 
treatment mechanism and intervention.390However, the absence of an individualised 
programme for the restoration of international prisoners and post-sentence strategy 
question the effectiveness of conviction and sentencing. It seems the ICC disconnects 
from evaluating the convicts time in prison. 
 
388Rold Einar Fife, ‘Appplicable Penalties’ in Otto Triffrere and Kia Ambos (eds) Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court :A Commentary (Third Edition  Beck and Hart 2016) 1879; UN Statndard 
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Hola, in her research titled, “When justice is done”  describes the offender rehabilitation 
program as “poorly.”391 She submitted that the system could not support the restoration 
and reintegration of convicts. From her interview, she observed that the prison officers 
are not ‘sufficiently trained’ to promote offender rehabilitation in these 
facilities.392Thus, one would conclude that the deficiency in the reformation and 
reintegration of these perpetrators would mean a loophole in the justice system—a futile 
effort to transform offenders.  
Lubanga served his term in  Makala local prison, Kinshasa, DRC. On 15 March 2020, 
after completing his time, Thomas Lubanga was released amidst jubilation by 
Kinshasa's residents.393 He immediately celebrated his release at a Church with 
different attendees, including the Senate's second vice president.394This celebration saw 
the grand entry of the ‘innocent messiah’ in DRC. 
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As explained by  him: “you know me better than these three international court judges 
who tried to present me as a devil, I remain Thomas Lubanga, who suffered with you 
in 2002 - 2003, during this conflict in Ituri I remain  the same to you, my people.”395 
From Lubanga’s address, one could infer the absence of remorse and his persistent 
reluctance to take responsibility for the war crimes; an issue which the victims raised 
during the sentence review. Most of the residents celebrated, and his statement 
portrayed him as a victor. It does not appear that the correctional facility made any 
impact during his incarceration. With this, his reintegration back into the society may 
be smooth. Nonetheless, one ponders on the reactions of Lubanga’s victims.   
The following section shall summarise this chapter. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to discuss the justification for punishment and found that retribution 
and deterrence are the main reasons behind sentencing in international sentencing, 
especially at the ICC. The criminal justice system’s foundation is retributive justice. 
Empirical study finds that criminal prosecution does not deter crime.396 However, it 
could foster compliance and ensure the international rule of law. Primarily, retribution 
is the rationale behind sentencing. Deterrent, rehabilitation, and some restorative justice 
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elements might be found in the ICC's sentencing decision. Some aspects of restorative 
justice within the criminal justice system(ICC) mirror a holistic approach towards 
victims’ position at the ICC. 
The thesis has also shown that victims’ role in sentencing is very restricted; thus, they 
have a relatively low impact on the sentencing decision. The extent of the applicability 
of their participation is subject to judicial discretion. Understandably, the Court must 
take caution when considering the impact of LRVs observations and submissions in 
sentencing. At times, the court’ sentence requires objectivity because emotions and 
vengeance may obscure most victims' expectations. The chamber compromises the 
victims’ expectations and the convicted person's right, which results in a liberal 
approach. The Rome Statute envisages the humane treatment of a convicted person as 
opposed to strict punitive measures.  
Concerning the central question in this chapter,  it is also shown that victims can 
participate, however in a restrictive means through written submissions and 
observations. Victims’ complaint about the lack of proportionality between the gravity 
of the crime and severity of punishment reveals the disparity between the norms, rules 
and principles in their jurisdiction and the ICC's approach to the declared sentence. The 
Katanga case is a perfect illustration of victims’ dissatisfaction with the declared 
sentence. They complained that the punishment was not proportionate to the gravity of 
the offence. Some of the victims were disappointed at the sentencing outcome.397This 
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result connotes victims’ interests in sentencing as opposed to Ashworth’s assertion that 
victims have no interests in sentencing.398Victims may perceive sentencing outcome 
and their participation in sentencing as an exercise of their right to justice. 
Unfortunately, the ICC sentence may not always meet victims’ expectations. For 
victims, there is a thin line between justice, and vengeance.-The opposition of victims 
against the declared sentence reveals ICC’s challenges in managing victims’ 
expectations. A reasonable approach to tackle this issue is to strike a balance between 
victims’ interests in sentencing and the justification of sentencing by the court. 
Additionally, the court may also need to enhance victim participation during sentencing 
by increasing restorative function of dialogue. One explanation for this is the absence 
of statutory provision and arrangements for the sentenced person’s reintegration into 
society.  
In a similar vein, the sentence decisions show the disparity between norms and cultural 
differences. Presumably, the victims' displeasure with the declared sentence illustrates 
a discrepancy between the Congo’s criminal justice system and the ICC. In most 
domestic jurisdictions, law overlaps with their culture. Thus, the law cannot be entirely 
detached from their norms and culture, one of the reasons while the victims rejected Mr 
Katanga’s offer apologise because the norm of Hema culture dictates that an offender 
must make amends an apology. The culture of the affected national jurisdiction filters 
into the sentence review. 
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The absence of expressive justifications for penalties in the Rome Statute, Rules and 
Regulations reveals the ambiguity in interpreting the ICC rationale for sentencing. 
From the declared sentence of the convicted person, it appears that the justification for 
international sentencing is not mainly centred on retribution, rather, general deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and some restorative justice elements are all involved. One could also 
argue that the sentencing of the ICC is lenient and influenced by western ideas. Studies 
suggest that in some third world countries, the more severe the offence is, the harsher 
the punishment.399That is why some third-world countries reward such punishment 
with harsher punishment like a death sentence and longer term of imprisonment. It is 
commendable that the court recognised the importance of the convicted person’s 
apology to the victims and the expression of regret and remorse by the offender, which 
enables the restorative function. 
Moreover, since the judges are usually from different jurisdictions; civil and common 
law jurisdictions, we should bear in mind that while some judges may be pre-defendant 
rights, some may be pro-victims rights. The implication of this is that such differences 
may lead to division in reaching consensus. The pro-victims judges may be more 
interested in the emancipation of victims’ rights in trials while the pro-defendant judges 
may be rigid in considering victims’ rights. 
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Restorative justice process may provide a context for forgiveness and reconciliation, 
especially in community settings.400Admittedly, there is no pure model for restorative 
justice activity/process.401It is clear from the sentencing process that the Rome Statute 
and the Rules of Evidence and Procedure infused some elements of restorative justice. 
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of restorative justice outcome can be subverted in the 
absence of guilty plea by the offender as well as refusal to participate in such activity. 
To conclude this section, it has been shown that their participation in sentence decision 
is minimal despite victims' empowerment at the sentencing hearing phase. Their 
participation is not absolute; the influence of such participation is subject to judicial 
discretion. 
The sentence review seems to embrace emoting and resolving the damaged relationship 
between the offender and victims rather than a more punitive approach. It also 
incorporates rehabilitation and reintegration of the convicted person; however, there 
seems to be a gap in the offender's restoration because the ICC does not monitor 
correctional facilities' role in transforming the victims. The convict might feign 
adherence to the conditions and factors(Article 110(4) and Rule 223) of good 
behaviour, prospects, reflections, individual characteristics and acknowledgement of 
responsibility for early release. 
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The next chapter describes the summary of the thesis and recommends a future solution. 




5.0 Chapter 5 
5.1.Conclusion 
The main goal of the thesis was to examine how the ICC has managed victims’ rights 
and interests through three themes, namely(1) prosecutorial discretion, (2) trial process 
and (3) sentencing. The researcher critically explored these themes to assess how they 
impact victims interaction at the ICC. 
 
Victims interests in this context are described as personal, as opposed to the 
Prosecutor’s interests which is general(community interests). Although, one may argue 
that some  Prosecutor’s interests overlap with the victims’. In the determination of the 
personal interests of victims, the Court uses a case-by-case assessment.1 Nevertheless, 
this unfettered power could become a double-edged sword metaphor, which might 
disproportionately affect victims access to justice. As put by Aptel, such victims would 
fall into the impunity gap.2 
 
With its broad discretionary powers, the independent prosecutor, which is ‘subject’ to 
the PTC, is the outcome of one of the compromises reached by the Rome Conference 
 
1 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 13 June 2007, International Criminal Court, Appeals 
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of the Appeals Chamber ‘ of 2 February 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-92513-06-2007 CB PT 0A8, para.11 
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negotiators; a decision made on state interests.3It is believed that the prosecutor's 
exclusive powers are to protect the integrity of the office in combating impunity. 
Chapter 2 has shown that, under the Rome Statute framework, the prosecutor enjoys 
considerable discretion even though the Pre-trial  Chamber is empowered to exercise 
checks and balances over the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or discontinue 
prosecution. The PTC’s reviews over the prosecutor’s authority to prosecute are 
limited. The exercise of these broad prosecutorial powers generally affects victims’ 
interests or in some circumstances, access to justice. For instance, the prosecutor’ 
decision to focus on some incidents, rather than others may leave some victims in an 
impunity gap. It can be seen in victims of SGBV, and cruel and inhumane treatment in 
both Lubanga and Katanga cases fell into the impunity gap.  The prosecutor’s influence 
starts from the selection of situation to cases and during trials-drafting of charges. 
Inadequate investigations relegated situations, and narrow charges might inadvertently 
preclude some victims from participating in the criminal justice and accessing remedy. 
This constraint could again emerge from gaps in the charging document, thereby 
jeopardising their interests.  
 
The prosecutor's exclusive powers to draft the charging document and his selection of 
situations and cases are contributing factors that could impede the victims access to 
justice. The controversial interpretation of Regulation 55 by the chambers in Lubanga 
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and the radical change made by the judges in Katanga case unravels the impact of 
prosecutorial discretion on victims. 
The prosecutor's obligation to investigate incriminating and exculpatory 
circumstances,4 and establish truth are conditions essential for objectivity in exercising 
the powers. The victims, as independent parties are also interested in truth and justice. 
Both interests emerge from the disruption of social order with different consequences 
for them. With victims, truth and their interests are on a personal level while for the 
prosecutor, he is duty-bound and exercising his powers. Accordingly, victims’ claims 
should be taken into consideration in the determination of justice.5The prosecutor has 
obligations to the victim, community, the court, and to the accused.6  
At the investigation stage, it is observed that victims are more interested in their 
recognition. In this phase, investigations are intense, and the identities of the 
perpetrators are sketchy. The acknowledgement of victims would be an adequate step 
to easing their fears and empowering them with a sense of belonging. The recognition 
of victims is set out in the 1985 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse. It is a measure of access to justice and fair 
treatment; a responsive process to victims' needs in the preliminary and investigation 
stages. Therefore, the investigation phase is as important as the trial phase for victims. 
 
4 Rome Statute 1998, Article 54(1)(a). 
5 Rome Statute, 1998, Article 53(2). 
6 Rome Statue 1998,Article 15(3), and 15(6), Article 19(3), Article 53; Article 54(1)(a); Rome 
Statute ,Preamble;;Article 61(4), Article 67, Article 69(4). 




The trial process reveals that tension still exists between the victims' rights and interests 
and the defendant's fair trial rights.7 This tension is further heightened when competing 
roles emerge from Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor and the defendant 
opposed the victims’ right to present evidence for the determination of truth. Victims 
cannot present evidence or question witnesses except with the chamber's authorisation, 
provided such request is exercised under Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute. The 
Chamber authorised the victims to present evidence, and question witnesses in line with 
Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, given that their personal interests are affected.8 To 
this end, there is fluidity in the third-party rights of victims. The personal interests of 
victims may attract some roles which would necessarily have been exclusive to the 
parties.  
 
 It has been shown that victim participation cannot fulfil all victims’ interests, for 
instance, regarding story-telling. Truth commission can complement the works of the 
ICC. The environment of TRCs is more suitable for victims’ healing and reconciliation. 
Some times victims rights and interests are secondary to the mandate of the ICC-
prosecution of the most responsible individuals for serious violation of human rights 
 
7Situation in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, The  Prosecutor  v. Thomas Lubanga  Dyilo, 
Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on 
Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeal Chamber, par.2 and 3, paras 67-104.;ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432 11-07-2008 1/44 ICC-01/04-01/06-1135;ICC-01/04-01/06-1136;Decision Granting Leave to 
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and humanitarian law. Therefore, there is a limit to the function of the ICC in achieving 
justice for victims.  
Edwards’ theory, which was discussed in Chapter 3, gives us a useful framework to 
analyse participation implications. Arguably, this dispositive theory, based on a 
reflection of victims’ significant control over the proceedings, is not applicable at the 
ICC. This submission is due to the statutory provision in article 68(3), which highlights 
judicial discretion, whereby the Court is in control, not the victims. With Edwards forms 
of participation, the analysis reveals that victims have no control over the proceedings 
and outcome.9 The dispositive category shows that the relationship between victims 
and the decision-maker mirrors the victims’ control over the processes.  
 
However, the non-dispositive category gives victims a degree of influence over the 
proceedings, as it places corresponding obligations on both decision-maker(judges) and 
the victims.10 While some of the roles of victims are voluntary, some may be 
mandatory. Nonetheless, victim participation enables them to exercise influence during 
the trial process, regulated by the court. It is worthy of mentioning that Edwards’ theory 
gives us an in-depth approach to the implications of participation rather than the 
competitive approach between victims’ rights and defendant rights.   
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In addition, it has shown that the application of victims’  procedural rights is limited. 
The restriction is not surprising as most human rights are not absolute.11 These 
procedural rights are exercised in such a manner that would not prejudice the rights of 
the accused.12 The use of procedural rights of victims ensures they access justice and 
participate efficiently during the trial process. The investigation into procedural rights 
has shown that while these rights enable victims to pursue their interests, the exercise 
of these rights is not absolute.13 We should note that the court's refusal to recognise and 
apply these rights during the trial process is likely to result in procedural injustice for 
victims. 
 
For effective participation rather than sheer tokenism, the ICC needs to enhance its 
engagement with victims. Clark opined that the physical, institutional and demographic 
barrier between the court and affected countries has been detrimental to the court's 
functions.14 The barrier is seen in the distanced ICC investigations and prosecutorial 
practices.15 The perceived distance is not unconnected to the court’s attempt at 
maintaining independence and impartiality.16 Unfortunately, the ‘distance’ has 
negatively impacted the court's operations and its interactions with victims. 
 
11 United Nations Charter 1945; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
12 Rome Statute 1998, Article 68(3). 
13 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Prosecutor v.Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-
Trial Stage of the Case, Pre-Trial Chamber 1,p.61. 
14 Phil Clark, Distance Justice:The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African 
Politics( Cambridge University Press 2018)25,304,379. 
15 Ibid; Christian De Vos, “Investigating from A far:The ICC’s Evidence Problem”(2013) 26(4)Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 1009-1024. 
16 Ibid. 





One more significant finding to emerge concerning sentencing is that victims are 
permitted to participate during a sentencing hearing via oral, written submissions and 
observations. Nonetheless, victim participation in sentence hearing is not a guarantee 
that their observations and submissions would impact the sentencing outcome. At this 
juncture, the court should compromise between the legitimate rights and interests of the 
victims and the rights of the accused. By Edwards’ analogy, they do not have control 
over the sentencing hearing or sentence outcome. There is an interplay of power and 
influence at this stage, which is shown in their observations and submissions before the 
court. Given that victims’ role in sentencing is restricted, they have a relatively low 
impact on sentence decision. 
The ICC's struggle to increase its focus on victims and strike a balance between 
retributive and restorative justice unravels during sentencing and sentence reduction. 
Factors such as the absence of a guilty plea by the convicted person and the sentenced 
person's reluctance frustrate the restorative justice approach. While there are elements 
of restorative justice such as interactions between the convicted person and victims, 
encounter, amends, and reintegration are best achieved in an informal setting, with 
cooperation from all stakeholders-victims offenders, and community. This activity 
could be implemented in the affected domestic jurisdiction with the monitoring and 
compliance by the ICC. 
There is a thin line between justice and vengeance; a clamour for a higher sentence for 
the convicted persons shows the quest for vengeance. On the other hand, it appears the 




ICC is liberal(western ideas) in mapping out a declared sentence for the convicted 
person. Consequently, the outcome reveals the disconnect between the expectations of 
some victims and the declared. Unfortunately, from their perspective, the gravity of the 
crime should be proportionate to the penalty. A lesser term in prison may be interpreted 
as undermining their suffering. A reference to their national jurisdiction reflects a 
perceived proportionality between the crimes' gravity and the severity of punishment. 
In some domestic jurisdiction, their criminal laws stipulate the justifications for the 
penalty's punishment and determination17. In the ICC context, neither the Rome Statute 
nor the ICC RPE set out the sentencing rationale. Scholars like Henham and Guzman 
pointed out this absence and criticised this gap in the Rome Statute and RPE 
provisions.18 With this in mind, the victims might not have grasped the rationale behind 
the sentencing. No provision lists retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation as the 
rationale for Rome Statute. As discussed somewhere in this chapter, there are 
speculations of deterrence and retribution as justifications for sentencing at the ICC. It 
is deduced from the preamble of the Rome Statute.19 Flowing from this, one may infer 
that the rationale/justification for sentencing is dependent on the discretionary power of 
the courts/judges. The single general provision on the imprisonment for all crimes was 
 
17 England and Wales Criminal Justice  Act 2003, c44pt12 s142; Criminal Code of Sentencing  1985, C 
c-46 ,s 718,4 
18 Ralph Henham. ‘Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials(( Ashgate 2005)15-
17;Ralph Henham, “The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing”  (2003) 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice ,64,85; Margeret Guzman,  ‘Proportionate Sentencing at the International 
Criminal Court ‘(2014)Temple University Legal Studies  Research Series(Research Paper  No. 2014-
2015. 
19 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision on Sentence, Trial Chamber I ,para. 16, Preamble of Rome Statute, 
paragraphs 4,5 and 9;Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Decision on  Sentence Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute,Trial Chamber II, paras 37--38 




intended to make judges role flexible since the requirements are not incompatible with 
the principle of legality.20One could not be certain if the declared sentence were 
primarily based on retribution or just desert theory. Although ‘Just desert’ theory might 
have been partly considered, the term of imprisonment seems to consider rehabilitation 
by striking a balance between retributive and restorative functions.  
In both cases, victims' objection to the declared sentence espouses the marked 
differences in the victims' cultural background and the Rome Statute's applicable law. 
According to article 77 and 78, in considering the appropriate sentence, the judges had 
to choose between life imprisonment and term of imprisonment, which is not higher 
than 30years. The Rome Statute did not codify the death penalty. In some national 
jurisdictions, DRC inclusive, the death penalty is capital punishment. The victims might 
have anticipated ‘severe or ‘capital punishment’ for the gravity of the crimes 
committed. 
Due to the lack of consensus regarding the law's adoption on penalties, the Diplomatic 
Conference's working group deleted it from the Draft Statute.21However, in 
consideration of appropriate sentencing, the judges could refer to Article 21(general 
principles of law derived by Court from national jurisdictions). Additionally, the 
application of capital punishment and death penalty was vehemently opposed by a large 
majority of the delegation based on its violation of human rights(dignity of the human 
 
20 Rolf Eina Fife “Article 77:Applicable Penalties”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos , In Rome Statute  
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Hart Publishing  2016)1881. 
21 Rolf Eina Fife “Penalties” in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos ,Rome Statute  of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Hart Publishing  2016)1501. 




person) and the possibility of rehabilitation.22   A reflection of the disparity between the 
progressive and conservative states. 
One could argue that sentencing outcome goes beyond proportionality; instead, it 
underscores both general and individual deterrence. The declared sentence serve as a 
just dessert for the convicted person as well as a deterrent function. Prior studies also 
note that deterrent as an arm of retributive justice serves a more rhetoric function then 
a pragmatic one.23Therefore, sentencing at the ICC drifts towards reforming the 
convict. The Rome Statute provisions and the ICC Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
mirrors a transformative approach towards retributive justice. A classic example is 
found in the strict conditions24 set out for the imposition of a life sentence and the 
exclusion of death sentence—an attempt to foster reintegration and rehabilitation of 
offenders. 
One notable point is the ICC's role and penal servitude in promoting the restoration of 
the offender. There are speculations about the outcome of rehabilitation for 
international prisoners, which raises the question of the degree of transformation the 
 
22 Ibid;Rolf Eina Fife “Article 77:Applicable Penalties”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos ,Rome Statute  
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Hart Publishing  2016)1879 
23 Ralph Henham, Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials(Ashgate Aldershot, 2005) 
24 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court ,228-
234;United Nations Document A/AC.249/WP.35;Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at its 
Session held from  1 to 12 December 1997, Annex V, Report of the Working Group on Penalties , UN 
Doc. A/AC.249/1997/l.9/Rev.1,p.18;Rolf Einar Fife, “Penalties” in Roy Lee(ed.) The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague Kluwer 1999)319-344;Rolf Einar Fife, 
“Article 77”, in Otto Triffterer(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court: Observers Notes, Article by Article(Brill Nijhoff 1999)985-998. 
 




sentenced person is exposed to post-conviction. It is crucial to assess the effectiveness 
of rehabilitation and the impact of the sentencing decision on the convicts. The 
assessment would enable us to weigh the outcome of sentencing on international 
criminals. If the Rome Statute aims to encourage convicts' reformation through a 
rehabilitation program(imprisonment), it is reasonable to examine international 
sentences' enforcement system. 
Since the ICC has not established a specialised prison for convicts, Article 103 of the 
Rome Statute stipulates that the sentenced person shall serve their term of imprisonment 
in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have agreed to accept 
sentenced persons. Given this situation, it implies that convicts' transformation is left 
under the host State's supervision. Therefore, one question that comes to mind if these 
prisons are well equipped for the rehabilitation of international prisoners. The study of 
Hola et al. advances answers to this question. Hola found that correctional facilities lack 
provisions for transforming the calibre of international prisoners.25 She noted that the 
staff were exclusively trained for local prisoners.26If the host prison is not upgraded to 
 
25 Justice Hub, ‘Expert:Rehabiltation of those convicted by international criminal tribunals is woefully 
inadequate’ accessible at https://justicehub.org/article/expert-rehabilitation-of-those-convicted-by-
international-criminal-tribunals-is-woefully-inadequate/ last accessed 17 November 2020;Barbora Hola 
and Jessica Kelder ‘Life after conviction at the international criminal Tribunals:An Empirical Overview’ 
(2014) 12 International Crimianl Justice, 109-132; Barbora Hola, Jessica Kelder and Joris van 
Wijk,’Effectiveness of International criminal tribunals :Empirical assessment of rehabiltaion as 
sentencing goal’ in  Nobio Hayashi and  Cecilia Bailliet, The legitimacy of international criminal 
tribunals (Cambridge University Press 2017) 351-375. 
26 Ibid. 




quality of reform, then the international prisoner is subject to the lower/poor standard 
of rehabilitation, defeating the purpose of sentencing.  
The section below moves on to give recommendations. 
5.2 Recommendation 
The question raised by this study is the extent to which the court respects victims’ rights 
and interests. The researcher divided the problem into three thematic categories; 
prosecutorial discretion, trial process and sentencing. 
The overall assessment of victims in the investigation, trial proceedings, and sentencing 
reveals that the ICC needs to improve victim engagement. To foster victim 
participation, the ICC needs to increase victim engagement from the investigation stage 
to the post-sentence phase.  There seems to be a gap between the operation of the court 
and victims. 
More research is needed to understand better why the ICC might need to incorporate 
VIS during sentencing. There could be a definite need for VIS because it engages the 
emotions of victims. Nonetheless, it could be unworkable because of the large numbers 
of victims involved in victims participation during this sentence hearing phase. 
Moreover, it is recommended that restorative justice practice may increase victims’ 
positive perception of the ICC, which could be done by striking a balance between 
victims' interests in sentencing and justification for sentencing. Henham posits that 
restorative justice “implies an approach to a punishment which is tolerant of the diverse 




contexts of criminality and capable of accommodating and realising its implications.”27 
With increased restorative justice elements, comes an enhanced victim role. However, 
the extent of applicability of the restorative justice approach during criminal 
proceedings is limited because of the structure of the criminal proceedings. The 
conventional context of the ICC negates an advancement of restorative justice. The ICC 
structure might not be suitable to incorporate full restorative activities. However, it is 
commendable that the ICC adopted more restorative elements to complement the 
punitive approach.  
Given that it is impracticable to include the full restorative justice process during the 
trial or sentence hearing. The ICC could complement its restorative function at the 
domestic jurisdiction of the affected State. This could be similar to the community-
Based Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. A viable recommendation since the ICC is not a ‘self-
contained’ institution- fragmented part of the international criminal justice system, 
based on pluralism.28  
It is revealed that neither the Court Statute nor rules make provision for the offender's 
reintegration after the sentence reduction. Arguably, this complementary practice is 
necessary to maintain stability and mend the relationship between the victims, offender 
 
27 Ralph Henham, Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials(Ashgate 2005)p.148 
28 Elias Van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiev, “Pluralism :A New Framework” in Pluralism in International 
Criminal Law  in, Elias Van Sliedregt & Serhey Vasiliev(eds) (2014)3, 10-11.  
 




and society. With this approach, recourse to the laws and principles guiding the 
domestic jurisdiction involved may fulfil victims expectations.  
Fulfilling victims’ expectations contributes towards the outcome of judicial processes. 
Substantive justice redresses the harm victims have suffered, and the causes of 
victimisation.29According to Bassiouni, judicial processes' outcome corresponds with 
an effective remedy in human rights law, which has developed three rights for victims 
of gross violation: truth; justice and reparations.30 These substantive rights can be 
effectively exercised and enforced within procedural fairness entrenched by the ICC. 
Another viable means of ensuring victim participation is a collaborative 
implementation of other mechanisms of transitional justice. The ICC employs criminal 
prosecution and reparations, at the domestic level. The use of truth commissions could 
complement storytelling and truth-telling as victims' participation, which brings us to 
positive complementarity. 
Besides, further research should investigate the relationship and impact of culture on 
the workings of the ICC. There is a connection between law and culture; therefore, there 
are instances where the domestic jurisdiction's culture and norms might clash with the 
court's statutory provisions. Research into this area will assist the efficiency of the court. 
 
29 Jo-Anne Wemmers,  ‘Victims’ Need for Justice :Individual  versus Collective Justice’, In Rianne  
Letschert, Roelof Haveman, Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Antony Pemberton (eds.), Victimological 
Approaches to International Crimes:Africa(Intersentia 2011) 148. 
30 Cheriff Bassiouni,  ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’  (2006) (6(2),.Human Rights Law 
Review,203-279. 




Perhaps, this would give us new insights and perspectives into the ICC's role in 
promoting transitional justice. 
Research might also explore the ICC's role in the reintegration of the victims and 
offenders in the community. It is suggested that the ICC should establish a unique 
rehabilitation centre for convicts to serve their term; this will ensure monitoring and 
compliance with standards. It is also noted that the convicts must be willing to partake 
in the rehabilitation. A sentenced person who denies responsibility for the charges and 
allegations may not be interested in his restoration. This information can be used to 
develop targeted interventions to supervise and upgrade offenders' correctional 
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  Appendix 
Victims’ needs  
A key aspect of victims’ life in criminal justice is their needs. Questions have been 
raised about the specificity of these needs. In some commentators opinion, Victims 
crave for information, participation and respect.31 The significance of victims’ needs is 
stated in the 1985 Declaration of principles; specifically, Principle 6(b) stipulates that 
victims' information upon their request and the consideration of their interests should 
facilitate the responsiveness of judicial and administrative mechanisms to the needs of 
victims.32It describes the requirements for the judicial mechanism or criminal trials to 
be responsive to victims' needs. The study of Strang suggests the needs of victims in 
international criminal proceedings include: 
“obtaining information on the progress and outcome of the case concerning them; 
being treated with respect and fairness; participating in the handling of the case that 
concerns them; making their voice heard, and obtaining economic and emotional 
redress.”33 
In another study, Zehr, a pioneer of the modern concept of restorative justice, submits 
the four types of victims’ needs. The need is information, truth-telling, empowerment 
 
31 Marijke Malsch and Raphaela Carrier, “Victims’ wishes for compensation : the immaterial aspect” 
(1999) 3 Journal of Criminal Justice.p239-239;Mina Rauschenbach and Damien Scalia , ‘Victims and 
International Criminal Justice: a vexed question? (2008) 90(870) International Review of the Red 
Cross,441-459,p.444.  
32 Principle (a) and (b) ,United Nations Declaration of  Basic Principles  for Victims of Crime and Abuse, 
1985. 
33 Heather Strang Repair and Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press 2002). 




and restitution or vindication.34 He observed that in most criminal justice processes, 
these needs appear to have been neglected. Victims require protection from risks 
associated with being vulnerable. In criminal prosecutions, when the perpetrator has 
been detained, this ensures victims’ safety.35  Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute 
confirms the assertion, which makes it a duty of the court to ensure that protection and 
safety measures are put in place for the victims by the court.36 Inevitably, some of these 
needs are incorporated into victims’ interests. In particular, victims' safety and security 




















34 Howard Zehr , The Little Book of Restorative Justice: Revised and Updated. (The Little Book of 
Justice and Peace building)13-14 
35 Ibid  
36 Rome Statute 1998, Article 68(1); Campbell McLaughlin, ‘Victim and Witness Measures of the 
International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis “ (2007) 6 The Law and Practice of the 
International Courts and tribunals,189; Robert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth 
Wimshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (First published 2007, Third 
Edition Cambridge University Press 2014 )486 
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